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Introduction 
 
 
The various articles in this volume emerge out of an international 
conference held at the Fujen Catholic University in Taipei, Taiwan on 
13-14 December 2013. Whilst the themes treated by these articles are 
quite diverse the conference at which they were presented shared a 
common purpose with the Council for Research in Values and 
Philosophy. The Council aims to bring scholars from different cultural 
and religious traditions together in order to pursue the goal of mutual 
understanding oriented towards helping cultures and religious 
traditions to flourish. In the particular case of this conference, the 
relationship between spiritual foundations and Chinese culture as 
considered from a philosophical perspective was the focus. Using a 
variety of philosophical methods the articles attempt to investigate the 
various ways the spiritual dimension is present in Chinese and 
western cultures. Some of the contributors took a comparative 
methodological approach, comparing and contrasting a Chinese and 
a western thinker or system of thought. Others took a more inter-
cultural approach seeing the interpenetration of systems of thought 
today as enabling and contrasting, and not merely as comparing 
between different cultures. Still others consider the analytical division 
between Chinese and western thought as in some ways inadequate. 
Whether because posing the Chinese and western binary immediately 
illicits the question what about the rest? The dynamics of globalisation 
seem unhappy with the singling out, perhaps artificially, of two 
particular cultures for comparison. Or, because in some ways the 
notion that thought happens in hermetically sealed cultural vacuums 
that can be compared or contrasted is itself problematic. As the 
canonical texts of world literature are now read in all cultures of the 
world there is a real sense in our present age that we have become a 
global culture sharing in a great diversity of classical texts. If this is 
indeed the case, then the reading of these canonical texts in different 
cultural contexts raises various hermeneutical questions, originating 
in ancient thought and developed in modern times that several 
scholars in this volume consider. 
Perhaps it is precisely because of globalisation that the question of 
the nature, scope, and place of the ‘spiritual’ has become so 
widespread today. There is now a clear sense that all particular 
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cultures and religious traditions are in one way or another limited. 
The mutual interaction between these itself points to a certain 
transcendence beyond any one culture or religious tradition. Whether 
this aspect of transcendence is seen as simply a regulative ideal of 
thought, an awareness of the limitation of one’s own horizons, or as 
the realisation that a certain global consciousness is emerging there is 
certainly a significant change happening in this respect. Previously 
tried formulas of ‘inclusivism’, ‘exclusivism’, and ‘pluralism’ seem 
inadequate to capture this new awareness. Rather, it seems as if in 
order for each tradition and culture to move forward a certain deeper 
dialogue is required. Such a dialogue is by no means easy to foster. 
The tendency of rather polite and often ineffective encounters has 
been to leave many dissatisfied with dialogues that seemed more 
about affirming what one already believed rather than about 
venturing into the unknown.  
But in considering the question of the ‘spiritual’ in the context of 
Chinese culture, a new opening seems to be emerging as China itself 
struggles to find its own pathway to modernity. As the evident 
economic progress of China is there for all to see so also is a quest to 
find a way in which this progress can remain in harmony with 
traditional values. But tradition and modernity are often difficult 
bedfellows. In the western world the story is not dissimilar. Nor, for 
that matter, is it much different in the Islamic world as it faces the 
same challenges of how to modernise and to remain faithful to its core 
values. It appears as if each part of the world is faced with the 
dialectical adventure of attuning itself to an emerging relation 
between tradition and modernity in this global age. This is why the 
‘spiritual’ as a problematic has taken its central place in global 
reflection. As horizons enlarge, parameters increase, and our capacity 
for information strorage and manipulation expands exponentially, we 
need a new compass with which we can direct ourselves. This new 
orientation, this desire for some way of discerning the better way 
forward at both personal and civilizational levels, is the spiritual 
question of our time. Whether the metaphor of “foundation” is the 
most appropriate for this is a matter for the reader to decide. One 
might also consider the metaphor of “horizon” as a way to describe 
the place, scope, and nature of the spiritual. The spiritual also 
provides a way of charting a direction in which the movement of 
progress should be heading and of generating a yardstick to assess, 
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and hence to criticise, wrong turns and cul-de-sacs in the dynamics of 
modernisation. This is a way to think of the role of the ‘spiritual’ in 
Chinese culture and indeed in all global cultures today. 
The hope of this set of essays is that from the various perspectives 
of the authors, something of this role of the ‘spiritual’ may be 
discerned. Partial, fragmentary, and no doubt in need of futher 
revision, the contributions presented here are honest and engaged 
explorations which earnestly seek to foster mutual enrichment and 
mutual understanding: themselves core values of the ‘spiritual’ in our 
days. 
 
Part I. Spiritual Foundation in Chinese Culture 
 
Chapter I, “Spiritual Foundations and Chinese Culture” by Robert 
Cummings Neville, proposes an ecological mode to explain the 
dynamic spiritual development of a culture. This article argues that 
the biological model of an evolving ecosystem better articulates how 
any given eco-harmony, such as of a spiritual sort, which is dependent 
on some conditions and independent of others, adapts in order to 
flourish. 
Chapter II, “Interpretation of Chinese Spirituality in an 
Intercultural Context—Methodological Considerations” by Vincent 
Shen, focuses on the methodology of interpreting Chinese 
philosophical and religious texts, especially those with spiritual 
implications, in the context of interculturalism. Proposing three levels 
of a dynamic contextualism, he argues for a hermeneutic approach as 
a better way for mutual understanding and mutual enrichment 
among different spiritual traditions. 
Chapter III, “The Daoist Sage in Modernity” by Edward 
McDougall, provides a middle way between complete seduction into 
modern life and an extreme ascetic or Luddite rejection of it. Thus, far 
from being simply out-dated, the ideal of the Daoist sage still remains 
relevant within westernised modernity. The author believes that in an 
age increasingly homogenious based on Europeanisation, it is 
important to look more deeply and seriously at such alternatives and 
to consider classical Daoist thought as a living tradition. 
Chapter IV, “Reflections on the Philosophical Foundations of 
Culture” by Corazon T. Toralba argues that differences found in 
cultures are a reflection of the wealth or poverty of (wo)man’s 
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understanding of her/himself and her/his world: the anthropological 
foundations of culture. The author uses the cultural matrix of Chinese 
history and thought as the means to expound this thesis. 
 
Part II Spiritual Horizon in Western Culture 
 
Chapter V, “The Spiritual Horizon of Philosophy in a Global Age: 
On the Intellectual Friendship between Jacques Derrida and Jürgen 
Habermas” by Anthony J. Carroll, explicates the spiritual horizon of 
philosophy and culture in our global age by exploring the intellectual 
friendship between Jacques Derrida (JD) and Jürgen Habermas (JH). 
The paper argues that the common theme of both of these 
philosophers, despite their differences, is a shared commitment to the 
spirituality of action which embodies the principles and values of 
justice, solidarity, and dialogue. 
Chapter VI, “A Catholic Theology of Energies in Terms of Bernard 
Lonergan’s Transcendental Method” by John Cheng Wai Leung, 
attempts to demonstrate the possibility of developing a Catholic 
theology based on the concept Qis, which derives from ancient 
Chinese culture and philosophy, and examines the validity of this 
Catholic theology of Qis with Lonergan’s well-known methodology. 
 
Part III. Comparative Study between East and West 
 
Chapter VII,“People are Born Religious: Perspectives from the 
Concept of Piety of John Calvin and the Sincerity of The Doctrine of the 
Mean” by Feng Chuantao and Zhao Weihua, carefully analyse the 
concepts of “Piety” and “Sincerity,” and explicate the nuances of these 
concepts respectively from the perspectives of John Calvin and The 
Doctrine of the Mean. 
Chapter VIII, “Comparing Christian and Buddhist Doctrines of 
Ignorance: Seng-chao and Nicholas Cusanus” by Ding Jianhua, 
provides a comparison between Christian and Buddhist Doctrines of 
Ignorance. This article concentrates on Nicholas of Cusa’s doctrine of 
“learned ignorance” and Seng-chao’s doctrine of “prajna ignorance.” 
After illustrating the commonality and differences between the two, 
the author concludes that Nicholas of Cusa and Seng-chao both 
denied in an apophatic way knowledge in order to emphasize its 
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limitation, yet neither of them completely abandons this knowledge 
as empty.  
Chapter IX, “Similarities in “Sheng-Sheng,” Meet in “Love”: 
Confucianism and Christianity” by Eum Jin Taik, suggests that the 
idea “sheng- sheng” in Confucianism and “love” in Christianity are 
similar to each other in many respects. Through a consideration of 
these concepts, the article argues that Christian thought and Chinese 
native Confucianism can further communicate with and 
accommodate each other. 
Chapter X, “Confucius’ Cosmology That Integrates “The Way of 
Heaven” and “The Will of God”: A Comparison with the Concept of 
Creation in the Bible” by Lam Yuet Ping, focuses on the Neo-
Confucian concept of “the Way of Heaven” (tiandao ??) and the 
creation theory of The Bible, and tries to show that these two theoretical 
systems are almost identical. 
 
Part IV Spiritual Manifestations in Aesthetics 
 
Chapter XI, “On the Influence of Phenomenological Aesthetics in 
Contemporary Chinese Aestheticians from the Mode of Thought - 
Taking Ye Lang, Zhu Liyuan and Zeng Fanren as Individual Cases” 
by Dong Huifang, discusses the work of certain Chinese aestheticians 
who are greatly influenced by Western phenomenological thought. 
With their focus on the subject-object relationship in aesthetics, these 
Chinese aestheticians’ inspirations, gained from a phenomenological 
approach, are investigated. 
Chapter XII, “Listening to Silence: John Cage and the Zen Buddhist 
Spirit” by Shang-Wen Wang, investigates John Cage’s controversial 
work 4’33’’ (1952) and the influence of Zen Buddhism. This article 
provides a way of seeing just how it is that different spiritual 
foundations can be encountered in a piece of music. 
Chapter XIII, “Created Truth and Remade Reality in Painting: 
From Jin Hao (833-917) to Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005)” by Katia 
Lenehan, compares the painting theory of Chinese painter and 
theoretician Jin Hao with that of Paul Ricoeur. This article emphasizes 
that, even though these two theories emerged in completely different 
cultural contexts, the texts of Jin Hao and Ricoeur provide us with 
very similar insights into painting. She argues that while there exist 
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subtle differences in their respective writings, these differences do in 
fact complement rather than contradict each another. 
Each of these articles in their own way seeks to contribute to a more 
profound thinking about the spiritual foundations of culture and the 
many forms of encounter between Chinese and Western cultures. The 
dialogue between diverse cultural-spiritual foundations, which a 
volume such as this represents, is part of the process of many ongoing 
encounters in our global age. The hope of this volume is that, at least 
in a modest way, these intellectual enquiries will contribute to the 
promotion of fruitful and harmonious encounters and processes of 
mutual learning that can be of universal benefit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part I 
Spiritual Foundations in Chinese Culture 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

1. 
Spiritual Foundations and Chinese Culture 
ROBERT CUMMINGS NEVILLE 
 
 
Introduction 
 
I am deeply grateful for the opportunity to address this conference 
on spiritual foundations and Chinese culture and will take the 
opportunity to treat the subject as seriously as I can. Both “spiritual 
foundations” and “Chinese culture” are ambiguous phrases and my 
intent is to sort out some of the most important ambiguities. 
To begin with “spiritual foundations,” the phrase can refer to the 
many foundational conditions for spiritual life that themselves are not 
especially spiritual in a religious sense. Among these are having a 
sufficiently settled life with food, safety, supportive companions, and 
a reasonably intact culture within which to articulate spiritual matters. 
Most of us can take these things for granted; but if we lived in Darfur 
right now, we would not expect much subtlety or depth of spiritual 
life because the foundational conditions are largely absent: we would 
be praying just to get through the night. I will say more about the non-
spiritual conditions for spiritual life in a moment, with illustrations 
from Chinese culture. 
“Spiritual foundations” also refers to the conditions for ascending 
to greater heights of spiritual development, getting deeper into the 
spiritual and its mature forms. Proximate levels of spiritual 
development are foundational for more ultimate ones. Here the 
languages, practices, and scriptures of a tradition are themselves 
spiritual but are really foundational for deeper levels of spiritual 
development. Most religious traditions, including the Chinese and 
Christian, mark stages of spiritual development each of which is 
foundational for the stages subsequent to it. Some forms of Buddhism 
distinguish 52 Bhumis, or stages of enlightenment. 
Finally, “spiritual foundations” refers to the role that various forms 
of spiritual life fulfill as foundations for other things, such as the arts 
and high culture, even for vitality in a whole society. Many people in 
the West—I won’t speak for Taiwan—complain that Western societies 
have lost their spiritual foundations and hence are more than usually 
unsure about the ground of obligation, about what human integrity 
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means, about attitudes toward significant others, about the meaning 
of life, and about the life-and-death contingency of existence, 
collapsing into nothing more profound than consumerism. 
The phrase “Chinese culture” has analogous distinctions to be 
made. What are the conditions within historical Chinese culture that 
make the specific cultures of Chinese spirituality possible? Confucius 
complained that they were absent in his time and he tried to rectify 
that. The Marxists in the Peoples’ Republic complained that those 
conditions were too powerful, keeping China in an unjust feudal state 
justified by bad spirituality, and tried to eliminate those aspects of 
Chinese culture that supported traditional spirituality. Chinese 
culture has also been fertile “foundational” soil for the “foreign 
religion” of Buddhism, which was the dominant Chinese spiritual 
culture during the Tong Dynasty. Some sociologists believe there are 
130 million Christians in the People’s Republic today, making it one 
of the largest Christian nations in the world, even though Christianity 
is still a small percentage of the overall population. 
“Chinese culture” secondly can mean its specifically spiritual 
dimensions as developed in Confucianism and Daoism with 
shamanistic and Buddhist influences and manifested in popular 
Chinese religion. Chinese spiritual culture, in ways I shall articulate 
shortly, is extraordinarily complex and multi-dimensional. The 
question of the compatibility of Chinese spiritual culture with 
Christianity has been an issue for a half-millennium. Surely, for 
Chinese Christians, Chinese Jews, and Chinese Muslims, their own 
spirituality is a special version of Chinese culture, however much it 
also contains different historical roots as well. 
Third, “Chinese culture” includes those aspects of culture in China 
that themselves depend on various spiritual dimensions of culture but 
that are not themselves particularly religious, such as art, moral 
practices and ideas, and many other things made possible by religion. 
It is difficult to assess these aspects of contemporary Chinese culture 
that are not themselves religious but that depend on other dimensions 
of culture that are religious. This is due to the suppression of religion 
for so many decades by the Communist government causing religion 
to take disguised forms. However, there are many examples from 
earlier periods. The most famous examples are those instances of 
Confucian moral and political policies that justified, to a limited 
extent, the claim that Confucianism is not a religion at all, but only a 
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moral way of life. Wang An-shih (1021-1086) was famous and 
influential as a political thinker, even though he was somewhat 
distant from the spiritual dimensions of sageliness and the cultivation 
of the Heavenly Principle associated with Neo-Confucian spirituality. 
Fourth, “Chinese culture” also refers to the influences and 
continuities of Chinese culture outside of China, and that in two 
senses. First, Chinese spiritual culture became very important, even 
dominant, in Korea, Japan, and southeast Asia, whose native cultures 
including racial ethnicity and language roots were very different from 
that of the Han Chinese. What was there in the native cultural 
foundations of Korea, for instance, that made it particularly hospitable 
to the Neo-Confucian spirituality of Zhuxi, whereas the cultural 
foundations of Japan made it more hospitable to the Neo-Confucian 
spirituality of Wang Yangming? The mixture of Chinese Buddhism 
and Confucianism that went to Japan gave rise to the deep spiritual 
and martial code of Bushido. However, very little like that happened 
in Korea where Chinese Buddhism and Confucianism were equally 
important. 
I have offered these illustrations of non-religious culture providing 
foundations for spiritual culture, of lower levels of spiritual culture 
providing foundations for higher levels, and of spiritual culture 
providing foundations for non-spiritual elements of culture in order 
to distinguish three meanings of “spiritual foundations” and how 
they might be exemplified in the Chinese case. Now I want to offer a 
more formal model of how to think about these things, and then return 
to discuss each one. 
 
The Ecological Model 
  
The basic model I want to present for considering spiritual 
foundations in the three senses mentioned comes from biology, and it 
works for most, although not all, of what needs to be understood. 
Consider this analogy: Suppose there is a pond in the woods. The 
pond is a complex biological ecosystem containing, among other 
things, the bacteria and other micro-organisms in the water, the plants 
growing on the bottom and on the shores (that line being variable with 
the water level), the fish, frogs, leeches and other animals living in and 
under the water, and the insects of many kinds that live on and about 
the surface, feeding on things in the water and reproducing on 
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adjacent plant-life. Each of these species is what I call an ecoharmony. 
A living ecoharmony has members with life-cycles of their own that 
reproduce and carry on their various activities in the larger pond 
ecosystem. Every ecoharmony has two kinds of components in terms 
of which it needs to be understood. First it has “conditional 
components” that consist of all that the individuals in the species need 
and receive from the larger ecosystem. For instance, fish need not only 
to have food in the larger ecosystem, but also the right conditions of 
temperature and water chemistry, places to breed, and so forth; 
different species of fish in the pond might need different conditional 
components. Second, every ecoharmony has “essential components” 
that make the species what it is; we usually think of DNA in this 
regard. Many different species can exist in the same pond because, 
although they have many of the same conditioning components, they 
have different essential components. Not all the species of fish eat the 
same things, however, or reproduce in the same places, and so differ 
with regard to their dietary and reproductive conditions. I call these 
ecoharmonies because each species is a harmony of its essential and 
conditional components. Prior to modern biology Aristotelian science 
was inclined to think of species in terms of their essence alone, making 
the conditions for them secondary. Now we should reject substance 
thinking and consider things to be harmonies, with their conditional 
components relating them to their environment being just as 
important to them as their essential components. 
I’ve been speaking of the species as an ecoharmony, but each 
individual within the species in the pond is also an ecoharmony; for 
the moment we can neglect this distinction. We should note that each 
component in an ecoharmony is itself an ecoharmony. The little fish 
or the plants eaten by big fish are themselves species with 
ecoharmonic structures even when they function as conditional 
components in the big fish. Each species of fish has an internal organic 
structure with substructures, each of which is an ecoharmony down 
to the molecular structure of the DNA. Put in another way, each 
species is a component of the larger ecosystem of the pond. The pond 
itself is an ecoharmony. It has its own “essential components” of the 
various species within it, but exists with the conditions of being in the 
terrain it is, with the chemical and biologic run-offs from the wider 
environment, depending on the chemistry and wildlife of the forest in 
many ways, and on the larger geology and climate of the area.  
          Spiritual Foundations and Chinese Culture          13 
 
The pond itself can be called a complex ecosystem, an ecoharmony 
with some integrity of its own, containing conditions from beyond the 
pond, but also containing many ecoharmonies within it. The 
ecoharmonies within the pond are more or less compatible with one 
another to the degree the pond’s ecosystem is stable. Each 
ecoharmony is dependent on some other ecoharmonies in the pond, 
but perhaps not all; some ecoharmonies can disappear without all the 
others disappearing. The asymmetries in the dependence relations are 
what are of interest when using the biological ecosystem as a model 
for understanding what is foundational about spirituality in the larger 
culture. The best way to understand the asymmetries is through the 
evolutionary dimension of the ecosystem. 
Imagine that a long time ago the pond was formed when a 
retreating glacier left it as a pocket of water over mainly bare rocks. 
Initially the pond water contained only primitive micro-organisms 
that could have survived under the glacier and also in a warmer 
climate. The micro-organism ecoharmonies that required the cold of 
the glacier died out. Grasses and grass-feeding animals moved into 
the surrounding area and their decayed remains and droppings 
entered the pond. This changed the chemistry of the pond water so 
that more species of micro-organisms which washed into the pond 
found the conditioning components they needed to survive as 
ecoharmonies, and their presence provided conditions for yet more 
things. Spring flooding allowed fish and other marine animals and 
plants to wash into the pond, insects from neighboring ponds flew in 
and birds dropped new seeds. The forest developed where there had 
been only grasses and more species of animals with their droppings 
and decay surrounded the pond. Most of these adventitious new pond 
ecosystems did not find the conditions they needed, but some did, and 
the pond grew in biological complexity. More particularly, within the 
pond spores arose with slightly different DNA than typical in their 
species. Some of these found the conditions they needed to survive, 
and so a new species emerged. This new species provided new 
conditions for yet other new species to survive and so some species 
unique to the pond evolved. With the new conditions in the pond, 
some of the ecoharmonies that previously flourished could no longer 
survive and died out. The other ecoharmonies that depended on them 
also died out. So the pond was constantly changing its internal 
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ecosystemic complexity, with some old ecoharmonies dying out and 
adventitious or emergent new harmonies coming in.  
Adopting this model for understanding spiritual foundations and 
culture, we can say that human societies and individual life are rooted 
in nature, a point Chinese culture has understood far better than 
Western cultures that think nature is made for humans to use for their 
own purposes. At any given time, human life is set within a vast 
complex ecosystem including the conditions of geography, climate, 
the flora and fauna local to specific places, some of which are 
necessary conditions for human nutrition, the kinds of social 
ecoharmonies necessary for human survival and flourishing, all 
nested within one another, and the cultural systems, religious 
traditions, economic conditions for material life, food production 
systems, educational systems, and systems of the architectural milieu. 
Please supplement this list with your favorite systematic conditions 
necessary or important for the flourishing of your spirituality. But 
don’t think of your spirituality only on its own terms. What you are 
likely to bring to mind as your spirituality’s own terms are only its 
essential components. Its conditional components, all those other 
ecoharmonies on which it is dependent, all the way down to basic 
biology and climate, are just as necessary to its identity as the essential 
components. Your spirituality’s true “own terms” include all those 
conditions systematically functioning in the complex ecosystem of life 
as well as the essential features by which you would ordinarily 
identify it. 
Now a crucial distinction needs to be made about the 
ecoharmonies in the complex ecosystems of human life. A given 
ecoharmony is dependent on certain conditions in its environment 
and not on others. Some other ecoharmonies can cease to exist and the 
given ecoharmony can still flourish, so long as the conditions on 
which it is dependent remain. Therefore, relative to other 
ecoharmonies, a given ecoharmony can be dependent or independent. 
For instance, human beings evolved in equatorial Africa, dependent, 
among other things, on that climate. But without changing their DNA 
they could migrate to colder climates by inventing warm clothing, 
snug dwellings, and the like. The colder climatic conditions, however, 
allowed for the evolution of new balances of DNA, such as reduced 
melanin in the skin. So we would say that the human species is 
dependent on a range of climatic conditions, but is independent of any 
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one of them, given the means to adapt. In matters of religion, the great 
missionary traditions always need some culture to inhabit but are 
independent of any one of those cultures in the sense that they can 
find other habitations. Buddhism, for instance, even died out in India, 
its birth-culture for centuries, while flourishing elsewhere. Of course, 
those other cultures allowed for all sorts of new forms of the religion, 
and in fact required some new forms for the religions to penetrate 
deeply into the new cultures. It is an interesting question whether the 
religions changed their “essential components” when migrating from 
one indigenization to another. Many people argue that Confucianism 
cannot migrate because it is too much defined by its East Asian roots—
though I have argued to the contrary in Boston Confucianism: Portable 
Tradition in the Late Modern World. 
As is obvious in the biological examples, ecosystems of 
ecoharmonies are dynamic and constantly changing, with different 
forms evolving to take account of changes in their conditional 
components. The same is true of religious practices including those 
associated with spirituality, although we frequently entertain the 
romantic notion that we are preserving the “ancient” or “pure” or 
“original” forms. 
 
Religion and Spirituality Defined 
 
My argument cannot move farther without paying attention to 
how to mark off religion and spirituality within the great ecosystem 
of human life. Defining religion is extremely controversial today and 
I am going to offer only a heuristic definition, that is, one that is useful 
for making distinctions appropriate to talking about spiritual 
foundations and culture. Religion is the human symbolic engagement of 
ultimate realities in cognitive, existential, and practical ways. By cognitive 
engagement I mean the gamut from myth and legend to sophisticated 
theology and philosophy, in many different forms in different 
cultures. By existential engagement I mean how individuals’ ultimate 
identities are formed in relation to what is ultimate in reality. By 
practical engagement I mean all the practices, both communal and 
personal, by which relations with what is ultimate are expressed and 
steadied.  
The heart of the definition, of course, is the reference to ultimacy. 
Let me quickly present my hypothesis about this, though without 
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much defense. The ultimate reality is an ontological creative act that 
creates everything that is determinate. No matter what you or anyone 
else believes the world is made of, from yin-yang vibrations to atomic 
particles, and no matter who turns out to be right, it has to be 
determinate. Anything determinate is contingent on being made. It is 
what requires the ultimate ontological creative act. That act is not 
determinate in itself apart from its creating the world. It has been 
symbolized in the West with metaphors of the person, from the 
frankly anthropomorphic imagery within the Bible to transcendent 
concepts such as the One, beyond any determinate distinction, and 
Thomas Aquinas’s notion of God as the pure Act of To Be. South Asian 
religions similarly stretched metaphors of consciousness creating its 
content to symbolize the creative act. East Asian thought developed 
metaphors of spontaneous emergence such as the Dao that gives rise 
to a determinate world made up of yin-yang configurations or 
changes. I’ll quote the basic text because it is so important for Chinese 
spirituality. It is from Zhou Dunyi, the 11th century Neo-Confucian: 
“The Ultimate of Non-being and also the Great Ultimate! The Great 
Ultimate through movement generates yang. When its activity 
reaches its limit, it becomes tranquil. Through tranquility the Great 
Ultimate generates yin. When tranquility reaches its limit, activity 
begins again. So movement and tranquility alternate and become the 
roof of each other, giving rise to the distinction of yin and yang, and 
the two modes are thus established. By the transformation of yang and 
its union with yin, the Five Agents of Water, Fire, Wood, Metal, and 
Earth arise. When these five material forces are distributed in 
harmonious order, the four seasons run their course.”  
The point is, from that which has no character of its own, the 
Ultimate of Non-Being and the Great Ultimate, arise all the things that 
do have character. 
The notion of an ontological creative act that creates everything 
determinate is very abstract, but also fruitful theologically. Any 
determinate thing has to be determinate with respect to something 
else. Therefore for there to be a determinate world there has to be a 
multiplicity of things. Each thing is a harmony of components that 
relate it to the other things with respect to which it is determinate, and 
of components by virtue of which it integrates these into its unique 
self. The former components are conditional and the latter are 
essential. We’ve seen examples of this in the discussion of the 
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conditional and essential components of ecoharmonies. Every 
determinate thing is a harmony of components with four traits. The 
harmony has a form or pattern in which the components are arranged; 
it has the plurality of components that themselves have to be fitted 
together; it has an existential location relative to the other harmonies 
with respect to which it is determinate and from which it gets its 
conditional components; and it has the value-identity of getting these 
components together with this form in this existential location. Let me 
emphasize again that there could be nothing determinate, no world at 
all of any kind, that does not have form, components formed, 
existential location, and value-identity. These four are ultimate 
conditions for any world and for the ultimate ontological creative act: 
there could be no creative act without creating something 
determinate. So there are five ultimate realities: form, components 
formed into a harmony, existential location, value-identity, and the 
ontological creative act. 
Set aside the complete generality of this picture and consider the 
world from the standpoint of human beings, acknowledging that 
there are many different cultural ways in which that world has been 
symbolized with considerable pragmatic truth. Human beings face 
the ultimacy of form in the guise of alternative possibilities with 
respect to which we have some control and among which we must 
choose. Often these possibilities differ in value and we lie under 
obligation to choose well, creating our moral character as we do so for 
better or worse. Every religion has the complex problematic of moral 
righteousness, deliberation, choice, failure, guilt, punishment, 
redemption and the like, because facing possibilities of different value 
is an ultimate condition of human life.  
Human beings face the ultimacy of having components in making 
up the overall patterns of their life, which involves coming to terms 
with the important components and integrating them in ways that 
respect their integrity. The ultimate ideal with regard to components 
is wholeness. Suffering and brokenness in body and spirit are the 
result of problems in finding wholeness. Because life is a complex of 
things needing integration, the quest for wholeness is a problem for 
every religion.  
Human beings face the ultimacy of being existentially located with 
respect to others who also are creatures of the ontological creative act 
just as much as themselves. From a selfish point of view, and with 
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regard to evolutionary adaptive advantage, it is tempting to regard 
other people and the natural environment only in terms of how they 
help or hinder one’s own advantage, or that of one’s in-group. But the 
Axial Age religions all agree that because “all are under heaven,” to 
use the Chinese slogan, all should be respected for what they are. All 
religions present the challenge of compassion and justice for all things, 
however diversely they interpret the implications of that and however 
imperfect the practice of universal love and justice is. 
Human beings face the ultimacy of having value-identity insofar 
as they cope with their nearly always ambiguous value in light of 
what life is supposed to mean or add up to. How do human beings fit 
into the larger picture of creation, given their value-identities? 
Sometimes this has manifested itself as the quest for security in 
existence, framed in terms of immortality or reincarnation. In more 
modern times this problematic appears as the search for meaning in a 
cosmos that seems to have none. All religions have some problematic 
of the meaning of value-identity. 
Human beings face the radical contingency of existence on the 
ontological level act in the shock of recognizing such a contingency, 
as distinct from the ordinary contingencies within the flow of life. 
Such a shock is often associated with the encounter with death. In 
some way or another the deep ultimate question is whether to affirm 
this contingent existence or deny it, to be fundamentally grateful or 
fundamentally hateful. In some way or other, most religions advocate 
consent to being in general, gratitude, and union with the act of 
creation and its radically contingent product, however filled with 
suffering and death. 
I have now listed five ultimate boundary conditions for human life 
that both separately and together, in various combinations establish 
the problematics of religion: lying under obligation, the quest for 
wholeness, engagement with others, the search for meaning, and the 
question of consent to being in general. Every religion has socially 
constructed categories for engaging these five ultimates and to this 
extent historicism is true. The religions by no means say the same 
things regarding these conditions. But these ultimate conditions to be 
engaged are part of the nature of reality, necessarily characteristic of 
any world within which human beings might live, any world that is 
determinate in any way. Therefore, religion is just as much a response 
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to reality for any culture as its response to the climate; the responses 
differ, but that to which they respond is ultimately real. 
You might have been amused to find that, when you ask a 
sociologist what religion is, the answer is a set of functions within 
society, as in Durkheim’s claims about legitimation of solidarity. Ask 
an anthropologist if religion turns out to be elements of culture that 
can be passed down. Ask a psychologist if religion is a coping 
mechanism for psychological problems. Ask an historian if religion is 
a major category for the continuity of identity of a group through time. 
Ask an evolutionary biologist if religion is what does or does not 
contribute to genetic adaptive advantage. Each of these disciplines has 
as its subject matter certain ecoharmonies that serve as conditions for 
the engagement of ultimacy. Religion always has a social setting and 
takes social forms, even for hermits. Religion always requires cultural 
elements as venues within which it pursues the five religious 
problematics. Religion always arises within psychological states and 
in turn modifies them. Religious engagements are always parts of 
larger stories. Religions affect adaptive advantage for better or worse. 
But I recommend that we bear in mind that the religious dimensions 
of society, culture, psychology and the rest are only those that involve 
the engagements with the ultimate realities. The fact that a society has 
institutions that have functioned to engage ultimacy does not mean 
that those institutions always do so, and when they do not they should 
be understood simply in social, not religious terms. Cultural 
traditions, such as Confucianism and Christianity, can have powerful 
social effects and be of historical interest even when they are 
religiously dead and are not venues for engaging ultimacy. All these 
things can be potential conditioning components of religion, but when 
the engagement of ultimacy is lacking, the essential components of 
religion are missing and those potential conditions are to be 
understood on their own, non-religious, terms. Nevertheless, when 
considering religion, it is not to be understood in terms of its essential 
components alone, but also in terms of all the conditioning 
components that make it possible, such as society, cultural traditions, 
psychic make-up, and the rest. 
I’m sorry to have burdened you with such a quick sketch of a whole 
theory of religion. But such is needed to make much progress toward 
understanding how Chinese culture, or any culture, can be a 
foundation for spirituality, how a culture’s spirituality has more and 
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less foundational elements, and how spirituality itself conditions the 
larger culture. Fortunately, spirituality is not the whole of religion. 
Rather, spirituality as that term has been used in the West, refers 
mainly to the problematics of the quest for wholeness and union with 
the ultimate creative act itself. To be sure, the issues of righteousness, 
engagement of others, and the quest for meaning bear upon 
spirituality and vice versa. But spirituality most prominently means 
one or both of two things, getting oneself together in the quest for 
wholeness, giving oneself over to engaging the ontological creative act 
itself. 
I want now to discuss how Chinese culture provides foundational 
components for these two senses of spirituality, wholeness and union 
with the ground of being. I shall discuss both Confucian and Christian 
forms of spirituality relative to these Chinese foundations, focusing 
on the Confucian to the neglect of other Chinese religious traditions. 
And I shall deal first with the Chinese cultural foundations when they 
are intact, and then when they are in disarray. I apologize for the 
complexity of this discussion and for the fact that I must presume that 
you already know quite a lot about the forms of culture and 
spirituality that I mention. 
 
Chinese Culture Intact 
 
Like all mature religious cultures, Confucianism has elaborate 
ways of dealing with all five religious problematics. Regarding the 
ultimate condition of underlying obligation, Confucianism has both 
the metaphysics of Li or Principle, as manifested in each thing as a 
kind of coherence or harmony, and complicated ways of learning 
discernment and perfecting action on the basis of learned choice. 
Regarding the ultimate of engaging others, it has a complicated theory 
of “love with differences” and the ideals of Ren or Humaneness. 
Regarding the ultimate of the meaning of value-identity, it has the 
problematic of finding the Mandate of Heaven.  
With regard to the two spiritual problematics, the greatest 
emphasis in Confucianism is on the quest for wholeness, which it has 
elaborated as the life of the sage. The sage is required to make a 
commitment to self-transformation that goes through stages. 
Although obviously involving the discernment of righteousness, 
cultivating the most effective love of others, and fitting in with a sense 
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of Heaven’s Mandate, the sage focuses rather on the integration and 
perfection of the self into what Roger Ames calls a “consummate 
person.” Emblematic of this is Confucius’s perhaps most famous and 
oft quoted statement: “At fifteen my mind was set on learning [the 
commitment to become a sage]. At thirty my character had been 
formed. At forty I had no more perplexities. At fifty I knew the 
Mandate of Heaven. At sixty I was at ease with whatever I heard. At 
seventy I could follow my heart’s desires without transgressing moral 
principles.” [Analects 2.4] 
What are the cultural conditions for the spiritual discipline of 
Confucian sagehood? Among the most important are two: family, and 
a particular ritual structure. By family the Confucians did not just 
mean the nuclear biological family, but an extended family with three 
or perhaps four generations. Moreover, the family was understood to 
be in a village where related families also lived, the in-laws of every 
generation, so that just about every possible relation is exemplified. In 
this context a person grows up being loved in just about every 
relational way, and learning to love back. This is an important and 
perhaps necessary set of conditions for a person to conceive of the task 
of becoming a sage. In Confucian spirituality, the quest for wholeness 
finds its most important setting in a person’s being loved and learning 
to return the love in a wide range of human relations. Without this 
family setting, in one guise or another, a person would not have the 
conditions necessary for undertaking the self-cultivation necessary for 
the spirituality of sagehood. The Confucian family thus is not merely 
in the family of direct touch, but also in its ancestral history. The 
loving virtues inherited in the family today come from the 
achievements of its ancestors. This solidarity of family sacrality has 
resonance in any culture in which family or tribal identity is 
important, but is developed very deeply with little dependence on 
tribalism in Chinese culture. Filial piety is an important condition of 
being spiritually alive in the world. 
As to ritual, many layers of social life are dependent on rituals that 
habituate behavior so as to carry out every-day moral decision-
making and relating to other people. But rituals are like formal dance 
steps that interweave people’s activities so that new levels of social 
reality emerge. Most social realities are not possible without the rituals 
that are their conditions. Regarding spirituality, the contents of the 
rituals are not particularly important except when the social realities 
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themselves are spiritual. But how one plays the rituals, how one 
individuates them, how one makes them one’s own, is indeed a matter 
of ultimately gaining integrity in a complex social situation in which 
hundreds of rituals are being played at once. Apparently, most of 
Confucius’ teaching was instruction in rituals and how to invest 
oneself in them. Having important rituals to play is an important kind 
of condition for the spiritual task of learning to invest oneself in the 
matrix of life’s rituals with integrity. A sage is a ritual master. 
Although sagacity, a prominent Confucian theme, is the Confucian 
ideal for the spiritual ultimate of the quest for wholeness, no equally 
prominent theme exists for the Confucian approach to the spirituality 
of union with the ontological creative act. The ancient Confucians, 
especially Xunzi, commented on awe at the inexplicable majesty of the 
heavens, but there seems to have been little spiritual focus on 
addressing that majesty in the ancient world. With the development 
of Chinese Buddhism, however, Confucianism learned the vocabulary 
and practices of meditation. You will remember that the Chinese 
metaphors for the ontological act of creation have to do with 
spontaneity of things arising from nothing, from emptiness. The Neo-
Confucians stressed this kind of meditation a great deal, although in 
ways critical of Buddhism. Buddhist meditation on emptiness led to 
complete vacuity, the Neo-Confucians thought, which in turn led to 
quietism. The Neo-Confucians meditated on the Ultimate of Non-
Being that spontaneously gives rise to the determinate world, and in 
the human case to action. For the Neo-Confucians, what I have called 
union with the ontological act meant identification of that act as the 
inner heart of oneself ready to move into action. For the Confucians of 
all periods, the ultimate ground of things is to be found already in the 
human heart. To be in touch with the ground of being meant, not the 
Buddhist retreat from the world into monasteries for the 
contemplation of nothingness, but rather the enhanced readiness to 
act.  
So much for the Chinese cultural roots of Confucian spirituality, 
however briefly outlined. Reflect now for a moment on the Chinese 
cultural roots as foundational for Christian spirituality. Christian 
spirituality is different in a great many ways from the Confucian. But 
Matteo Ricci, the great 16th century Roman Catholic missionary to 
China recognized the great potential of Chinese cultural roots for 
Christianity. He saw the Confucian spirituality of sagehood with its 
          Spiritual Foundations and Chinese Culture          23 
 
roots in family and ritual as being a close analogue to the educated 
Christian aristocrat. So he learned Chinese, dressed as a Confucian 
literati, and engaged the Confucian intellectual circle as a quite 
respectable sage. Such success as he had came in large measure from 
the fact that he was respected as a sage. Ricci also thought that he 
found a Chinese cultural condition for union with God in the ancient 
Chinese concept of Shang-di. Shang-di was a storm god, the high God 
of the earliest dynasties with anthropomorphic properties rather like 
the early renditions of Yahweh. Here he was less successful with the 
Confucian literati. They knew that the anthropomorphic conception 
of Shang-di had been given up for the most part in sophisticated 
Confucianism for the non-anthropomorphic notions of Heaven and 
the Ultimate of Non-Being and the Great Ultimate. Ricci’s mission 
failed in the long run, however, not because his Chinese version of 
Christian mysticism did not catch on, although that was a problem. 
The real problem was with Rome, which rejected the Chinese 
dependence on the family as a condition for virtue and sagehood. 
Chinese veneration of ancestors was taken to be idolatry incompatible 
with Christian monotheism and Ricci’s missionary strategy was 
forbidden. In actual Chinese culture, the veneration of ancestors was 
never taken to be incompatible with meditative engagement of 
Heaven, the Dao, or any of the other symbols of the ontological act. 
Rome never saw the irony in the analogy between Chinese veneration 
of ancestors and Christian veneration of saints, angels, and the Blessed 
Virgin, a condition of Roman Catholic piety that Protestants at the 
time did believe to be incompatible with the spirituality of 
monotheism. 
 
Chinese Culture Not Intact 
 
Step back with me for a moment and reflect with a critical eye on 
the spiritual ideals of Confucianism and Christianity and their relation 
to the Chinese cultural traditions that are their conditional 
foundations. I’ve spoken of spiritual ideals because the ideal is so 
rarely achieved, either in Confucianism or Christianity. And the 
reason for that is usually that the conditions required for them rarely 
obtain. If the problematic of becoming a sage depends on having a 
family of great extension and close connection with ancestors worth 
venerating going back generations, then the fact that most families are 
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dysfunctional makes the project of spiritual sagehood seriously 
unrealistic. And is it not the case that most families are dysfunctional, 
especially if you look beyond the immediate nuclear family that might 
be effective? Psychotherapists will tell you that families that function 
with the ritualized authority structures advocated by Confucians and 
many Christians are common covers for traumatic abuse. Too many 
relatives are criminals, or moral failures, or seriously incompetent at 
playing the idealized roles required. Confucian culture idealizes an 
ancient time when it was imagined that families stayed on the family 
plot of land for generation after generation. But in fact such peasant 
cultures suffered frequent dislocation. The times of genuinely stable 
government in all the world’s cultures have been infrequent and brief. 
In the United States most of the population are descended from 
immigrants who left their ancestral families behind; a significant 
minority are descended from slaves whose families were wholly 
broken. The Native Americans were mainly nomadic and generally at 
war with one another. A family seriously intact for more than three 
generations is very rare indeed. In ancient China, the very motivation 
of Confucius’s work was to respond to what he took to be a serious 
breakdown in civilization, including government and the economy, 
but also the family and the required ritual structure. Although he 
appealed to the past, that was a fiction and in fact he was inventing 
the future. Irony of ironies, for Confucius, it required sages to rectify 
conditions so that family life and harmonious rituals supporting the 
institutions of high civilization would be possible.  
One of the most important differences between Christianity and 
Confucianism lies in their attitudes toward families. Whereas most of 
Second Temple Judaism out of which Christianity was born shared 
the Chinese sense of identity being formed by kinship relations, Jesus 
said only negative things about families. He required his disciples to 
leave their families, even when they should be attending to mourning 
the dead; he said he came to bring a sword to family relations, not 
peace; when his own family were ashamed of him and tried to get him 
to stop healing and teaching, he said his true father was God and his 
true siblings were believers, not blood kin. When Jesus was on the 
cross he told his mother to take the Beloved Disciple as her son and 
asked him to take care of his mother, even though he had plenty of 
siblings to do that. The early Christian communities were not built up 
out of kinship groups but focused much on the widows and orphans, 
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the outcasts, those who had no families. Congregations became 
substitutes for families, and other family-substitute social 
organizations such as monasteries and religious orders developed 
because families could not be counted on. After all, Adam, Eve, and 
their children were not an auspicious beginning for family life. 
Despite what some religious conservatives say today, Christianity is a 
religion that is explicitly independent of family functionality, 
whatever other social orders and conditions it depends on. Therefore 
Christianity has great appeal in East Asia today where traditional 
societies, that understand themselves to be tied to land and extended 
generational families, find themselves at a loss. In China people are 
being moved from the country to the cities en masse. Modern 
technology makes jobs dependent on merit and mobility. Therefore, 
Christianity has great appeal in China because it offers an alternative 
to a deeply eroded if not always functional family structure. Islam is 
likely to offer the same thing, because it too creates an alternative to 
the family. Buddhism offered the same thing a millennium and a half 
ago in the chaos between the Han and Dong dynasties.  
It therefore becomes an interesting question whether the relative 
success of Christianity and other non-family oriented religions in 
China would develop forms of social life that in turn can become 
conditions for something like the Confucian sage. Certainly within 
Christianity there have been saints who look something like such 
sages, although much careful comparative work would have to be 
done to establish how similar they are.  
Functional rituals are also crucial for a Confucian sage, as well as 
for many of the institutions of high civilization. We live, as did 
Confucius and Jesus, in times of great cultural pluralism where the 
rituals of any one group could hardly be generalized beyond that 
group, and few inter-group rituals existed. Most forms of Christianity 
that are now flourishing in China are of the conservative sort that 
foster Christian ingroups. But Christianity also has an anti-ingroup 
strain of hospitality to all. In fact, the original Christian paradigm 
shift, manifested in St. Paul, was the transformation of the promises 
God made to Israel in the Sinai covenant to be applicable to all the 
Gentiles as the New Covenant. This means that, if conditions in China 
stabilize, partly through the emergent contributions of Christianity, 
perhaps some saint/sages will emerge who can shift ingroup Christian 
defensiveness to a more liberal hospitality that develops rituals for 
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engaging larger segments of the population. I personally believe that 
would be a more authentic form of Christianity. 
One more comparative point needs to be made here, although I 
obviously have already simplified an extremely complex ecosystem of 
spirituality in culture. In traditional, intact, idealized Confucian 
culture, it is supposed that Heaven or the ground of being, the 
ontological creative act in my language, is within us as our motivating 
heart. Therefore people do not need saviors from the outside, only 
sagely models, usually ancestral, to motivate spiritual efforts toward 
either personal healing and wholeness or union with that ground. 
Christianity has a vague analogy to that Heaven-centeredness in its 
idea of the image of God in each person, but in the ordinary Christian 
worldview this is rendered impotent by original sin and an external 
savior is necessary. In Christian spirituality, the more advanced one 
is, the more the conditions are right for the next steps in spiritual 
maturity, and the more internal God in Christ is seen to be. For 
Augustine, for instance, God is discovered to be closer to us than we 
are to ourselves, rather like the Confucian model. But where the 
conditions for higher spiritual advancement are missing and the 
culture or one’s personal psyche is in disarray, the appeal of an 
external savior is very great. Perhaps that accounts for the current 
appeal of conservative Christianity in China which offers an external 
savior who can help the helpless. If that contributes to more highly 
developed and stable cultural conditions, then perhaps the more 
internal divinity strain of Christian spirituality will become common, 
as well as the Confucian spirituality of sageliness.  
I ought to apologize, I suppose, for leaving the discussion in such 
an unfinished state. But I don’t, because the discussion is genuinely 
unfinished. I hope I have argued persuasively for the following points: 
 
1. Religion is not just one thing, such as the simple pursuit of 
salvation, but at least five: the pursuit of righteousness, wholeness, 
compassionate engagement of others, ultimate meaning, and union 
with the act that creates all determinate things. 
2. Spirituality focuses on the second and fifth of those, namely 
personal wholeness and perfection on the one hand and union with 
the ground of all things on the other, often both at once. 
3. Every stage or level of spiritual achievement is an ecoharmony 
that depends on certain other conditions obtaining for its conditional 
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components. Therefore we can ask what cultural, social, psychological, 
and personal elements are necessary for each kind of spiritual 
achievement to be possible. 
4. Within spiritual development itself, there are stages that are 
conditions for one another, often in some kind of hierarchy of 
achievement. Higher stages of spiritual development might depend 
on new non-spiritual conditions, such as a newly stable society, as 
well as prior spiritual achievements. 
5. Spiritual achievements themselves become conditions for new 
achievements in culture, society, and so forth. 
6. Whereas it is tempting and traditional to think of high 
civilization and high spiritual achievement on the model of a 
hierarchy of stable conditions, in fact all the conditions are in flux. 
Therefore the biological model of an evolving ecosystem is better, 
articulating as it does how any given ecoharmony, say of a spiritual 
sort, is dependent on some conditions and independent of others, 
constantly adapting to flourish or perish. 
7. I hope to have illustrated all these points in discussing the 
spiritual foundations of Confucianism and Christianity in the cultural 
conditions of Chinese culture. Leaving the discussion where I have 
illustrates the dynamic complexity of an evolving spiritual ecosystem. 
Thank you. 
 
(Boston University, Boston, United States)

2. 
Interpretation of Chinese Spirituality in an 
Intercultural Context: 
Methodological Considerations 
VINCENT SHEN 
 
 
Introduction: An Approach in Intercultural Philosophy 
 
Today’s philosophizing, and even that related to spirituality, 
should have an intercultural dimension, going beyond the scope and 
nature of comparative philosophy. In the past, comparative 
philosophy was limited to the study of similarities and differences 
between two or several philosophers, philosophical systems or 
traditions. Even if doing comparative philosophy in this manner could 
lead to a kind of relativism in philosophy, and thereby de-absolutize 
the truth of any philosophical discourse, it would not really help self-
understanding, not to say mutual understanding, and would not 
contribute much to the practice of philosophizing itself. Quite often 
comparative philosophy was done in the service of a nationalism that 
claimed the superiority of its own philosophy over those of other 
nations. Through the looking glass of an orientalism that imposed its 
own conceptual framework on the scholars of the colonized areas, 
these scholars were to look at their own cultural and philosophical 
conceptual traditions in the light of the colonizing tradition. 
Nowadays, different cultural and philosophical traditions are 
meeting each other in the process of globalization. I define 
‘globalization’ as “a historical process of border-crossing, in which 
human desire, human interconnectedness and universalizability are 
to be realized on this planet as a whole, and to be concretized in the 
present as global free market, trans-national political order and 
cultural localism.” 1 
This historical process pushes all peoples of the world beyond 
themselves to meet many others. In fact there is no place where many 
1 Vincent Shen, “A Book Review of Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri’s Empire” in 
Universitas: Monthly Review of Philosophy and Culture, Number 361 (Taipei, June, 
2004), 109-112. 
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others are not present. In this situation, we should work toward a 
dialogue of/for mutual understanding and enrichment. Without these 
things, we may well find ourselves in situations of vehement conflict 
and violent confrontation, with all the suffering that this entails. 
We live now in an age of global multiculturalism, in which there is 
an urgent quest for cultural identity and respect for cultural 
difference, which needs, as Charles Taylor proposes, a ‘politics of 
recognition.’2 Indeed, multiculturalism means for me, at the outset, 
that each and every culture has its own cultural identity, and that each 
should respect the other’s cultural difference; then, it should mean, 
above all, mutual enrichment by cultural exchange and the unceasing 
search for the universalizable elements embodied in various cultural 
traditions. 3  As I see it, Charles Taylor’s “mutual recognition” 
presupposes the idea of intersubjectivity which itself is the extension 
of the philosophy of subjectivity so much cherished by modern 
European philosophy. For me, it is now time to move from the 
minimalist “mutual recognition” to an optimal “mutual enrichment.” 
Knowledge of the different ways of doing philosophy in different 
cultural traditions could enrich our vision of the multi-layered and 
multi-faceted nature of reality. Any philosophy capable of facing this 
challenge has to include within itself an intercultural dimension. In 
view of the times in which we live, then, it is now proper to move from 
comparative philosophy toward intercultural philosophy. 
The real objective of doing intercultural philosophy is to contrast 
rather than simply compare different philosophical traditions,4 so as 
to find the universalizable elements within them and to lead to their 
mutual-enrichment. I understand ‘contrast’ as the rhythmic and 
dialectical interplay between difference and complementarity, 
continuity and discontinuity, by which universalizablility could be 
2  Charles Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism, edited and 
introduced by A. Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 25-36. 
3 Vincent Shen, From Politics of Recognition to Politics of Mutual Enrichment, in The 
Ricci Bulletin 2002 (Taipei: Taipei Ricci Institute for Chinese Studies, number 5, 
February 2002), 113-125. 
4 I have worked out a philosophy of contrast in my works, especially in my 
Essays in Contemporary Philosophy East and West (Taipei: Liming Publishing, 1985). 
There, ‘contrast’ was defined as the rhythmic and dialectical interplay between 
difference and complementarity, continuity and discontinuity, which leads 
eventually to the real mutual-enrichment of different agents, individual or 
collective, such as different traditions of religion or philosophy. 
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made manifest. For example, ancient Greek philosophy concerns itself 
more with theoretical universalizability (theoria), while Chinese 
philosophy concerns itself more with practical universalizability 
(praxis). Nevertheless, both of them try to go beyond particular 
interests and to transcend the limit of particularity towards a 
universalizable value. In a certain sense, both of these philosophies 
target universalizability, and in this light theoria and praxis might be 
seen as complementary. 
In this paper, I define spirituality as “theories and practices of self-
cultivation towards human perfection that deal with the human desire 
for meaningfulness and its fulfillment through relation with ultimate 
reality.” Spirituality is thus defined in terms of the Ultimate Reality 
with which one is interacting, and thereby forms a process of self-
cultivation in getting closer to one’s perfection. Usually those theories 
and practices are recorded in the philosophical/religious texts of 
different traditions. 
 
Epistemological Strategies Useable in Intercultural Philosophy 
and Dialogue 
 
Let us now consider the epistemological strategies we can adopt in 
order to achieve an effective intercultural philosophy and 
intercultural dialogue. I will propose two consecutive strategies here: 
language appropriation and strangification. 
First, language appropriation means learning the language or 
discourse of other philosophical traditions. From early childhood, 
learning language leads to the construction and understanding of 
meaningful worlds. As Wittgenstein says, different language games 
correspond to different life-forms. Therefore, the appropriation of 
another language would give us access to the life-form implied in that 
specific language. By appropriating the different languages of 
different cultural/philosophical/religious traditions, we can enter into 
the different life-worlds of many others and thereby enrich the 
construction of our own world. 
By the second strategy, waitui ?? (strangification), I mean the act 
of going beyond oneself to many others, from those with whom one 
is familiar to strangers, from one’s cultural/philosophical world to 
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many others’ cultural/philosophical worlds.5 Strangification could be 
practiced on three levels: linguistic, pragmatic and ontological, as I 
have developed elsewhere.6 On each of them, I conceive “dialogue” as 
a process of mutual strangification. 
These two strategies could help us to avoid both radical relativism, 
which amounts to a contradiction in affirming validity by claiming 
that everything is absolutely relative; and absolute universalism, 
which doesn’t work in the human world constituted by historicity. In 
the historical process, what one can do is extend the universalizability 
implicit in one’s own tradition and look for mutual enrichment by 
way of language appropriation and strangification. 
In the context of intercultural philosophy, I conceive philosophical 
dialogue as a process of mutual waitui ??  (strangification). This 
proceeds on three consecutive levels, as follows: On the level of 
linguistic strangification, cultural/philosophical tradition A 
(abbreviated as TA) should translate its propositions or ideas/values/ 
belief system into a language understandable to cultural/ 
philosophical tradition B (abbreviated as TB). Meanwhile, TB should 
translate its propositions or ideas/values/belief system into language/ 
discourse understandable to TA. If they are still valid there, this would 
mean they have larger universalizability. In the case that one’s 
ideas/values/belief system becomes absurd or unintelligible after the 
translation, then one should examine one’s own principle and 
methods, rather than hold that others are wrong. 
On the level of pragmatic waitui?? (strangification), TA should 
draw its propositions, supposed truths/cultural expressions/value/-
religious beliefs out from its own social, organizational contexts and 
put them into the social, organizational context of TB, to see whether 
they could still work there. Meanwhile, TB should draw its 
propositions, supposed truths/cultural expressions/value/religious 
5 Given this term means the act of reaching out to strangers, even if it looks a bit 
strange in English, I still want to keep it in honor of the root “stranger” in it. 
6 These three strategies, originally developed by F. Wallner for the use only in 
the area of interdisciplinary research, have been extended and developed by 
myself to the areas of intercultural exchange and religious dialogue. See my 
Confucianism, Taoism and Constructive Realism (Vienna: Vienna University Press, 
1994), and my Duibi, waitui yu Jiaotan (Contrast, Strangification and Dialogue) 
(Taipei: Wunan, 2003); and Kuawenhua Zhexue yu Zhongjiao (Essays on 
Intercultural Philosophy and Religion) (Taipei: Wunan, 2012). 
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beliefs out from its own social, organizational context and put them 
into the social, organizational context of TA. If they can still work 
there, this would mean they have larger universalizability. In case 
they become unacceptable and cannot work, one should examine 
them rather than hold that others are wrong. 
On the level of ontological waitui?? (strangification), TA should 
make an effort to enter into TB’s micro-world, cultural world or 
religious world through the detour of his experience with Reality 
Itself, such as a person, a social group, Nature, or the Ultimate Reality. 
Meanwhile, TB should also make an effort to enter into TA’s micro-
world, cultural world or religious world through making a detour 
from one’s own experience of Reality Itself. 
Dialogue in the form of mutual waitui?? (strangification) is more 
fundamental than Habermas’s notion of communicative action as 
argumentation. For me, the Habermasian argumentation presupposes 
a previous effort of waitui ?? (strangification) in expressing one’s 
proposal(s) in the other’s language or in a language understandable 
to the other, without which there will be no real mutual 
understanding and no self-reflection in the process of argumentation. 
Habermas’s four ideal claims of understandability, truth, sincerity 
and legitimacy will not work in the real world without previous 
mutual waitui?? (strangification): I think I’m sincere, but you think 
I am a hypocrite; I think I’m telling the truth, but you consider that 
absurd. Because a commonly acceptable norm doesn’t exist yet, or 
because the law to legitimize is still an issue under debate, there is no 
mutually accepted legitimacy.7 
Chinese Philosophy encourages strangification, as we find in the 
Confucian concepts of shu (?) and tui (?), Buddhist concepts of geyi 
(??) and huixiang (??) and the Daoist idea that “the more the sage 
gives to others the more is his life enriched.” We also find the idea of 
“many others” in Chinese philosophy, instead of the concept of “the 
Other” expounded in the philosophy of Lacan, Levinas, Derrida, 
Deleuze etc., that presupposes an implicit dualism between Self and 
                                                 
7 See also Vincent Shen, Chuantong de zaisheng (Rebirth of Tradition) (Yeqiang 
Press, 1992). 78-79, where I point out that Habermas’ argumentative consensus 
presupposes a pre-linguistic, tacit consensus; and Duibi, waitui yu jiaotan (Contrast, 
Strangification and Dialogue) (Taipei: Wunan), 172-173, where I argue the 
effectiveness of Habermas’ communicative action presupposes the act of 
strangification in order to achieve mutual understanding. 
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Other. The Daoist idea of “milliard things,” the Buddhist concept of 
“all sentient beings,” and the Confucian idea of “five relations” are all 
telling us that we are born into and grow up among many others. 
 
A Hermeneutics in the Context of Intercultural Philosophy 
 
How should one interpret philosophical texts in general, and 
Chinese philosophical texts in particular, in the context of 
intercultural philosophy? My hermeneutics for interpreting 
philosophical texts is based on what I call a “dynamic contextualism” 
that takes the meaning of a term, a sentence, a paragraph in the context 
of its relation with other terms, sentences and paragraphs, and the 
situation of a term in the sentence, the sentence in the paragraph, and 
the paragraph in the texts…etc., in the dynamic unfolding of the 
meaning of a text. In a certain sense, this is inspired by 
Schleiermacher’s concept of the “whole-part” circle, wherein the more 
one understand the parts, the more one understands the whole; and 
the more one understand the whole, the more one understands the 
parts. Thus, the second canon of Schleiermacher’s grammatical 
interpretation reads “the meaning of every term in one paragraph 
should be determined in terms of the context in which it appears.”8 
For example, when reading Plato’s dialogues, the more one 
understands each word, sentence, paragraph etc., the more one 
understands the whole dialogue; while the more one understands the 
whole dialogue, the more exactly one understands the meaning of 
each word and sentence. And again, if one understands other works 
of Plato, and even when one is able to extend one’s understanding to 
other works related to Plato, then one’s understanding of a particular 
dialogue of Plato will be even better. 
For me, the acts of both writing and reading belong to the process 
of expressing and interpreting, and can therefore be seen as a 
pragmatic movement. While an author creates a meaningful piece of 
work, his readers interpret its meaning. However, both writing and 
interpreting should allow the movement of words, sentences, 
paragraphs, sections and the whole text involved to develop a 
8  F. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Handwriting Manuscripts (Montana: 
Scholars Press, 1977), 127-129. 
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dynamic process of meaning unfolding in a dialectic of whole and 
part. 
This way of reading the movement of a text differs from the 
reading by key words, key concepts or key sentences. The latter way 
of reading picks out some major concepts and propositions that 
proceed to dominate or at least to lead the reading of the whole text. 
However, when attention is paid only to some key concepts and key 
propositions, the pragmatic movement of the text is somehow 
neglected, and attention is not paid to the different layers of the textual 
meaning. In order to avoid this situation, key words, key concepts or 
key sentences should first of all presuppose the acting of reading in 
term of dynamic contextualism. 
Dynamic contextualism applies also to the process of translation, 
which is an urgent issue in today’s globalizing world, and indeed 
crucial for the mutual understanding and mutual enrichment 
envisaged by an intercultural hermeneutics. Originally, hermeneuia, 
the Greek term for interpretation, means: to say, to explain and to 
translate. To say is to mediate between thought and language. To 
explain is to mediate between what is said and the reason why it is 
said. To translate is to mediate between one form of language and 
another form of language. It is true that any meaningful expression, 
be it in the form of images, sounds, writing or speech, always involves 
some basic activities of understanding and interpretation. In the case 
of translation, a language other than the original (for example, 
English) is used to tell its understanding and interpretation of the 
original language (say, Chinese) in order to make it understandable to 
people in another linguistic and cultural context. The exchange 
between peoples of different languages and cultures requires a 
dialogical process that involves what I call “language appropriation” 
and “mutual strangification” by which a person goes beyond the 
language and culture that is familiar, to learn to express his or her 
ideas/values/beliefs in a language understandable to others, and 
others should do likewise with regard to them. Thus I understand 
“translation” as an essential component of strangification. 
 
First Level Principles: Four General Principles of Interpretation 
 
I will now discuss the four general principles of interpretation that 
belong to the first level of principles, before entering into hermeneutic 
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principles of a more specialized nature. The following four general 
principles of interpretation, applicable to all philosophical texts of the 
East and the West, are to be practiced consecutively, which means that 
the latter rules presuppose the former: 
First, the principle of intratextuality and intertextuality, where the 
principle of intratextuality precedes that of intertextuality: the 
meaning of a text must be completely contained within, and 
extractable from, the text itself and only that text. Taking the Zhuangzi 
as an example, all possible meanings of the texts in the Zhuangzi 
should be read only from the text present to us, not to be imposed on 
the text by theories or views outside of the text. In the case of a 
corrupted text that invites revision or correction, this should be done 
only with support from other texts, either newly discovered ones or 
texts from other contexts. For me, only with the support of 
intratextuality can we proceed to what J. Kristeva calls 
“intertextuality,” which means the vertical and horizontal relations of 
a specific text with other texts.9 I agree with Kristeva that each text is 
constituted from its reference to many other texts and is itself an 
absorption and/or transformation of other texts. Each text results from 
a continuous dialogue among its author, its ideal readers and external 
texts, that could be read horizontally (author and readers) and 
vertically (previous textual traditions). However, the decisions about 
intertextuality and the proper horizontal and vertical relations always 
depend on the intratextual meaning constituent of all texts thus 
concerned. 
Second, the principle of coherence: a philosophical work should 
have its own coherence. This so-called “coherence” means that, on the 
negative side, a text should be able to avoid holding self-contradictory 
or self-oppositional views; on the positive side, the concepts, ideas and 
propositions proposed in the work should constitute a reasonable 
whole. We may presume that a philosophical text with a higher degree 
of coherence is philosophically more significant and valuable than a 
text with a lesser degree of coherence. A great classical philosophical 
text with lasting impact must be a text of great coherence. On the other 
9 Julia Kristeva, “Word, Dialogue and Novel,” in The Kristeva Reader, edited by 
Toril Moi (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 36-37. Notice Kristeva says, “À la place de la 
notion d’intersubjectivité s’installe celle d'intertextualité, et le langage poétique se 
lit, au moins, comme double”. Cf. Julia Kristeva, «Le mot, le dialogue et le roman,” 
In Recherches pour une sémanalyse (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1969), p. 146. 
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hand, a text, fragmentary or not, containing inconsistency and 
contradiction, though it might still have great historical value, does 
not have great philosophical value. Of course, we should leave texts 
as they are; if there is contradiction, let them be read as contradictory; 
if there is incoherence, let them be read as incoherent. If indeed a text 
is found illogical, contradictory and incoherent, let it be read as such. 
Thus, even though it may have great historical value, it should 
accordingly be deemed as having less philosophical meaning, except 
where the text is playing with dialectics, such as Laozi’s notion that 
right words can be said in seeming contradiction, or when 
contradiction is shown among the appearances to illustrate the 
absolute otherness of the Ultimate Reality. Except in the case where 
the text itself is contradictory or fragmentary (intratextuality), or is 
shown to be thus by other texts (intertextuality), a deliberate reading 
of a text as contradictory or fragmentary is against the principle of 
charity. 
Third, the principle of minimum amendment: when reading a text, 
Chinese or otherwise, there should be no impulsive correction of the 
original. In case the text says things that differ from our own theory 
or our imagined view of the text, it is our theory or view that needs to 
be corrected in light of the text, rather than correcting the text to 
conform to our theory or view. 
Fourth, the principle of maximal reading: when all the principles 
described above, that is, the principle of intratextuality and 
intertextuality, the principle of coherence, and the principle of 
minimal amendment are all followed, we may maximize our reading 
of the meaning of the text in question and interpret the text in a way 
so as to obtain a maximal degree of meaningfulness. The degree of 
meaningfulness of a philosophical text is judged according to the 
principle of meaning saturation. This is to say, when we have read the 
reading of a text intratextually/intertextually, coherently, and with 
minimal amendment, we may try to obtain the maximal degree of 
saturation of meaning in interpretation. It is in the nature of human 
beings to be always hungry for meaningfulness, and to aim for the 
most satisfactory answers that can be obtained critically through 
philosophy. If we are doing research into the history of philosophy, 
the first three principles (intratextuality/intertextuality, coherence, 
and minimal amendment) might suffice. However, if we are doing 
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philosophical interpretation and philosophizing on a text, the 
principle of maximal reading is needed. 
 
Second Level: Respect the Special Nature of 
a Philosophical Tradition 
 
Besides the first level principles applicable to all texts, when we 
deal with Chinese philosophical texts, we have to respect their special 
nature. Generally speaking, in comparison with Western philosophy’s 
preference for conceptual analysis, Chinese philosophy employs the 
use of metaphors; in contrast to Western philosophy’s concern with 
argumentation, Chinese philosophy uses narratives to communicate 
its ideas. Since metaphors and narratives are all put into words in the 
pragmatic process of speaking and listening, writing and reading, in 
which meaningful discourses are produced, they must be understood 
also in terms of dynamic contextualism. 
Spirituality is defined specifically in terms of the Ultimate Reality 
with which one is interacting, and thereby form a process of self-
cultivation in getting closer to it. Ancient Chinese philosophers, when 
seeking enlightenment and insight into Ultimate Reality by 
speculative reason, tend to form a kind of Original Image-Ideas, 
something between Pure Idea and Iconic/sonoric Image, such as tian
? (heaven), dao? (the Way), xin? (Heart),…etc., keeping thereby 
the holistic character of the manifestation or the intuitive reception of 
Reality Itself. These Idea-Images are seen as expressive and evocative 
of, though never exhausting of, the richness of Reality Itself and 
therefore are given the status of metaphor. Chinese artistic creativity, 
by means of poietic transformation and creative imagination, would 
render the Idea-Image into a sort of concrete Iconic/sonoric Image and 
thereby materialize it. In moral and ethical actions, the practical 
function of reason would bring the Idea-Image into the judgment of 
events and the intervention of one’s own action into the course of 
events and thereby takes responsibility. In narrating histories, the 
function of historical reason is to reveal human historicity and 
existential meaning implicit in the historical events, and their plots in 
the historical account. Indeed, telling our own stories to others and 
listening to others’ stories bring us hope that they may reveal to us the 
meaning of existence and eventually Ultimate Reality, though always 
in a metaphorical way. Compared with the Original manifestation of 
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Reality Itself, these three ways of realization in Idea-Image possess an 
As-structure, in the sense that they allow us to see Reality Itself as Idea-
Images, the latter thereby serving a certain metaphorical function. 
By contrast, in Western philosophy, as I see it, the pre-Socratic 
philosophers such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus 
etc., still keep a very intimate relation with the original Ideas-Images, 
in relating, for example, the ideas of Arché and Physis with regard to 
water, to the unlimited, to the air, to the fire,…etc. However, 
mainstream Western philosophy since Parmenides and Plato consists 
in turning the Idea-Image into pure idea, and then, with intellectual 
definition, conceptualizing it and relating one concept with other 
concepts in a logical way. Concepts are detached deliberately from 
images, things and events, and are defined and related one to another 
logically in descriptive and argumentative sentences and discourses. 
By this detachment, concept and argumentation could help the human 
mind to develop the critical function of human reason, in not limiting 
itself to the particularity and materiality of images, things and events, 
and by paying attention to the abstract universalizability of concepts 
and the rigor of their logical relation. Even if the validity of concept 
and argumentation might be absolutized, claiming universality and 
rational structure per se, in fact, they can only allow us to see Reality 
and its structure in an abstract way. On the other hand, metaphors, 
mostly related to one another by poetic verses and stories, are 
different from abstract concepts and well-structured argumentation, 
yet still keep an intimate relation with images and events. 
 
Third Level: Hermeneutic Principles of the Philosopher/School 
under Discussion 
 
Each philosopher or school of philosophical thought may be said 
to have offered their own view of language and guidance for 
interpreting texts. This is true both for Confucians and Daoists. I 
should point out that my dynamic contextualism is, first of all, much 
closer to the Daoist spirit of letting texts show their own meaning in 
the movement of reading, before it starts to highlight the essential part 
of the texts and construct meaning thereupon like Confucianism. 
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Example One - Classical Confucianism: Confucius and Mencius 
 
Confucius, in interpreting texts, prefers a way of reading that 
highlights some key words or key sentences. This is different from 
what I call dynamic contextualism and it tends to neglect the 
pragmatic movement of the text. Confucius’ “appropriation of 
meaning by cutting/selecting text (duanzhan quyi ???? )” or 
“featuring key verses” way of reading is very similar to the reading 
by way of key concepts or key propositions that exists today. For 
example, in the bamboo slips of Konzi Shilun ???? (Confucius on 
Poetry), we find Confucius commenting on poems by highlighting a 
certain key verse(s) to represent the whole poem. For example, 
Fragment 6 reads, 
 
[The Qingmiao says,] “Great is the number of the officers, 
assiduous followers of the virtue of King Wen.” I pay my 
homage to this. The Liewen says, “What is most powerful is 
being the Man.” “What is most distinguished is being 
virtuous.” “Ah, the former kings are not forgotten.” I am 
delighted by all these. [The Haotian You Chengming says,] 
“The Heaven made its determinate mandate, which our two 
sovereigns received.” They are indeed highly honored and 
powerful. The Songs…”10 
 
Here Confucius puts together a group of key verses of different 
poems in the Songs to emphasize the idea that the admirable morals 
and ethical power of the person of King Wen consist in his virtues, 
seen as the surest assurance of the Mandate of Heaven bestowed upon 
him.  
Again, Confucius’ saying that, “All three hundred odes can be 
covered by one of their sentences, and that is, ‘Have no depraved 
thoughts’” is itself an exemplary case in which Confucius 
appropriates meaning of poems by creative selection and 
interpretation. Originally the verse “Have no depraved thoughts” is 
from the poem entitled “Stallions” in the Lu Songs, which is sung when 
10 Konzi Shilun (Confucius on Poetry), in Shanghai Museum’s Chu Bamboo Books of 
the Warring States. Vol.1. edited by MA Chenyuan (Shanghai: Shanghai Museum, 
2001), p. 133. 
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someone is pasturing horses,11 where the term “si ?” is merely an 
auxiliary term and the whole verse says something like, “Ah, don’t go 
astray.” Yet Confucius uses the term “si?” to denote “thought” and 
reads the whole verse as “thought without depravity.” 
Cutting a verse to its appropriate meaning concerns mostly the 
users of poems, yet the hermeneutic criterion of the readers or 
listeners is left untouched. Later, Mencius proposes to “trace the 
expressed intention by understanding” (yiyi nizhi ????). Mencius 
says, “Therefore he who interprets the Odes, should not be stuck by 
words in detriment of a sentence, and he should not be stuck by 
sentence in detriment of earnest thoughts. If one can trace back to the 
earnest thought by understanding, he then is said to have caught its 
meaning.”12 Using one’s understanding of a poem to trace back to its 
author’s original and earnest intent could mean something very 
similar to what Wilhelm Dilthey says about the function of 
understanding in historiography. According to Wilhelm Dilthey’s 
historical hermeneutics, human life is teleological in the sense that it 
tends to the creation of meaning by expressing its creativity in words, 
deeds and works, which, in their turn, can be understood by enacting 
this process of creative expression in a sympathetic understanding. 
While the process of creativity goes from the dynamic teleology of life 
to meaningful expression in words, deeds and works, the process of 
understanding goes inversely from the expressed words and deeds to 
trace back to the dynamic and creative process of life via the 
intelligible structure of words, deeds and works in question. When 
added to Confucius’ “hermeneutics of author,” Mencius’ 
“hermeneutics of reader” can be seen as having completed the circle 
between author and reader in classical Confucian hermeneutics. 
I should say that the Confucian hermeneutics of key concepts not 
only makes an essential selection of words and texts, but also creates 
new meanings. This is to say that the Confucian method of 
interpretation can lead to a creative reading of texts, which could be a 
                                                 
11 The Stallions reads, “Fat and large are the stallions, on the plains of the far-
distant borders. Of those stallions, fat and large, some are cream-coloured; some, 
red and white; some, with white hairy legs; some, with fish eyes; All, stout 
carriage horses, Ah, how they are without depravity; He thinks of his horses, and 
thus serviceable are they.” Legge, James, trans., The She King, in The Chinese 
Classics, vol. IV (Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc. 1994), p. 613. 
12 The Mencius, 5A: 4. My translation. 
42           Vincent Shen
better way for systematic construction in philosophy. However, prior 
to that, we probably need a spirit of “letting be,” that lets a text speak 
for itself by the reader paying attention to the movement of text, 
allowing the text to unfold its pragmatic movement and its meaning 
fully. Here dynamic contextualism is better for doing interpretation, 
whereas Confucian hermeneutics is better for doing systematic 
construction. However, systematic construction should presuppose 
an act of reading by way of dynamic contextualism. 
 
Example Two - Classical Daoism: Zhuangzi 
 
A theory of language is offered in the Zhuangzi: the discourses used 
by Zhuangzi are summed up by himself into three types: metaphorical 
discourse, hermeneutic discourse and de-constructional discourse. 
Among these three, the metaphorical discourse is the most 
fundamental, because there must be first of all an extension of 
experience that emancipates the human spirit from the constraint of 
sensible perception and logical reasoning so that there may be 
revelation of truth by the hermeneutic and de-constructional 
discourses.  
I take these three discourses as representing Zhuangzi’s view on 
textual meaning in general, and his chongyan ??  (hermeneutic 
discourse) as his view on interpreting traditional texts in a narrow 
sense. Zhuangzi’s hermeneutical discourse, the chongyan, consists in 
quoting and interpreting texts recording the deeds and discourses of 
a certain previous time, either of a venerable old man or in the 
tradition.13 Two essential points to be noted concerning Zhuangzi’s 
hermeneutic discourse: first, the hermeneutic discourse talks about 
words that have already endured over time either belonging to a 
venerable old man or a traditional scripture. Second, hermeneutic 
discourse must interpret these words of the venerable old man or of 
traditional scripture in order to obtain credibility by reason of their 
endurance over time. 
Here is an important hermeneutic problem: when someone 
proposes an original discourse, how should he/she render justice to 
13  “Seventy percent (of metaphorical discourses) consists of quoting and 
interpreting that which has been said before. Those quoted are the venerable men 
of old.” Zhuangzi jishi, edited by Guo Qingfan (Taipei: Dingyuan Cultural Press, 
2005), p.949 
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discourses belonging to tradition or proposed in the past? Zhuangzi 
quotes texts and words of the past in order to reveal truth. However, 
truth does not mean making a copy to the extent that we can verify 
them word for word. On the contrary, they must be submitted to the 
creative interpretation/transformation of the author. Tradition 
contains in itself truth to be revealed through creative interpretation, 
resulting from a certain kind of “fusion of horizons,” as Gadamer calls 
it. A true understanding of the past must have, in a certain sense, taken 
over the horizon of meaning constituted in the tradition that overlaps 
with one’s own horizon of meaning. 
It is in the form of a dialogue that human beings realize this sort of 
fusion of horizons, as clearly exemplified by Zhuangzi’s hermeneutic 
discourse. That is why most of Zhuangzi’s chongyan are constituted of 
dialogues of two or more persons. Those dialogues between venerable 
old persons in historical records or traditional texts are put in the 
context of his metaphorical discourse and reconstructed through his 
creative interpretations, and thereby obtain fusion of horizons in the 
form of dialogue. The truth of hermeneutical discourse does not 
consist in its corresponding to a given content, but rather in revealing 
the dynamism of truth in time.  
The third kind of discourse used by Zhuangzi is ziyan (??) which, 
without presupposing any pre-established thesis, responds to an 
interlocutor according to the situation and topic involved, and, in 
referring to Dao, pronounces the truth that is implied in the situation, 
and eventually deconstructs it before returning to the original silence. 
In this way, one can always keep one’s creativity without being 
limited by any achievement or discourse of one’s own; as Zhuangzi 
says, “without the daily de-constructional discourses to harmonize 
with the measure of Heaven, who could endure long?”14 
 
Words of Conclusion 
 
It is undeniable that Chinese philosophical texts have their own 
specific characteristics, and are thus in need of special principles of 
interpretation, such as the second level principles and the third level 
principles. However, these should not contradict the general 
principles applicable to all Eastern and Western philosophical texts. 
                                                 
14 Ibid., pp.949-950 
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This means that understanding and interpretation are universalizable 
in all forms of human communication and therefore in need of some 
general principles. This does not mean the four principles I propose 
are already universal principles in an absolute sense. They are only 
the most universalizable principles for the moment and still need to 
enhance their universalizability through the further effort of 
strangification. The same applies to the second and third level 
principles. Both the characteristics of a specific tradition and the 
principles adopted by a philosopher or a school of philosophy should 
be examined in the process of strangification in order to extend their 
universalizability. Hopefully the dialectics of the general and special 
principles and their further extension through the process of 
strangification could bring Chinese and Western philosophies and 
other philosophical traditions to mutual understanding and mutual 
enrichment. 
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3. 
The Daoist Sage in Modernity 
EDWARD MCDOUGALL 
 
 
This fourth-century BC Chinese philosophy is relevant not 
only to its own time and place but to all times and places and 
particularly the global situation of mankind in the 1970s [or 
in the 21st century]*—Arnold Toynbee, Mankind and 
Mother Earth1 
  
Daoism is an ancient, philosophical and religious tradition, which 
has its origins in the Warring States period China around the fourth 
century B.C.E. During this period it coexisted alongside a number of 
other schools of thought, such as Mohoism (Mo Jia, ??)—a school 
which taught universal ethics and Legalism (Fa Jia, ??)—a school 
which held that human nature was inherently evil and as such needed 
to be held in check by strong leadership. Early Daoist thinkers, like the 
other schools of Chinese philosophy, sought to respond to the 
condition of life during that period, particularly the problem of 
continual warfare. However, the scope of Daoist thought extended 
beyond immediate concerns of the Warring States era and elements of 
Daoism have survived since that time to the present day, often 
existing in combination with Confucianism or Buddhism, while still 
retaining distinctive elements. Daoism might be defined basically as a 
combination of certain ontological principles such as Dao—? 
(roughly translated into English as “way”) an interpretation of 
existence, as well as qi—? energy, together with the yin yang as a 
balance of opposites, and also a way of life focused on the practice of 
wu wei—?? (action-less action) and ziran—?? (naturalness and 
spontaneity). Historically, Daoism has been a loose-knit and diverse 
movement. An important distinction exists between the two com-
monly confused schools of philosophical Daoism, on the one hand, 
(Dao Jia, ??), generally associated with the writings of thinkers such 
as Laozi, Zhuangzi, Leihzi and subsequently Huannanzi, and 
* Note words in [] - indicate my addition to the text. 
1 Arnold Toynbee, Mankind and Mother Earth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1976,) p. 220. 
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religious Daoism, on the other hand, (Dao Jiao, ??), identified with 
later figures such as Zhang Dao Ling. Historically and in popular 
culture these two forms of Daoism have often been combined. 
However, at a philosophical level it is important to differentiate them. 
These two approaches differ most directly over the role of personal 
immortality, with religious Daoism advocating the use of various 
elixirs and practices aimed at transcending human mortality, whereas 
philosophical Daoism proposes a simple reconciliation with the 
condition of human mortality. There are other areas of disagreement, 
as well some areas of continuity, between the two forms of Daoism, 
which it is not possible to discuss here. The focus of this paper will be 
on philosophical Daoism (Dao Jia), particularly as expressed through 
the writings attributed to Laozi and Zhuangzi, 2  seeking to 
demonstrate how such writings can be read as a response to 
westernisation, showing their continued relevance.  
For over a century now, Chinese culture, along with other East 
Asian cultures, has been under Western influence. This has led to an 
uneven relationship, where contemporary Chinese philosophy has 
been influenced by Western thought, but this process has not been 
reciprocated in the West. Early Chinese thought, in particular Daoism, 
although it has influenced a number of important Western thinkers, 
notably Martin Heidegger and Carl Jung, still remains a fairly fringe 
discipline in most Western universities. The aim of this paper is to 
challenge such a situation by showing how Daoism can provide a 
basis for confronting Westernised modernity and is thus relevant in 
providing a guide for responding to contemporary life. This will 
demonstrate how Daoism, rather than being simply an archaic school 
of Chinese thought, can be understood as a response to what 
Heidegger held to be the condition of modern Western nihilism. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2  It should be noted that it is generally acknowledged that the historical 
Zhuangzi did not write all of the book commonly attributed to him, but only the 
so-called inner chapters (the first seven chapters of the book of Zhuangzi). For the 
purposes of this paper all 33 chapters of the work of Zhuangzi will be considered 
as they all provide relevant philosophical development of Daoist ideas, although 
some show influence from other schools too. For more information please consult 
the works of Karyn Lai and Brook Ziporyn amongst others.  
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Heidegger, Daoism and Europeanisation 
 
The marginalisation of Daoist thought in the contemporary world 
should be understood as part of a process that Heidegger called 
Europeanisation in his “Dialogue between the Japanese and an 
Inquirer” written in 1959, where he states that “Europeanization of 
man and of the earth attacks at the source of everything of an essential 
nature. It seems that these sources dry up.”3 By this claim Heidegger 
means that the process of Europeanisation has already developed so 
far and in such a way as to effectively block off any alternative mode 
of existence. Such a notion of Europeanisation represents a 
controversial and complex process, which can roughly be understood 
as the universalisation of a Western notion of progress to the exclusion 
of any substitute. It can take different forms in different countries and 
it is important to note that it should not be linked with one side or the 
other in the cold war. At least in the way that Heidegger interpreted 
it, Europeanisation will take place under both free market capitalism 
and state socialism. Europeanisation might be understood as having 
started during the nineteenth century, when it was linked with 
Western imperial expansion in Asia. However, Europeanisation need 
not imply direct imperial conquest. Hence, the contemporary rise of 
mainland China need not be seen in itself as an end to the process of 
Europeanisation.  
Such a universalisation of the Western notion of progress has made 
Daoism often seem under-developed or irrelevant to modernity in the 
sense that, from a western enlightenment or Hegelian perspective, it 
would be natural to assume that such an ancient view of the world, 
with its emphasis on a mystical sense of nature and life, has been 
surpassed. Hence, Daoist claims such as Laozi’s famous statement at 
the beginning of the Dao De Jing that “dao ke Dao, fei chang Dao” (?
??, ???), roughly translated by Keping Wang as “the Dao that 
can be told is not the constant Dao”4 appears by definition to defy 
rational explanation and thus should simply be ignored or be 
dismissed by the project of modern Western thought. This is because 
                                                 
3 M. Heidegger, “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” 
(On the Way into Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz and Joan Stambaugh (San 
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1971), p. 16. 
4  Laozi, “Dao De Jing,” Reading The Dao: A Thematic Inquiry, ed. and trans. 
Keeping Wang (London: Continuum Press, 2011), p. 1. 
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Daoism appears to lack a logical and systematic explanation of things. 
Therefore, it would seem Daoist thought can contribute little to what 
has arguably been the central project of at least Western 
enlightenment thought. Thus the ascent of the West must appear to 
entail the decline of Daoism, with the writings of thinkers such as 
Laozi and Zuangzi preserved as aesthetic poetry, but excluded from 
philosophical consideration.  
However, such an ascendance of the dominance of European 
thought based on a Hegelian ideal of “the march of reason” has been 
challenged by a number of modern thinkers, notably in Heidegger’s 
later thought and that of his Japanese contemporary, Nishitani Keiji. 
Both of these thinkers were influenced by Nieztsche’s notion of 
“European nihilism,” by which is meant the loss of the metaphysically 
foundational principles of western thought, signifying not only 
Nietzsche’s often quoted claim that “God is dead,”5 referring to loss 
of the western monotheistic notion of the divine, but more generally a 
loss of transcendental Platonic values. Nishitani, from an East Asian 
perspective states that, “European nihilism teaches us to return to our 
forgotten selves and to reflect on the tradition of oriental culture.”6 
Along such lines, Heidegger’s thought, precisely by highlighting the 
crisis of the modern Western world, provides an opportunity for a 
renewal of East Asian thought. In consideration of this, Blocker and 
Starling take a somewhat idiosyncratic metaphor, borrowed from H.G 
Wells’ War of The Worlds comparing Westernisation to the Martian 
invasion of that novel, where “the earthlings [East Asians] are invaded 
by a seemingly unstoppable foe, but the Martians [the Westerners] are 
finally stricken where they stand by a microbe within [nihilism].”7 In 
this way, Heidegger’s thought, with its critique of Western 
philosophy, offers a unique historical chance for a far-reaching 
dialogue between East Asian and Western thinking. The rest of this 
paper will seek to present a Daoist response to modernity in the light 
of Heidegger’s critique. 
 
                                                 
5 F. Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (Random House, USA, 
Vintage Books Edition, 1974), p. 180. 
6  Nishitani Keiji, The Self Over-Coming of Nihilism, trans. Graham Parks and 
Setsuko Aihara (New York: State University of New York, 1990), p. 179. 
7 H G. Blocker and C. I Starling, Japanese Philosophy (New York: State University 
of New York Press, 2001), p. 163. 
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Why Look to Daoism? 
 
Even within the relatively limited study of classical Chinese 
philosophy in the West, Daoism appears comparatively overlooked. 
It appears natural for example, when discussing the historical 
relationship between China and the West, to refer to “Confucian 
values” and “Western values”. Such an approach implicitly equates 
all Chinese thought and culture with Confucianism leading to, in 
some measure, a one dimensional view of Chinese philosophy, which 
marginalises all non-Confucian tendencies, including not only 
Daoism, but Buddhism too. However, such a view of Chinese thought 
is clearly historically inaccurate, since throughout Chinese history 
Confucianism never existed as a singular, unopposed system. Hence, 
the movement, or rather group of movements conventionally called 
Neo-Confucianism (Song-Ming Lixue, ???? ), which came to 
dominate China particularly under the Ming dynasty, while taking 
Confucianism as its nominal ethical foundation, borrowed heavily 
from both Buddhism and Daoism. Equally, it is hard to deny the 
contribution Daoist philosophy has made to the arts in China, notably, 
poetry and painting.  
Daoism therefore represents an important aspect of classical 
Chinese thought, while at the same time, it often had an oppositional 
character in Chinese history. This paper will utilise certain 
oppositional or critical characteristics of Daoist thought to challenge 
dominant tendencies in the Westernised world, just as the Daoists 
once challenged the conventions of Confucian society.  
 
Ziran and Wu Wei 
 
Ziran in Daoism, which has been translated literally as “so of its 
own,” is associated with “naturalness,” “freedom,” “spontaneity,” 
both in people and in beings in general. Ziran might be understood 
roughly as “everything being able to be as it is.” Ziran links with wu 
wei as the ultimate aim for the Daoists. The central consideration of 
Daoist “actionless action” is therefore, in Qingjie Wang’s words, “how 
‘I’ can behave in such a way the other’s ‘it-self-so-ing’ will have 
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maximum room for growth and realization”.8 The notion of “ziran” is 
exemplified by the tree in the village shrine that Zhuangzi discusses, 
dismissed by the carpenter as “a worthless tree,”9 but to whom the 
tree later responds that being of no use is “of great use”10 to itself. This 
means that being of no use to humans, the tree is able to preserve its 
own ziran, precisely because it does not get used up by being cut 
down. Such a way of life appears radically removed from any society 
in the twenty first century, either in the East or West, where it would 
seem that any notion of ziran would be abandoned in favour of 
economic optimisation. However, rather than being a basis for 
dismissing Daoism, it should be looked to as a potential alternative for 
the excesses of modernity, in particular, the economic optimisation of 
resources, understood by Heidegger as a defining feature of modern 
nihilism that he associated with technology. 
The defining feature of such an approach is that it reveals beings, 
and particularly the earth, “as the chief storehouse of the energy 
standing in reserve.”11 Thus, what it means to exist in such a world is 
to be a resource. Hence, within such a system, a forest, for example, 
will be revealed primarily as a supply of wood. A cultivated 
plantation forest is, in practice, grown entirely for this purpose. It is 
therefore essentially the character of the way that beings are disclosed 
within the framework of modern technology, that they are there as 
resources. The resources have merely fulfilled their purpose as used 
up in the flow of technology. Heidegger even goes further in his view 
of modern technology, seeing this principle of the reduction of beings, 
including humans, to resources, as extending further into every aspect 
of modern life, stating, “the current talk about human resources gives 
evidence of this.” 12  Hence humans become a supply of labour or 
consumption, in the same way that a hammer in a blacksmith’s 
workshop primarily shows up as an implement. Elements of this 
                                                 
8  Qingjie Wang, “‘It-self-so-ing’ and ‘Other-ing’,” Comparative Approaches to 
Chinese Philosophy, ed. Bo Mu (UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2001), p. 233. 
9  Zhuangzi, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, trans. (Burton Watson: Columbia 
University Press, 1968), pp. 63-64. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., p. 21. 
12 M. Heidegger, “Question Concerning Technology,” The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, trans. Williams Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 
1977), p. 18. 
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approach can be seen in the treatment of higher education in many 
societies today, where there is a general assumption that its only 
function ought to be to train a future generation of workers. Such a 
way of relating to beings reductively as resources, with the ultimate 
aim being their economic optimisation, clearly appears to deny the 
ziran or spontaneity of such entities. 
Heidegger controversially treats such a way of life as having its 
origins within the development of Western metaphysics, but as 
having been spread around the world through Europeanisation or 
Westernisation, to now become the dominant overarching system. In 
this way it is possible to see that the contemporary rise of mainland 
China may not fundamentally alter the process of Europeanisation, at 
least not in this respect, as such a development still clearly rests on 
this technocratic way of life. Indeed the development of mainland 
China may work out in such a way as to extend and further 
universalise such a way of life. While it is not possible to enter into a 
full discussion of Heidegger’s interpretation of technology at this 
point, it is clearly the case that now economic optimisation of 
resources is a driving force in the world, just as competition between 
the rival states was a driving force at the time when Daoism first 
emerged. In both cases the condition is a threat to ziran. 
Clearly, therefore, the Daoist ought to resist such a system. Certain 
passages in the Dao De Jing may appear to be putting forward such 
an ideal of a non-technological society along the lines of utopian 
primitivism. Section 80 states: 
 
Let there be a small state with few people. It has various kinds of 
instruments,  
But let none of them be used. Let the people not risk their lives,  
and not migrate far away. Although they have boats and carriages, 
Let there be no occasion to ride them. Although they have armor 
and weapons, 
Let there be no occasion to display them. Let people return 
to knotting cords and using them. 
Let them relish their food, 
Beautify their clothing, Feel comfortable in their homes  
And delight in their customs. 
Although the neighbouring states are within sight of one another, 
And the crowing cocks and barking dogs 
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On both sides can be heard 
Their peoples may die of old age without even meeting each other13 
 
This passage appears to present a view of Daoist thought that is 
similar to Richard Rorty’s claim about the later Heidegger, that 
“Heidegger’s utopia is pastoral, a sparsely populated valley in the 
mountains.”14 Such an idyllic rural utopia based on ziran may easily 
appear cut off from modernity, suggesting that Daoist thought now 
would simply entail opting out of, rather than engaging with, 
contemporary society. Such a reading would therefore present 
Daoism as providing little more than a distant rural utopia radically 
isolated from the concerns of modernity, which therefore becomes in 
effect, unreachable. Heidegger states “technological advances will 
move faster and faster and can never be stopped.”15 While given that 
such a way of life is based on a fundamental state of mind, it would 
appear that even were a Luddite government to attempt, by whatever 
means, to stop the progress of modern technology, the fundamental 
technocratic mindset would still remain. Returning to such a pre-
technological society, barring a major catastrophe dramatic enough to 
cause a breakdown in modern civilization, seems impossible or at the 
very least appears to be a rather impractical and extreme response to 
modernity, comparable to swimming against an inconceivably strong 
current. However, such a view is an over-simplification of Daoist 
philosophical practice. In general, Daoist thinkers do not advocate 
such an extreme rejection of technocratic development. For one thing, 
imposing a violent Luddite revolution would be acting radically 
against the Daoist principle of wu-wei. At the same time Daoism does 
not simply resign itself to the status quo, with only a distant hope of 
rural utopia. Rather Daoist practices of self-cultivation are aimed 
precisely at living within a world that is corrupted or denies the 
possibility of absolute ziran. How is this achieved? 
The following section of the paper seeks to show how it is feasible 
to look again at the Daoist ideal of the sage, showing how such an 
                                                 
13 Laozi, “Dao De Jing,” Reading The Dao: A Thematic Inquiry, ed. and trans. 
Keeping Wang (London: Continuum Press, 2011), p. 173. 
14  R. Rorty, Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens: Essays on Heidegger and Others 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 75. 
15 M. Heidegger, “Memorial Address,” Discourse on Thinking, trans. John M. 
Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 51. 
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ideal can be relevant to the modern world by looking at both 
Zhuangzi’s thought and that of Heidegger. It will show how the 
approach set up for responding to life in Warring States period China 
can be applied to life in westernised modernity. 
 
The Daoist Sage 
 
Zhuangzi uses the term zhen ren (??) literally meaning “true 
person.” Religious Daoism later mythologised this term to imply a 
state of supernatural power. However, zhen ren can be more 
accurately described as a type of sage, who has a particular type of 
skill and awareness which enables a kind of liberation from the forces 
of regularity and conformity. Through this skill Zhuangzi’s sage is 
able to undo layers of convention in order to recover what, in Karyn 
Lai’s words, is “a more spontaneous and seemingly intuitive 
expression of self.” 16  It is along the lines of this awareness and 
spontaneous expression that Benjamin Schwartz states that the 
“problem” for Zhuangzi’s “men of gnosis is how to avoid 
government,”17 in that they are detached from the demands made by 
hierarchy and no longer hold to the legitimacy of established 
institutions. Such a man, for instance, sees no value in seeking a higher 
position within the official bureaucracy. The use of the word “gnosis” 
for the kind of intuitive awareness that Zhuangzi is seeking is in itself 
problematic, although as will be seen, there is a sense in which it may 
be called mystical. It is, however, correct to say that it is through this 
awareness of wu wei and cultivation of ziran that Zhuangzi is, in a 
sense, seeking to escape from subordination to convention associated 
with the Confucian rules of morality or the legalist state hierarchy. 
Such a mode of self-cultivation was set up for living in societies like 
the militaristic, expansionist Kingdom of Qin, or the ritualistic, 
strongly Confucian Lu Kingdom in Warring States period China. Such 
kingdoms do not appear to closely resemble the previously mentioned 
Daoist utopia any more than does modern society. How can this ethos, 
developed in a different time, still be applicable now? 
                                                 
16  K.L. Lai, An Introduction to Chinese Philosoph (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), pp. 156-157. 
17  B. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 232. 
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In order to show that such an approach can be applicable to life in 
Westernised modernity, it is helpful to combine it with a similar 
approach taken by Heidegger, which he called the “Shepherd of 
Being” (or “Guardian”). Zhuangzi’s sage can be understood as a 
model for Heidegger’s “Shepherd of Being” in that both apply non-
doctrinal religion in different settings; Heidegger responding to 
modern technocratic nihilism, Zhuangzi confronting the Confucian 
bureaucracy. However, despite their different contexts, both of these 
approaches share an underlying similarity. In both cases, the Dao and 
Being as Seyn,18 are seen as obscured. In Zhuangzi’s situation this is 
done by the hierarchical power structure and conformity of the 
Confucian system, whereas for the later Heidegger this occurs because 
of dominance of technocratic and calculative reason. However, both 
Zhuangzi and Laozi seek to cultivate an attitude towards the Dao or 
Seyn that can be manifested in a number of possible ways, thus 
resisting the claims of technocrat or bureaucrat to absolute authority.  
Hence, just as Zhuangzi could see the Confucian bureaucracy as 
itself a manifestation of the Dao, so too does the Heideggerian 
perspective see modern technology ambiguously as both a destiny of 
Being and as an impoverishment in the disclosure of Seyn. Such 
positions appear problematic for both the Daoists and Heidegger in 
that, while both Confucian bureaucracy and modern technology are 
seen as obscuring the Dao or Being, these two ontologies are taken as 
all-encompassing, even encompassing that which appears to be 
opposed to them. Thus, both Confucianism and modern nihilism are 
thought to remain in relation to the Dao or Being, in that they appear 
as manifestations of the Dao or Being. They are, however, both deeply 
impoverished. The Confucian bureaucracy or modern technology, 
while they may become dominant, are both taken as only one possible 
way that the world can be, without the claim of absolute justification. 
Zhuangzi implicitly undermines the traditional Chinese notion of the 
mandate of the Confucian ruler from heaven (tian, ?), stating that 
“the petty thief is imprisoned but the big thief becomes a feudal lord 
                                                 
18 Seyn in Heidegger’s later thought means Being in an ineffable sense. It is not 
possible here to enter into a full discussion of Seyn in Heidegger’s thought. 
However, it might roughly be understood as comparable with chang Dao (??) of 
Daoist thought, representing the un-graspable flow of all beings.  
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[or ruler].”19 As a result, the authority of the ruler for Zhuangzi is no 
longer seen as being justified and based on a mandate from heaven, 
that may be corrupted or lost, but is taken as being corrupt in its 
foundation, with the ruler being compared to a criminal. Heidegger’s 
thought might be said to undermine a mandate of Western 
technocratic progress, such as the Hegelian ideal of the “march of 
reason” through history that ultimately culminates in modern 
Western rationality. Such an idolisation of western rationality is 
referred to by Heidegger, in “A Dialogue on Language between a 
Japanese and an Inquirer,” as the proclamation of reason “as 
goddess”.20 The aim of Heidegger’s thought, particularly his reading 
of the history of western philosophy, is in part to undermine such 
hubris. In this way, Heidegger’s thought undermines the absolute 
legitimacy based on either divine right or human progress. 
Both the Confucian ruler and the modern western world have their 
absolute legitimacy taken away from them by the thought of 
Zhuangzi and Heidegger. They are both possible ways in which the 
Dao or Seyn can be disclosed. Crucially, however, they are not the 
only viable ways in which disclosure of being or Dao can occur. 
Hence, Zhuangzi’s sage or Heidegger’s Shepherd both remain open 
to other possible manifestations. Thus, Zhuangzi’s sage may attend 
the court of the Confucian emperor, but still remain open towards the 
more chaotic way of the mountains in the wilderness, while the 
Heideggerian Guardian may still use technological gadgets, although 
remaining attuned to the deep mystery of the forest. Thus, the disciple 
of Zhuangzi would care less about attaining a high rank within the 
civil service of the Confucian state; and the truly Heideggerian 
Guardian should be less concerned with the acquisition of the latest 
electronic consumer device. In both cases, such attainments lose their 
significance as worthwhile projects. These figures are, however, not 
required to completely detach themselves from official life at court or 
from the use of technology. What matters is that they remain open to 
various senses of the sacred that stay outside technocratic reason or 
Confucian rules. It is this openness or attunement, combined with the 
                                                 
19  Zhuangzi, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, trans. Burton Watson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 332. 
20  M. Heidegger, “A Dialogue on Language Between a Japanese and an 
Inquirer,” On the Way into Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper 
Collins, 1971), p. 16.   
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undermining of the absolute foundations or legitimacy, that keeps 
Zhuangzi’s sage or Heidegger’s Shepherd from being completely 
incorporated within the Confucian hierarchy or the flow of resources.  
Thus, neither Zhuangzi’s sage nor Heidegger’s Guardian should 
be thought of as a strict ascetic or Luddite in the sense that neither of 
them advocates a complete renunciation of involvement with the 
Confucian or technological world. Such an approach, therefore, differs 
from the practice of complete, extreme non-attachment to the world, 
as practiced by the Jain ascetic or the Schopenhauerian renunciation 
of the will. Zhuangzi refers disparagingly to the emphasis put on 
simplicity by the Mohists, 21  who, while criticising the Confucian 
hierarchy and social order, advocated a life of extreme renunciation, 
going so far as to hold that there should be “no singing in life” and 
“no mourning in death”.22 This form of denial Zhuangzi held to be 
inhuman, stating that “to make men anxious, to make them 
sorrowful—such practices are hard to carry out, and I fear they cannot 
be regarded as the Way [Dao] of the sage.”23 In this way, Zhuangzi 
rejects all forms of extreme ascetic renunciation, while Heidegger 
states that “the flight into tradition, out of a combination of humility 
and presumption, can bring about nothing in itself other than self-
deception and blindness to the historical moment.” 24  As a true 
Heideggerian, therefore, one is not required to live away from modern 
society in the forest, just as the true Daoist is not required to live in the 
mountains. 
Instead of adopting such extremes of asceticism, the Daoist sage or 
Heideggerian Shepherd is able to set himself free from the Confucian 
bureaucracy and from technocratic thought. They see the worlds of 
Confucianism and technology as only one possible manifestation of 
the Dao or Seyn, and they develop an openness towards a sense of the 
sacred that lies outside of these traditions. They are able to enter and 
live within such places without being completely absorbed by them. 
                                                 
21 The Mohists rejected Confucian rites and hierarchy, taking this view to the 
extreme conclusion of rejecting all ceremony and aesthetics. Hence they even held 
basic ceremonies such as the funeral rite to be superfluous and over ostentatious.  
22  Zhuangzi, Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, trans. Burton Watson (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 365-366. 
23 Ibid.  
24  M. Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1977,) p. 136. 
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Nor should they be understood as Nietzschean Übermenschen, laying 
down a new set of values, while shattering the old law tables. This is 
because, along the lines of non-doctrinal religion, neither Zhuangzi’s 
nor Heidegger’s thought should be understood as an alternative set of 
rules of behaviour or creed to replace the Confucian or technocratic 
valuation of life. Hence, Zhuangzi does not seek to set out a rigid 
alternative set of a Daoist programme of rules of conduct to replace 
the Confucian rites (li, ?), while Heidegger’s thought should not be 
understood as a systematic doctrine of Being to replace western 
metaphysics. In both cases, such efforts would be counter-productive, 
in that they would be in danger of merely creating another way in 
which Seyn or Dao could be obscured. Therefore, there can be no 
Marxist-style revolutionary programme or manifesto, since neither 
Zhuangzi nor Heidegger offers a systematic schedule of how to 
abolish the Confucian bureaucracy or technology and Gestell; nor do 
they offer a new systematic world view to replace Confucianism or 
technology.  
However, this apparent lack of a structured revolutionary 
programme or methodical new paradigm, should not be read as a 
conservative acceptance of the tradition or status quo, in that, without 
directly seeking to implement any kind of new order upon the world 
around them, the Daoist sage and Heideggerian Shepherd are able to 
free themselves. The ethos of the sage of Zhuangzi or the 
Heideggerian Guardian can look back at the prior development of 
tradition, whether this is the development of Confucian customs or 
the history of western metaphysics, while their critiques deprive the 
prior tradition of its authority and legitimacy. Thus, through this 
process of critique and subversion, the sage or the Heideggerian 
Guardian are thereby able to set themselves free from the weight of 
previous traditions. In this way, Zhuangzi and Heidegger may both, 
to a certain extent, be seen as iconoclasts in the sense of undermining 
traditional authority. The sage thus stands at a distance to demands 
of both modern technocratic and Confucian societies because they 
were recognised, in David Cooper’s words, as “a component in a 
perspective on the world that should not pretend to objective 
correctness.”25 
                                                 
25 D.E. Cooper. Convergence with Nature (Dartington, UK: Green Books, 2012), p. 
78. 
60           Edward McDougall 
However, there is no violently iconoclastic command to “shatter 
the good and the law tables of the good.”26 This means there is no 
recommendation that the whole preceding world and tradition ought 
to be swept away. There is no need for any such direct or violent 
iconoclasm on the part of Zhuangzi’s sage or Heidegger’s Shepherd, 
because they are able to view previous traditions from a distance that 
undermines their authority, but at the same acknowledges and even 
respects aspects of the sacred within them.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Thus, Daosim provides a middle path between complete seduction 
into modern life and an extreme ascetic or Luddite rejection of it. This 
is done through preserving an ironic distance from modernity, so that 
the Daoist sage effectively takes a step back whilst remaining within 
modernity. Hence, when viewed from such a position, Europeanisa-
tion or westernisation no longer appears as the only and absolute 
model for the development of East Asian traditional thought, which 
may otherwise simply be dismissed as backward. This approach can 
potentially also be applied more broadly to a more collective level in 
providing a basis for nations with non-western traditions to relate to 
“the Europeanisation of the Earth and Man” that Heidegger referred 
to in the “Dialogue Between a Japanese and an Inquirer”. This 
provides a model to which countries can potentially relate, including 
Western influence, without becoming completely Westernised, while 
at the same time not returning to pre-nineteenth century or Boxer-
rebellion-style isolationism. It is therefore possible to adopt aspects of 
modern western life while preserving the religious sensibilities 
associated with the Daoist sage, thus taking a step back from un-
critical westernisation and the idolisation of technocratic progress.  
Thus, in conclusion, far from being simply out-dated, the ideal of 
the Daoist sage still remains relevant within westernised modernity. 
Such a tradition ties in with the later Heidegger’s project of not being 
completely absorbed into the flow of resources as a passive producing 
and consuming human resource, while at the same time not cutting 
oneself off completely. In an age of increasing homogenisation based 
                                                 
26 F. Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (London: Penguin 
Classics, 1969), p. 230. 
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on Europeanisation, it is therefore important to look more deeply and 
seriously at such alternatives and to consider classical Daoist thought 
as a living tradition. 
There is, however, a residual danger that this type of approach, 
particularly when focused on the ideal of the spiritual cultivation for 
the lone, isolated sage, could lead to a somewhat elitist focus on the 
cultivation of a few individuals who are able to become attuned to 
Seyn or the Dao. Such an approach may thus easily appeal to a 
minority of relatively privileged intellectuals, while excluding the 
majority of humanity, who are not in a position to contemplate the 
Dao or Seyn, thus being left as human resources standing in reserve. 
Hence, in focusing on the contemplative spiritual cultivation of a few 
isolated individuals, the Heideggerian Shepherd or Zhuangzi’s sage 
both appear disengaged from political life in the modern world. The 
cultivation of such a way of life, focusing on inner attunement, could 
therefore be seen as evasive and, in the terms of Sartre’s “What is 
Literature,” to be lacking in political responsibility and commitment. 
Therefore it may be necessary to consider modern Daoism from a 
wider political perspective as well. However, such a discussion goes 
beyond the immediate scope of this paper.  
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4. 
Reflections on the Philosophical 
Foundations of Culture 
CORAZON T. TORALBA 
 
 
I 
  
Culture has various meanings. The term itself originates from two 
Latin words: cultus and colere. The former refers to worship, while the 
latter to the act of cultivation, specifically the tilling of the land. 1 
Western contemporary understanding of culture includes (1) the 
general state of the mind, having close relations with the idea of 
perfection; (2) the general state of intellectual development in a society 
as a whole; (3) the general body of the arts; and lastly (4) a way of life.2 
It can also be defined according to elitarian, pedagogical, and 
anthropological concepts. The first refers to a great quantity of 
knowledge, as when we refer to a person who is very cultured. The 
second sense indicates education, formation, and cultivation of man 
through which man comes to the full maturation and realization of his 
own personality. The last signifies the totality of customs, techniques, 
and values that distinguishes a social group, a tribe, a people, a 
nation. 3  Culture is commonly understood as the combination of 
symbols, attitudes, and values expressed in conduct that imply a form 
of adaptation to the natural and social conditions within which the life 
of man unfolds. It also refers to the particular manner of adapting 
those conditions to human needs and adapting man to the world 
around him, hence the reciprocal relationship between man and his 
immediate milieu.  
The most popular definition of culture is that of Edward B. Tylor: 
“Culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, 
1  Online Etymology Dictionary, accessed February 3, 2014, http://www. 
etymonline.com/. 
2 The Dictionary of the History of Ideas, accessed September 2, 2013, http://xtf.lib. 
virginia.edu/. 
3  Battista Mondin, Man: An Impossible Project? Philosophical Anthropology 
(Bangalore: Theological Publications in India, 1991), pp. 145-146. 
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custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society.”4 This definition includes cultural and civilization 
aspects. Culture is differentiated from civilization in that the former 
refers to man transcending himself, becoming better in the process, 
while the latter refers to the way in which man adapts the 
environment to his needs.5 Civilization comprises the whole legal and 
political relations in any given society. It includes the whole range of 
relations embodied in constitutions, laws, and legal and political 
practice.6 Both culture and civilization are man’s creation prompted 
by the need to live harmoniously with the physical world that he 
inhabits. 
Human being is said to be a cultural being, not simply a natural 
being. He is cultural in two senses: as a creator of culture, and as a 
prime receiver of culture in its subjective sense (formation of the 
individual) and objective sense (society’s spiritual formation). The 
primary aim of culture is to form man in as much as he is an 
individual, that is, as a unique and unrepeatable example of the 
human species. At birth, he has the bare minimum to survive and live 
as a human being should. He has the task of making and forming 
himself so as to fully realize his being. The whole of man is a product 
of nature and culture. 7  Man is not born existentially perfect, but 
perfectible; hence, he needs to “cultivate” himself. He attains his 
existential perfection through self-transcendence, by confronting his 
given environemnt to meet his needs and by wrestling with himself 
so as not merely to conform to what is already there. 8  Culture is 
something acquired and created. It is a personal creation that 
simultaneously creates and recreates the person.  
                                                 
4  Dictionary of Anthropology, accessed November 7, 2013, http://www. 
anthrobase.com/Dic/eng/. Another inclusivist definition is UNESCO’s “Culture 
should be regarded as the set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and 
emotional features of society or a social group, and that it encompasses, in 
addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, 
traditions and beliefs.”—UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, 
accessed November 7, 2013, http://portal.unesco.org/. 
5  José María Barrio Maestre, Es posible un dialogo entre culturas, accessed 
September 4, 2013 http://es.catholic.net/temacontrovertido/326/2780/. 
6 Yves R. Simon, Work Society and Culture (New York: Fordham UP, 1971), p. 156. 
7 Mondin, Ibid., pp.146, 148. 
8 Maestre, Ibid. 
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In the West, culture, in a broad sense stands for the cultivation of 
the spirit, of the intellectual life and this is carried out largely by 
studying what other people have learned and done. The cultured 
person is one who has organized his knowledge and increased it with 
the help of others. His intellectual work is systematic and fruitful. 
Through study and reflection the intellect is enriched and the life of 
the spirit becomes more fertile; man is raised, so to speak, beyond his 
own personal limitations, viewing everything from the wider 
perspective of a culture, which is the fruit of the work of many other 
people. All this stock of knowledge—properly assimilated, judged, 
and reflected upon—creates a personal attitude towards events and 
so generates new ideas and new conclusions, which in turn add to the 
general patrimony of human culture. No wonder then that culture is 
associated with the act of tilling the land—agriculture—because the 
task of farming involves working what is already there: the land. Man 
has to understand this physical reality that he has to cultivate, find out 
what will thrive best in that parcel of space, plant the appropriate seed 
at the opportune time, and wait until it could be worked on further. 
Necessary interventions are put in place until the produce is ready for 
harvest and for serving his needs. The cultivation of the soil is akin to 
the cultivation of the mind. Cicero talks of philosophy as the 
cultivation of the mind: “this it is which plucks up vices by the roots; 
prepares the mind for the receiving of seeds; commits them to it, or, 
as I may say, sows them, in the hope that, when come to maturity, they 
may produce a plentiful harvest.”9 In contrast, Orientals do not limit 
culture to the cultivation of the intellect but include the correct action 
and good relationship with others starting from family members, 
hence the holistic development of the person.10  
Culture does not happen by chance; it is something intended, 
hence the importance of education in its development and 
transmission, with the family playing a key role.11 Culture is also a 
                                                 
9  Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, accessed February 3, 2014, see http://www. 
gutenberg.org/files/14988/14988-h/14988-h.htm. 
10  Confucius, Analects Section 1 Part 1, accessed November 12, 2013, 
http://classics.mit.edu/Confucius/analects.html. Henceforth Analects. 
11 T.S. Eliot, Notes towards the Definition of Culture in Christianity and Culture (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), pp. 115-16.b. See also Alberto Bisin 
and Giorgio Topa, Empirical Models of Cultural Transmission, accessed February 4, 
2014, http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.153.2700. 
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result of the person cultivating his faculties, talents, possibilities etc. 
in a way that is imprinted in external symbols (arts and languages) 
and in moral attitudes and social institutions. Human culture is the 
different manifestations of thinking and living that can be reflected in 
symbols, moral attitudes, and social institutions. It is constituted 
subjectively through human activities that express and in some way 
reveal humanity, and objectively through work and its accompanying 
transformation of the world to the extent that such conforms to human 
nature and the objective order of nature. The development of culture 
then is “intimately linked to the understanding of the human being as 
a self—a person: a self-determining subject…Culture develops 
principally within this dimension, the dimension of self-determining 
subjects. Culture is basically oriented not so much towards the 
creation of human products as towards the creation of the human self, 
which then radiates out into the world of products.”12 The importance 
of philosophical anthropology in the creation and development of 
culture comes to the fore because this discipline determines who and 
what man is. So, what is man?  
 
II 
 
“Operari sequitur esse.” Operation follows being, so goes the 
medieval adage. An extended application of this could be that the 
product is determined by the one who created such. Man’s regard for 
himself is born of the consciousness of his being that resulted from his 
interaction with the physical world, which includes the social 
relations he has forged. In fact, self-image is largely influenced by how 
one is regarded by others and by the becoming of those things that 
one has willed to be.  
What is man? Contemporary man’s condition is unfortunately that 
of “fragmentation.” Man is now ordinarily identified with only an 
aspect of his being. Some identify him with his actions, others with his 
appetites, a few with his will, a modicum with his intellect, and a good 
number with his body. 
Awed by the achievements of physical science that concentrated 
on the material dimension, man has forgotten his spirituality. Bereft 
                                                 
12 Karol Wojtyla, “The Person: Subject and Community,” Person and Community 
Selected Essays Theresa Sandok, OSM trans. (New York: Peter Lang, 1993) p. 265. 
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of his spiritual moorings, he strives to build an earthly paradise 
isolated from the transcendental, including the supernatural. Political 
systems built on any of these fragmented ideologies enact laws that 
promote such a reduced understanding of his person. Thus, the 
culture that led to man’s apparent inability to discover the full truth 
about himself prevails. 
This development is due to modern philosophy’s change of focus 
from knowing what to knowing how, from being cosmocentric and 
theocentric to being anthropocentric. On the one hand, this shift 
paradoxically led to the proliferation of anthropological studies 
enhancing modern’s man self-understanding at the expense of 
certainty of knowledge. On the other hand, it also led to 
“immanentism,” an attitude that makes man shut off from external 
influences. The methodology that ushered in modern philosophy 
reveals how it is beholden to the achievements of physical science, and 
it thus shuns the possibility of knowing those realities that cannot be 
doubted, resulting in its divorce from sense data, religion, and 
traditions. Following a mathematical model, it asserts that the only 
thing man could be certain of is his thinking, and by thinking, he 
exists, as in the famous cogito ergo sum. The existence of all other beings 
is dependent on the human mind’s clear perception of them. As a 
consequence of such philosophy, God and the world became 
postulates of reason, which were later on also subjected to doubt. 
Detached from the rest of reality, man was left to his own devices.13 
As stated in the foregoing, awareness of his existential condition 
prompts man to create products to answer his needs. Man’s self-
transcendence propels him to improve his lot. Man is not usually 
satisfied with status quo; he wants something more of life: better living 
conditions and faster ways of doing things, while longing for stability 
and security. These desires reflect the complexity of man. It also gives 
us an insight into what he is. The quality of response and satisfaction 
of desires and needs is affected by his self-esteem, which in turn is 
developed through interaction with the immediate physical and 
spiritual environment. He whose self-identiy is as that of a composite 
being with corporeal and spiritual components, and whose actions are 
                                                 
13 Corazon. T. Toralba, “The Response of Fides et Ratio to the Educational Task,” 
Thomism and Asian Cultures Celebrating 400 Years of Dialogue Across Civilization 
Alfredo Co and Paolo Bolaños eds. (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2012), pp. 
306-307. 
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answerable to a Being higher than himself would be more likely to 
create products that exalt the noble aspects in him. Consequently, they 
would enrich not only the person but also the community’s cultural 
patrimony. On the other hand, a person who regards himself as 
simply material and whose existence ends with his death makes 
products that satisfy ephemeral desires, hence the speed by which 
products are replaced without leaving a trace. 
Self-knowledge comes by reflecting on one’s own actions, while 
knowledge of the physical world comes from immediate contact and 
experimentation. Man tests the possibilities and limits of the material 
world, so much so that he learns how to live harmoniously with 
nature, that is, he discovers the laws that govern the use and misuse 
of a particular object, orients his life accordingly, and then projects its 
possible uses. In the knowing process, man simultaneously improves 
his world and is improved, refines the tools at his disposal, and 
becomes refined in his ways.  
How does man improve his world? Man makes the physical world 
serve his needs through work, that “human effort which creates 
goods, that is to say, the effort which puts itself at the service of a piece 
of work, a creation of labor, itself destined for humanity, an effort 
personal in its origin, but fraternal in its ends.”14 Work could also be 
defined as the “totality of human activities necessary as means and 
technically recognized as such, by which men transform the world to 
suit their needs, render service to society, and perfect themselves as 
persons.”15 The production of useful and pleasant goods propels the 
person to work. Man works not only to satisfy his physical needs but 
also his desire for perpetuity. Work enables man to establish a 
family—whose maintenance he will support—and build a society of 
mutual help.16 Through his children, he leaves a legacy that may be 
immortalized through certain ways of doing things, hence the 
existence of family traditions that are preserved through family 
rituals.  
                                                 
14 Etienne Borne and Francois Henry, A Philosophy of Work (London: Sheed and 
Ward, 1938), p. 96 
15 Tomas Melendo, La Dignidad del Trabajo (Madrid: Rialp, 1992), p. 104. 
16 John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, 10 accessed February 4, 2014, http://www. 
vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jpii_enc_14091981
_laborem-exercens_en.html. 
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Work reveals another aspect of man’s nature: his sociability and 
cultural being. He works not only for himself but also for others. 
Because no one has all the tools needed for a fulfilled survival, one 
needs others to live contentedly. Other human beings, at times, could 
be the end of his actions, the company that will keep him safe, and the 
mirror through which one can truly see oneself. The last situation is 
true of friends who are alike in virtue.17  
Acceptance by persons outside the family circle is an essential 
human trait. It is one of the elements that complete the happy man.18 
However, the fulfillment proper for man is that which corresponds to 
the activity of the highest faculty of man, which is contemplation,19 
thus the need for leisure to “cultivate” the mind. Leisure here is 
understood not as being unengaged but as having time at one’s 
disposal to contemplate, to know one’s immediate world, and 
ultimately to know the self. Leisure is a disinterested inner 
communion with truth, beauty, and goodness.20 
 
III 
 
Why are there cultures of different places and different periods of 
history?  
The key could be in that indisputable fact that while all human 
beings are essentially the same, they are existentially different. “By 
nature, men are alike. Through practice, they have become far 
apart.”21 Essence here is understood as that which makes all human 
beings human, that is, their constitutive difference from all other 
beings, which makes any human being a proper member of that 
species called homo sapiens, hence an abstracted concept. Existence 
refers to a concrete mode of being, that is, to be in a particular time 
and space interacting with other beings. It refers to who the person is 
and has become through his actions. Human acts define the person to 
be this rather than that. 
                                                 
17 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics” 1161b 27-30 The Complete Works of Aristotle 
Vol. II J. Barnes, ed. (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984). Succeeding 
quotations are based on this collection. 
18 Aristotle, Rhetoric 1360b 10-1362b 25. 
19 Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics” 1177a 11-17. 
20 Josef Pieper, Leisure the Basis of Culture (London: The Fontana Library, 1965).  
21 Analects Section 4 Part 17. 
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Essentially, all human beings are a composite of the body and a 
life-giving form called soul.22 It is man’s corporeity that is responsible 
for his situatedness in a particular period of history and a definite 
location where he unfolds his life. The events that impacted his life 
and on which his life leaves an impact is the subject of one’s personal 
biography. However, that personal biography is not made up solely 
of physical existence but also of man’s becoming, his transformation 
from a helpless infant to a mature individual who leaves an imprint 
of his being on his world. Man’s interaction with the physical and 
social world transforms him as he transforms that world. That mutual 
interaction between the person and the environment creates a way of 
life that is a particular response to the present stimulus, whether it is 
a challenge to be surmounted or a need to be met. The physical 
environment is experienced by everyone who inhabits a particular 
time and space and is challenged by the same limitations. Meeting the 
same circumstance or answering a need is specific to that 
circumstance and becomes a distinctive culture created for that 
particular person or group of persons.  
This communal consciousness becomes the nurturing culture of 
any member of that society. That particular culture shapes his 
personality and his outlook in life, which in turn influences his 
worldview and his interaction with that nurturing culture.23 Culture 
is not static; it is dynamic. Its dynamism lies in the persons who 
created and lived by that particular culture. Culture could change for 
the better or for the worse. The change could be conscious or 
unconscious on the part of the community members. Conscious 
changes are brought about by a purposive and deliberate intent, with 
one influencing the others for the need to change. The direction that 
such changes are heading in is determined by what the leader thinks 
is worth pursuing, which in turn depends on his self-esteem, as stated 
above. Development of culture takes time and effort, as much as it 
does to either preserve or change it. For the preservation of culture, an 
appreciation of its worth is necessary, hence the effort to transmit in 
word and deed that which can be emulated. This idea is encapsulated 
in Geertz’s definition of culture, which states: “Culture is a historically 
transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of 
                                                 
22 Aristotle, “De Anima,” 402a5-10. 
23 Eliot, Ibid., p. 93. 
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inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which 
people communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about 
and attitudes toward life.”24 
While the education community has its fair share of nurturing and 
developing culture, it is still the family that greatly influences the 
intellectual and moral development of people. 25  Intellectual 
development is not limited to the inquisitive and critical function of 
the intellect but rather involves the pursuit and acceptance of truth 
about oneself and the world that one inhabits. Truth is perceived not 
only through rationalization but also through its intuitive grasp in 
action. 26  While the mind could independently pursue the truth, 
nevertheless it is not functioning like a tabula rasa. The grounds for the 
method of discovery and its consequent acceptance have been laid in 
the family setting with the trust and confidence that is fostered in and 
by the parents. This relational aspect of learning makes a person 
secure in the acquisition and acceptance of culture. 27  This aspect 
factors in as another distinguishing feature for cultural developments. 
Likewise, its transmission, which constitutes tradition, starts with the 
family.28 It is no wonder that when the ruling class wishes that their 
constituents think and act in a revolutionary way, the future 
generations—the youth—are schooled in the ideology that fosters the 
state’s interest.29  
As discussed previously, development of culture is the 
development of the intellect of the persons that inhabit that particular 
                                                 
24  Clifford Geertz, Religion as a Cultural System, accessed October 30, 2013, 
http://isites.harvard.edu/fs/docs/icb.topic152604.  
25 Iffat Naomee, Role of Families on Early Childhood Development and Education: 
Dhaka City Perspective, The International Journal of Social Sciences Vol.11 No.1, 
accessed February 5, 2014, https://www.academia.edu/3624185. 
26 Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1985).  
27 Charles Dhanaraj, Marjorie A Lyles, H Kevin Steensma and Laszlo Tihanyi, 
Managing tacit and explicit knowledge transfer in IJVs: The role of relational 
embeddedness and the impact on performance Journal of International Business 
Studies (2004) 35, 428-442, doi:10.1057/palgrave.jibs.8400098, accessed February 6, 
2014, http://www.palgrave-journals.com/jibs/journal/v35/n5/abs/8400098a.html. 
28 Steven Wolin and Linda Benette, “Family Rituals,” Fam Proc 23:401-420, 1984, 
accessed February 5, 2014, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j. 
1545-5300.1984.00401. 
29 John Dewey, My Pedagogic Creed, accessed October 30, 2013, http://dewey. 
pragmatism.org/creed.htm.  
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world. The highest form of achievement a man is capable of is to be a 
sage, and the highest achievement of the sage is the identification of 
the individual with the universe. The universe is understood as the 
world of human relations and the physical world.30 Thus, it becomes 
a major challenge to cultivate and provide the optimum conditions for 
that formation to take place. It is worth considering that the highest 
expressions of culture, shown in the works of arts and the literature of 
the period, correspond to those periods in history when there is 
relative peace and prosperity brought about by leaders who have a 
clear vision of who they should be as a people. The highest points in 
Chinese history—Han, Tang and Soong dynasties—were examples of 
this ideal. Moreover, those periods were characterized by the presence 
of persons whose deeds were commended not solely for their brawn 
but also for their brains. While these dynasties were established by 
force, their relative stability and prosperity were brought about by 
competent persons on the job, because they were installed through 
civil service examinations. 31  On the contrary, those so-called low 
periods are marked by persons who have questionable character and 
pursue selfish goals. Clearly, the development of cultures is 
dependent on the self-knowledge of those who live and breathe that 
particular culture.  
Another angle worth considering is the intellectual and moral 
formation of the leading promoters of culture and how their visions 
were forged. While most of the influential rulers in the distinctive 
periods of Chinese history were warlords. They nevertheless ruled 
with foresight and moral uprightness to pursue their goal. Duke Huan 
and Guan Zhong of the Spring and Autumn Periods attest to this 
claim.32 The same period was most noted for advances in philosophy, 
poetry, and the arts, and saw the rise of Confucian, Taoist, and Mohist 
thought.33 Confucius’s “primary concern was a good government and 
harmonious human relations. To this end, he advocated a government 
                                                 
30 Yu-Lan Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy (New York: McMillan Press, 
1948), p. 6. 
31 Ancient Encyclopedia History, accessed October 29, 2013, http://www.ancient. 
eu.com. 
32 Spring and Autumn China (771-453), accessed October 29, 2013, http://www. 
indiana.edu/~g380/1.7-Spring_Autumn_Narrative-2010.pdf.  
33 Ancient History Encyclopedia, accessed October 29, 2013, http://www.ancient.eu. 
com/. 
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that ruled by virtue and moral example, rather than punishment or 
force. His criterion for goodness was uprightness, as opposed to 
profit. For the family, he particularly stressed filial piety, and for the 
society in general, proper conduct.”34 
Ideologies and behaviors that the person observed and assimilated 
could promote an encouraging or deviant behavior. A case in point is 
the study conducted among the Chinese youths who are influenced 
by liberal ideologies and are deemed to be losing their Chinese 
identity. 35  On the other hand, it is remarkable that Chinese 
government has mandated a duty that was once a distinctive feature 
of Confucian societies—respect and care for the elders. Concretely, the 
central government mandated that children visit their parents. This 
was prompted by the disturbing news that:  
 
The decomposing bodies of an elderly couple were found in 
their rented home in Louyang, Henan province, on 
September 18, a day before the Mid-Autumn festival. 
Despite being the parents of three grown-up sons, the elderly 
couple died more or less unattended. The tragedy once again 
highlights the “empty nest” problems facing the rising 
population of aging people in China.36 
 
The quoted news article shows a changing regard for cultures and 
tradition that hold the moral fiber of a family. Whereas the family is 
the privileged place for the transmission and preservation of culture, 
weakening family ties would account for the degradation of 
worthwhile culture. The family is one of the greatest influences in a 
person’s life. History is replete with examples of how kingdoms rise 
and fall with a member of the family having a positive or negative 
influence in the running of the government. Take the consolidation of 
the dynasties quoted in the above as examples.37  
                                                 
34 Wing Tsit Tsan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1963), p. 15. 
35 See Jui-shan Chang, “Sexual Revolutions in Chinese Societies: Are Young People 
Becoming Less Chinese,” accessed October 27, 2013, http://www.tasa.org.au/ 
conferences/conferencepapers05/.../ethnicity_chang.pdf. 
36 “Elderly need better care,” ChinaDaily.com.opinion, 26 September, 2013, p. 9. 
Print. 
37 Ancient Encyclopedia History, http://www.ancient.eu.com, 29 October 2013. 
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In the same way that ideological underpinnings have an effect on 
culture’s formation, so too does religion because the underpinning of 
culture is spiritual in nature. 38  The physical aspects are external 
manifestations of man’s touching base with his inner world, an 
expression of himself. 39  However, while in the West, religion’s 
emphasis is visible in its liturgical function and rites, the Chinese are 
more concerned with the practice of the virtues. This does not mean 
that Christianity does not regard noble deeds; Christians insist on 
following the examples of Christ who is the paragon of how virtues 
are lived harmoniously. The external homage due to God, expressed 
in the Western culture through rites, is observed in China by the way 
the Chinese honor their ancestors.40  
 
IV 
 
Culture is a reflection of a person and his community’s spiritual 
heritage developed through intellectual and moral formation that has 
external manifestations. The artifacts mirror man’s regard for himself 
and his harmonious relationship with his immediate milieu, which he 
tries to understand so that it could serve his needs for survival and 
improve his lot. In the process of answering his needs, he transforms 
his physical environment, while he is also transformed by the 
interaction, such that a reciprocal relationship exists between them. 
Observable differences could be traced to man’s existential dimension 
that makes him inhabit a particular time and space, which influences 
his interacting with the physical environment.  
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Part II 
Spiritual Horizon in Western Culture 

5. 
The Spiritual Horizon of Philosophy in a 
Global Age: 
On the Intellectual Friendship between 
Jacques Derrida and Jürgen Habermas 
ANTHONY J. CARROLL 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The importance of the apophatic spiritual tradition for western 
philosophy has until recently been very much neglected.1 The current 
interest of the French phenomenological tradition of western 
philosophy has again brought back into the philosophical agenda the 
place of the mystical in reflection on the nature and extent of 
rationality. Thinkers such as Jacques Derrida (JD), Michel Henry, Jean-
François Courtine, and Jean-Luc Marion have engaged with this 
tradition of spiritual experience and reflection in order to uncover 
hidden and perhaps overlooked aspects of western thought. This 
recent French philosophical tradition is well known today for its 
interest of the so-called “negative theology” tradition. Of no less 
significance, to my mind, is the interest of the German critical theory 
tradition for negative theology. Whilst thinkers such as Jürgen 
Habermas (JH) have been well-known for contributing to social and 
political reflection, the importance of the spiritual dimensions within 
their thought has been more cautiously received.2 Yet, what I believe 
both of these traditions of philosophical reflection demonstrate is that 
there is an underlying spirituality to philosophical reflection today.  
1  See, for example, Gregorii Nysseni, De Vita Moysis, edited by Herbertus 
Musirillo, Leiden, Brill, 1964. The version introduced and translated by Jean 
Daniélou in Sources Chrétienne No 1 bis has a very helpful introduction and 
range of footnotes, see Grégoire de Nysse, La Vie de Moïse ou Traité de la Perfection en 
Matière de Vertu, introduction, critical text, and translation by Jean Daniélou SJ, 
fourth edition (Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1987). 
2 A good anthology of the importance of spirituality for the Frankfurt School can 
be found in Eduardo Mendieta (ed.), The Frankfurt School on Religion (New York: 
Routledge, 2005). 
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In considering the topic of spiritual foundations and Chinese 
culture it seems to me that this apophatic spiritual tradition in the 
West may have a good deal of relevance to considering the place of 
the spiritual within Chinese culture. Often associated with the very 
rational mind of some western theological speculation, western 
spirituality can seem to be entirely distinct from Chinese traditions. 
However, highlighting the importance of the apophatic tradition for 
western philosophy can help to bridge the perceived divide between 
Chinese and western cultures. Other articles in this volume speak of 
this possible bridge between western and Chinese traditions of 
thought and experience in the apophatic tradition and, in this article, 
I would like to say something that is perhaps both more modest and 
at the same time more radical.3 
In this article, I want to say something about what is a significant 
influence on some contemporary philosophy that I believe will have 
echoes in the Chinese philosophical context. Specifically, I will reflect 
on the intellectual friendship between two of the most significant 
Western philosophers of recent times, JD and JH. As both of these 
philosophers have been well received by philosophers in China, it is 
perhaps a misnomer to designate them as “Western philosophers”. As 
the excellent article by Vincent Shen in this volume argues, 
philosophical and theological reflection should have an intercultural 
dimension, which transcends merely the comparative philosophical 
project of outlining distinctions. Rather, using an intercultural 
methodological approach, one should seek to discover the 
universalizable dimensions of each tradition, which can lead to the 
mutual enrichment of all traditions. I contend that in the intellectual 
friendship of JH and JD something of universal significance is 
discoverable which, as a consequence, should not be classed as simply 
a Western philosophical approach but rather has universal 
implications beyond any one particular culture, philosophical 
perspective, or religious tradition. 
My focus here will be on the importance of explicating the often 
hidden currents of spirituality which lie beneath the surface of 
contemporary philosophy. Typically, philosophers, especially so-
called “secular philosophers,” will consider it a given that the 
                                                 
3 See, for example, the discussion of the similarities between Nicholas of Cusa 
and the thought of Seng-chao and Nāgārjuna on the doctrine of ignorance in the 
article by Ding Jianhua in this volume. 
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relationship between philosophy and theology, and certainly between 
philosophy and spirituality, have little to do with academic 
philosophy in the modern “secular age”. They hold that whilst there 
may have been a relation between philosophy and theology in 
classical and medieval times, since the inauguration of modern 
philosophy, this is no longer the case. I consider this assumption to be 
incorrect at several levels.  
Firstly, it is historically inaccurate, as recent historical research in 
philosophy has shown. 4  Lack of historical knowledge is the chief 
reason for this inaccuracy. It is not the only one, however. There is also 
a common normative assumption in significant areas of philosophy 
today that to do good philosophy is to do it tabula rasa: to do it without 
religious or spiritual assumptions, presuppositions, and prejudices. 
The identity of secular philosophy is grounded upon this set of givens, 
and so it is no wonder that resistance to revising them is slow to come 
in the academy. But it is on the way. John Cottingham’s recent work 
is one example, 5  and one will find similar developments in the 
philosophical traditions of not only most Western schools but also in 
the various philosophical traditions of Asia. 6  The reasons for this 
emerging change are many, and here I can only state some of what 
seem to be generally the most important ones.  
The first reason is without doubt the crisis in the self-
understanding of modernity as developing necessarily according to 
Western cultural and social dynamics. The former view, in much 
theoretical reflection, was that there is only one single model of 
modernisation, which de facto has originated in the Occident. 
Furthermore, as modernity is understood to be singular, it is therefore 
also universal in its application to any other society which wants to 
modernise. As a result of this conception, Western modernity was 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Stephen A. McKnight, The Religious Foundations of Francis 
Bacon’s Thought (Columbia and London: University of Missouri Press, 2006); Jorge 
Secada, Cartesian Metaphysics. The Late Scholastic Origins of Modern Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Kim I. Parker, The Biblical Politics 
of John Locke (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, 2004); Maria 
Rosa Antognazza, Leibniz on the Trinity and the Incarnation. Reason and Revelation in 
the Seventeenth Century, translated by Gerald Parks (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2007). 
5 See, for example, John Cottingham, The Spiritual Dimension. Religion, Philosophy, 
and Human Value (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
6 See the articles in this volume for examples of this.  
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seen as the model to be exported anywhere which chose to develop 
from being an undeveloped to a modern society. Woven into the fabric 
of this worldview is the constitutive self-understanding of the 
Western conception of modernity that views its own social and 
cultural dynamics and frameworks as necessarily structured along 
secular lines.  
This former view of modernity and the processes of modernisation 
have relatively recently undergone significant revisions, as 
modernisation has been found to have occurred in all major world 
civilisations, and often much earlier, and in a much more advanced 
state than in the West; as the case of China illustrates, for example.7 
Moreover, as the actual rather than the presumed structures and 
dynamics of patterns of modernisation and modernity have been 
studied in different parts of the world, it is now clear that there are 
both shared and overlapping features of these developments, and also 
distinctive features of modernisation in each civilisation. The question 
of singularity and multiplicity does not result in a simple either/or 
answer, but rather includes features of both in the analysis of historical 
and actual world civilizational investigations. 
To further complicate matters the assumption of hermetically 
sealed civilizational developments has also been revealed to be 
problematic, as very early interpenetration and fusions within the 
major world civilisations have been found to have occurred. Research 
on the silk roads, for example, has found both material and intellectual 
levels of contact and, indeed, mixing to have occurred between the 
Greek, Chinese, Indian, and Near Eastern Civilisations in the first 
millennium BCE.8 
Finally, the view that secularity is the necessary logic of 
modernisation has also been questioned as part and parcel of the 
current revisions of the classical secularisation thesis. Recent work 
done on the Axial Age has revealed a much more textured and 
nuanced understanding of the pathways of religious development 
                                                 
7 For a systematic study of the intellectual connections between major world 
civilisations, see Randall Collins, The Sociology of Philosophies. A Global Theory of 
Intellectual Change (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, Harvard University Press, 1998). 
8  See, for example, the work done by the International Dunhuang Project. 
Available at http://idp.bl.uk/. I am also particularly grateful to Professor Vincent 
Shen for helping me to see this point with greater clarity than I was able to prior 
to visiting China and Taiwan. 
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than the earlier nineteenth-century inspired classical secularisation 
theories of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber.9 Whilst these foundational 
theories continue to be of great use and inspiration, they are not 
adequate as stand-alone accounts, given the current state of 
knowledge that we now have of world civilizational developments. 
The second reason for the change from a classical secularist 
Western understanding of philosophy to the emerging intercultural 
account, which sees religious dynamics as still intimately connected 
with socio-cultural developments, is the current geo-political 
significance of religion. One needs only to read the newspaper or turn 
on the television in any part of the world to see the influence of 
religion on geo-political events. Whether it be in matters of security 
and the threat of terrorism, or in the dynamics of social change and 
even revolution, as in the case of Russia and the Ukraine, for example, 
or in the new and increased visibility of religions in the modern world 
through the advent of the many types of social media, there can be 
little doubt that the classical secularist understanding is inadequate to 
provide a convincing account of the place and dynamics of religions 
in the modern world.10 
Also, within the many affluent cultures around the globe, there is 
the rise of the so-called ‘post-materialist’ societies which are in search 
of new spiritualties to fit our times. The prosperity of many, and one 
should emphasise here, by no means all, have resulted in, at least in 
the socio-economic middle classes and upwards a desire for a more 
meaningful and holistic life and lifestyle. As a result of this desire, the 
pursuit of pathways of realisation, which formerly were the monopoly 
of religious institutions and understood as roots of salvation, now 
have been openned to competition and ultimately compete, so to 
speak, in the market place of contemporary spiritualities. This has 
resulted in a plethora of combinations of spiritual visions. For 
example, in any part of the world today a not inconceivable menu of 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Robert Bellah, Religion in Human Evolution. From the Paleolithic 
to the Axial Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap, Harvard University Press, 20011); 
Robert Bellah and Hans Joas (eds.), The Axial Age and Its Consequences (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap, Harvard University Press, 2012); S. N. Eisenstadt, The Origins and 
Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations (New York: State University of New York Press, 
1986). 
10 On this point, see José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
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options might include attending an institution of collective worship 
on the respective Holy Day of the week, taking part in Yoga or Tai Chi 
group exercises, and practicing Vipassina meditation alone or with a 
friend at home. Moreover, the current transformation has resulted in 
new combinations of individual and institutional allegiances which 
have been mapped in a number of studies in the sociology of religion. 
The “believing without belonging” of Grace Davie,11 the “spiritual not 
religious” of Linda Woodhead, 12  and the “pilgrim and Convert” 
typology of Danièle Hervieu-Léger13 are just some examples which 
have provided a helpful vocabulary in which to express these 
transformations. 
In other words, whilst, for some, spirituality is seen to be an 
enclave of theology, I argue that, on the contrary, in order to 
understand better what is going on in contemporary philosophy, one 
needs to uncover the spiritual ‘tectonic plates’ which lie underneath 
its surface. That contemporary Western philosophy has created a 
narrative of its own secularity is interesting and indeed highly 
instructive in this respect, and it indicates the very roots of the 
spirituality from which it draws its inspiration, namely, 
Protestantism.14  
 
 
                                                 
11 Grace Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945. Believing Without Belong (Oxford: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 1994). 
12 Linda Woodhead and Paul Weelas, The Spiritual Revolution. Why Religion is 
Giving Way to Spirituality (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2004). 
13 Danièle Hervieu-Léger, Le Pèlerin et le converti. La religion en movement (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1999). 
14 Whilst Judaism has undoubtedly had a significant influence on contemporary 
western philosophy (Buber, Levinas, and Derrida, for example), in terms of the 
formative influences on modern Western philosophy, Protestantism has been the 
dominant tradition. This is due to a combination of factors such as the 
institutionalisation of Protestant universities in Germany, the anti-modernist and 
anti-democratic spirit of the Catholic Church until the Second Vatican Council, 
and the anti-Semitic history of Europe which persecuted its Jewish communities 
and prevented Judaism from institutionalising in the educational sphere so that it 
could have the deep cultural influence that Protestantism has had. On this point, 
Anthony J. Carroll, Protestant Modernity. Weber, Secularisation, and Protestantism 
(Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2007), pp. 229-254; and Anthony J. Carroll, 
“The Importance of Protestantism in Max Weber’s Theory of Secularisation,” 
European Journal of Sociology, 50 (1, April 2009), 61-95. 
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The Protestant Roots of Modern Western Philosophy 
 
Modern Western philosophy, with some notable exceptions, such 
as Novalis, Heidegger, and the Catholic Modernists 15  has been 
fundamentally shaped by its relation to Protestantism. Let me explain 
this general statement by drawing on the work of Max Weber, the 
great German nineteenth century philosopher and social scientist. 
Weber, like so many of his nineteenth century companions, was a 
highly complex individual with both a distaste for, and even rejection 
of, conventional bourgeois religion, and at the same time a sense of 
being trapped within this worldview. In seeking to articulate a 
discourse of modernity, Weber drew upon the best cultural resources 
available to him at the time and that meant Protestant ones. These 
included the Protestant philosophy of Kant and the Neo-Kantians, the 
Protestant exegesis and theological scholarship of the great German 
Universities such as Heidelberg and Berlin, and the 
Kulturprotestantismus, the cultural Protestantism which Bismarck had 
employed to provide a social cement to the newly formed German 
nation of 1870/71. When secular Germans thought, they thought 
within a Protestant worldview even, and perhaps especially, when 
they rejected Christianity as many did, including, Nietzsche. The 
origins and progress of the modern world for these great thinkers was 
in the Protestant Reformation and its eventual liberation from the 
‘mythology’ of religion into the sure ground of scientific certainty. But 
the legacy of Protestant individualism and scientific rationalism, the 
focus on the word rather than on the image, the championing of the 
anti-hierarchical spirit of democracy, and on what Charles Taylor 
calls, the “affirmation of the ordinary,”16 structured the framework 
                                                 
15 For theological and philosophical developments in the Catholic tradition, see 
Thomas F. O’Meara O.P., Romantic Idealism and Roman Catholicism. Schelling and 
the Theologians (Notre Dame and London: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982); 
Thomas F. O’Meara O. P., Church and Culture, German Catholic Theology, 1860-1914 
(Notre Dame and London: Notre Dame University Press, 1991); and Anthony J. 
Carroll, “The Philosophical Foundations of Catholic Modernism,” in Oliver P. 
Rafferty (ed.), George Tyrrell and Catholic Modernism (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 
2010), pp. 38-55; and Anthony J. Carroll, “The Importance of Protestantism in Max 
Weber’s Theory of Secularisation,” European Journal of Sociology, 50, 1, 2009, pp. 
80-95. 
16  See Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of Modern Identity 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 211-302. 
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within which the architecture of modern scientific philosophy and 
social science were thought.17  
Uncovering this implicit metanarrative underneath the so-called 
“secular modern discourses” has, until now, penetrated the self-
understanding of many contemporary philosophers only marginally. 
But with the “turn to religion,” in so much contemporary philosophy 
now it is an opportune moment to turn the gaze of philosophy from 
simply considering religion as an external object of analysis to 
focusing rather on the spiritual foundations, or as I prefer to call it, the 
spiritual horizion of contemporary philosophy itself. Whilst clearly 
the influence of Protestantism on the worldview of modern 
philosophy has been chiefly a Western phenomenon, nevertheless, 
through the globalisation of modern theory, this Protestant influence 
has been exported to other cultures around the world without, as is 
also the case in the West until recently, the implicit confessional 
metanarrative underlying this framework being made explicit. 
After these formal and procedural remarks, let me turn now to 
more substantive matters. Here, I will analyse the intellectual 
relationship between JD and JH as an illustration of what I consider to 
be the pervasive and powerful force of the presence of the spiritual 
dimension in contemporary philosophy. 
 
The Uneasy Friendship between 
Jacques Derrida and Jügen Habermas 
 
I came across the work of Habermas as an undergraduate student 
in the 1980s by reading the books on the shelf of a postgraduate 
student who was doing his doctorate in that area. Looking for a 
systematic philosophy myself, at the time, I used the books on the 
shelf of my post-graduate roommate to indicate the steps at an 
undergraduate level that I would need to take to one day understand 
Habermas at a later stage and in greater depth. On discovering that 
for Habermas, philosophy needed to be done in tandem with the 
social sciences, I too moved in the same direction. Later, in post-
graduate studies, I entered what today would be called the “team 
Habermas camp”.  
                                                 
17 Limitations of space prevent me from developing this point but I have already 
done this at length in my Protestant Modernity. Weber, Secularisation, and 
Protestantism (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2007). 
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Habermas stood for enlightenment reason and rationality, German 
rigour, the “Vorsprung durch Technik” philosophy that has made the 
car manufacturer Audi such a lot of money! In the other camp were 
the French and their allies. In this camp were various types of 
postmodernists who poked fun at the universality of reason and who 
saw the Enlightenment project as the continuation of the ideology 
behind the death camps of Auschwitz. The atmosphere was rather 
polemical, to say the least. 
And such an ambience was fuelled by the early literary, but not 
personal, encounters between Habermas and Derrida, which were 
combative. In 1985 Habermas published his The Philosophical Discourse 
of Modernity, in which he constructed a philosophically sophisticated 
binary narrative of the discourse of modernity, which opposed the 
categories of the rational and the irrational, of communication and 
domination, and of the normative and the instrumental, in the 
developmental logic and historical dynamics of modernity. The 
resulting irrationality, structures of domination, and the 
inappropriate extension of the instrumental rationality was, in his 
account, the consequence of reducing reason to the subject-centred 
philosophy inaugurated in the modern era by thinkers such as 
Descartes. Habermas viewed this form of reason as the cause of 
reducing some groups of people to the status of objects in the 
developmental, institutional dynamics of modernity. Power relations 
of domination, subjection, and objectification inevitably followed and 
manifested themselves in what he personally lived through in the 
Nazi atrocities of World War II. According to Habermas, part of the 
failure to think beyond this barbarous account of reason lay in the very 
tradition within which Habermas himself was situated, namely the 
Frankfurt School of Critical Theory. Horkheimer and Adorno, two of 
the founders of the School, had themselves, according to his narrative, 
fallen prey to this subject-centred or instrumental reason. They had 
abandoned the Kantian tradition of the Enlightenment’s goal of 
liberation through reason in favour of the flight into the mystical 
Other of Adorno’s negative dialectics. This left the only moment of 
critique and secular salvation to be found in the aesthetic dimension 
of mimetic thinking.18 
                                                 
18 For two excellent introductions to the thought of Adorno, see Gillian Rose, The 
Melancholy Science. An Introduction to the Thought of Adorno (New York: Columbia 
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Habermas, by temperament situated within the Protestant 
tradition, is a defender of the Law, and hence of reason in a Kantian 
sense, and in a typically Protestant Barthian-sense, is both quite anti-
religion, as itself a form of idolatry, and against the Catholic 
correlationality tradition of analogical theology which is grounded in 
the correspondence between faith and reason and ultimately in the 
analogia entis of Thomist metaphysics.19  
This rejection of the capacity of reason to liberate, so 
emblematically expressed in the clarion call of the Kantian 
Enlightement motif of Sapere Aude!, is for Habermas the source of the 
problem. Rather than abandon reason in a fanciful flight to the “other 
of reason,” he argues that the unfinished project of Enlightenment 
rationality needs to be re-kindled and embodied in the democratic 
institutions of modern society.20 
Derrida also shares in this Kantian understanding of the liberation 
of humanity through philosophical reason. He draws his inspiration 
from Kant’s phenomenology as read through Hegel, Husserl, and 
Heidegger. But contrary to Habermas, Derrida, views the suppression 
of the Other of reason, of the attempt to deny the instability of our 
grasp of phenomenal reality and meaning, which he holds to be part 
of the “logocentrism of Western metaphysics,” to be the real 
philosophical problem of modernity. 21  Also, a supporter of the 
Kantian moral law, his account of universality is of the universality of 
                                                 
University Press); Simon Jarvis, Adorno. A Critical Introduction (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1998). 
19  See Rodney A. Howsare, Hans Urs Von Balthasar and Protestantism. The 
Ecumenical Implications of His Theological Style (London: T. and T. Clark, 2005), pp. 
77-99. 
20 See his The Theory of Communcative Action (Oxford: Polity Press), 2 Volumes, 
1984 and 1987; and Between Facts and Norms. Contributions to a Discourse Theory of 
Law and Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1997). 
21 Derrida is of the opinion that written language has been subordinate to the 
spoken language, and that written language has been viewed (wrongly for him) 
as merely the representation of spoken language. Rather than language simply 
expressing an original pre-linguistic meaning (as in the representationalist 
epistemology of the seventeenth century, such as in John Locke, for example), 
Derrida believes that all meaning is linguistically constituted and open to multiple 
interpretations as it is received by different dialogue partners. This has resulted 
in a logocentric conception of western metaphysics from Plato onwards. His own 
method of deconstruction is meant to free Western thought from this illusion of 
absolute, objective, given, rather than linguistically constituted, meaning. 
The Spiritual Horizon of Philosophy in a Global Age          89 
 
the instability of meaning, of the pathological tendency to foreclose 
the law in a realised eschatology of an ideological account of 
Enlightenment reason. True to his secular-Jewish roots, and shaped 
by his difficult upbringing as an excluded Jew in Algeria, eager to 
outdo colonial France in its Vichy-inspired anti-Semitism,22 Derrida 
was suspicious of any attempt to suppress the voice of the other by 
imposing an ideological interpretation on the plurality of meanings 
and to see the law as something which closes down and excludes. On 
the contrary, he viewed the law as a regulative principle of the need 
to infinitely expand the circle of inclusion and so to defer any temporal 
temptation to conclude that it has been fully realised. In Derrida, it is 
the Kantian conditions which still predominate, but unlike the 
traditional reading of Kant it is no longer the phenomenal conditions 
of possibility but rather the conditions of impossibility which become 
the focus of his philosophy. Whether in reflecting on hospitality or the 
gift, or knowledge of God, or forgiveness, it is the phenomenological 
fact that we cannot fully do any of this which interests Derrida. 
So, for example, for Derrida, we cannot be fully hospitable to each 
other. For, as soon as you say to your guest, “make yourself at home,” 
you are entering a ‘performative contradiction’. Saying, “make 
yourself at home,” makes evident the fact that you are not at home, 
that you are the guest, that you are a stranger in the home of another. 
Yet, we are constantly caught up in these double binds in life, and 
crucially at those moments in life which we value most: friendship, 
hospitality, and love. All these experiences are for Derrida examples 
of the paradoxical situation within which we find ourselves. It is never 
possible to truly welcome a guest, because to do so would be to deny 
the guest as guest. The guest would have to become the host and the 
host the guest, and so a guest can never be welcomed in this logic. 
Charity is the “impossible possibility,” which always finds us lacking, 
and by which we are nevertheless called, by being itself, to react to the 
best of our abilities. Phenomena themselves, in a Heideggerian sense, 
reveal the nature of being in this respect. We never get behind them 
to the origin, to the Kantian noumena of things in themselves (Das Ding 
an Sich) but are always presented with the partiality of phenomena, 
that are endlessly interpreted by us as the world. But this, what we 
                                                 
22  See Lasse Thomassen (ed.), The Derrida-Habermas Reader (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2006), pp. 1-7. 
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might call, “Derridean reading of the Kantian moral law,” impels us 
to always open out to the excluded, the suppressed voices, the 
marginalised, just as he was excluded at the age of 12 from his Lycée 
in Algeria for being the other, for being a Jew. 
As we are caught in this paradox we need to find some way of 
negotiating our way through life without the former security of the 
now post-Nietzschean illusions of absolute and objective meaning. In 
Derrida’s philosophy this task is performed by his account of the 
“deconstruction of Western metaphysics” and in the often quoted 
parallels of his thought with the tradition of negative theology.23 In his 
1993 book, Sauf le Nom (Except or Without the Name), it is the call of 
the O/other which invites always to move beyond; to include rather 
than to exclude which is never embodied in any one tradition, but 
which always, in a quite Pauline way that has become so popular 
today, grounds the universal in transcending the limits of any one 
perspective and tradition.24 All fall short of this law and all are subject 
to its critique, including any static conception of reason and 
rationality. Religion for Derrida is thus both a problem and a 
possibility.25 It is a problem in that it wrongly interprets itself as the 
singular-universal, it is a possibility in that it rightly opens the way to 
the deferral of transcendence, which is the trace of the universal in 
history. This is a key point to his later reconciliation with Habermas. 
After an initial frosty start to their relationship, in polemics and 
tribal rivalries, during an encounter after a lecture that Derrida gave 
in the late 1990s at a party at the Northwestern University in Evanston, 
just North of Chicago where they both held teaching posts, Habermas 
suggested that they have a “discussion”. This discussion, which later 
took place in Paris, reminded Derrida of that haunting saying of 
Nietzsche in Daybreak, “How greatly the thinker loves his enemy.—
Never to hold something back or conceal from you that which can be 
                                                 
23 See, for example, John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of Jacques Derrida. 
Religion without Religion (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1997). 
24  Cf., Alain Badiou, Saint Paul. The Foundation of Universalism (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 2003). 
25  For a good insight into Derrida’s understanding of religion, see Jacques 
Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (eds.), Religion (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998). In 
Derrida’s own contribution to this volume entitled “Faith and Knowledge: the 
Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason Alone,” one can again see the 
influence of Kant on his thinking.  
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thought against your thoughts! Promise yourself! It is essential to the 
highest level of the honesty of thought. And every day you must also 
conduct your campaign against yourself.” (Daybreak, 370).  
This breakthrough encounter gave rise to an intellectual friendship 
in which they would send each other pieces that they had written, 
which mentioned the other, prior to publication, and also jointly 
signing a number of petitions and manifestos (on Algeria, for 
example). Both were greatly troubled by the 9/11 disaster and held a 
distaste for the Bush-government’s “War on Terror”. They also shared 
concerns and wrote in newspapers about the difficulties of the 
European Union and of the need for a common foreign policy in the 
face of mounting sectarianism and the rise of nationalism in Europe. 
Both of them also subscribed to a common concern for the 
development of a post-national politics, and an outward looking 
European Union, and a stronger United Nations which would play its 
part in the Kantian cosmopolitan politics that inspired them.26 
It was in this shared concern for the other, for the ethico-political, 
for the grounding of community in ever expanding circles of dialogue, 
solidarity, and justice which brought Derrida and Habermas into an 
intellectual friendship that helped to dispel the destructive tribal 
loyalties of their various supporters in the 1990s. Such an emphasis on 
the need to always seek to include the other has characterised the 
spirituality of contemporary philosophy. In philosophical terms this 
has meant a shift from the former privilege held by theoretical 
rationality (born in the Greek contemplative tradition of Theoria, 
which lay behind spirituality viewed as a passive union) to the 
predominant place now held by practical rationality, or Praxis, in the 
philosophical account of reason and rationality. 27  Philosophy 
                                                 
26 For Habermas and Derrida on each other, see Lasse Thomassen (ed.), op cit., 
pp. 300-308. 
27  Vincent Shen in his article in this volume notes that “ancient Greek 
philosophy concerns itself more with theoretical universalizability (theoria), 
whilst Chinese philosophy concerns itself more with practical universalizability 
(praxis)”. In recovering the other tradition emerging out of Greek experience and 
reflection, namely, the apophatic mystical tradition beginning with Gregory of 
Nyssa this more practically oriented universalizability can be seen to be equally 
present in the western tradition though often placed in the shadows by the more 
positive kataphatic theology. The emphasis on love rather than on knowledge as a 
way to God in the apophatic tradition, a tendency often expressed by the use of 
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originally spurned the vita activa as a mere propaedeutic step on the 
philosophical pathway to enlightenment, in favour of the vita 
contemplativa, the so-called contemplative life, which found its 
fulfilment in the contemplative vision of the good (as recounted in 
Plato’s Republic, for example). However, philosophy, like many forms 
of spirituality, has shifted the emphasis from the aristocratic leisure-
based model of contemplation outside of the world of daily life to the more 
democratic praxis model of personal and social transformation within 
the world of daily life. The site of the spiritual, in both philosophy and 
theology, has shifted from the static passivity of being outside of the 
world of changing history, to the dynamic transformation of the world 
of daily life from within it: simul in actione contemplativus 
(contemplative likewise in action) as the Jesuit Jeronimo Nadal will 
coin the phrase in the sixteenth century. Mystical union, as for 
Gregory of Nyssa, who draws on St. Paul’s “stretching out ahead” in 
Philippians 3: 13, is here viewed as the continual and dynamic 
emergence beyond oneself to the O/other, as in Gregory’s doctrine of 
the epektasis (the continual drawing out of the soul in dynamic union 
which never ends).28 
Habermas, in his way, also has had a long engagement with 
negative theology. 29  His article on the German philosopher-
theologian Michael Theunissen reveals an often overlooked formative 
background in Habermas’s thought.30 The horrors of Nazi Germany 
have seared into Habermas’s soul the dangers of giving up on 
universal reason as a safeguard against the partial power-dynamics of 
ideologies and mechanisms of exclusion. Law, for Habermas, is the 
safeguard that such barbarism and terror will never again come to 
dominate as it did in the Germany of his youth. He also realises that 
the engagement with and for the other, especially the vulnerable and 
                                                 
various verbs which express ‘unknowing’, is a chief characteristic displayed in the 
writings of thinkers in this tradition. 
28 See Anthony Meredith SJ, Gregory of Nyssa (London and New York: Routledge, 
1999), p. 22. 
29 Habermas speaks, in his own postmetaphysical framework, of the transition 
of the site of the spiritual in terms of “Transcendence from Within. Transcendence 
in this World. See, Jürgen Habermas, Religion and Rationality. Essays on Reason, God, 
and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 67-94. 
30 See “Communicative Freedom and Negative Theology. Questions for Michael 
Theunissen,” in Jürgen Habermas, Religion and Rationality. Essays on Reason, God, 
and Modernity (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 110-128. 
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the marginalised, is an ethical imperative that has been bequeathed to 
Europe through the Judeo-Christian tradition. 31  Like Derrida, the 
spirituality of Habermas is the philosophical-spirituality of seeking 
the O/other which never reveals its name, because it is never confined 
in any one religion or spiritual tradition, but is the ground and horizon 
of the ethico-political imperative, which is imprinted in our 
consciences and, in which, the spiritual finds its dynamism: Do good 
and avoid evil; and which manifests itself in the various religious and 
indeed secular forms of the Golden Rule: Do unto others as you would 
like to be done by. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This is the shared spirituality of Derrida and Habermas. The 
former originating in the excluded Jew, growing up in North Africa 
like so-many pied noir of the French colonial times, and the latter in the 
pietistic concern for private religious devotion and public morality, 
suspicious of too affirmative theological statements, and viewing 
deeds rather than words as the true religion. With a Jewish and 
Protestant suspicion of hierarchy, a Rabbinic and puritan love of 
debate and intellectual confrontation, a centrality of the “other” in all 
ethical pronouncements, and a deep distrust of idolatry in all its forms 
(both religious and secular), Derrida and Habermas represent two 
philosophical currents, emerging out of the philosophical discourse of 
modernity, which have translated the theoretical rationality of many 
modern spiritualities into the practical rationality of the ethical-
poltical spiritual concern for the O/other. At the height of their 
intellectual carriers, and with enough recognition to foster the elusive 
goal of intellectual humility both thinkers recognised in the other their 
rival, their enemy, if you will, actually, their closest intellectual friend 
who embodied their Nietzschean call to honesty (Redlichkeit).  
Different in temperament in many ways, Derrida and Habermas 
found in one another their nemesis. Competition to be the best, to 
occupy the pole position, possibly played a role in their early relations. 
However, as the maturity of life set in, both realised in the other a call 
to honesty, to recognise that alone one is never complete but that only 
                                                 
31 See J. Habermas and J. Ratzinger, Dialektik der Säkularisierung. Über Vernunft 
und Religion (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 2005), p. 31. 
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by recognising complementary, and even contradictory, voices can 
one come to reconciliation with oneself. This strangely familiar story 
of needing to come to reconciliation with one’s own other is told in so 
many cultural forms that it is now so familiar to us. Whether 
recounted in the Book of Changes as the harmony of Yin and Yang, or 
in the epics of the Brothers Grimm fairy tales, or danced in the rivalry 
between the black and white swans in Tchaikovsky’s Swan Lake, or 
analytically outlined in the scientific discoveries of Freudian and 
Jungian psychology, and the Rousseau-like depiction of the 
manipulation of desire in Lacanian psychoanalysis, 32  the motif of 
union with one’s shadow-side is an all-too-familiar theme in 
contemporary culture. 
The unconscious, in which our shadow-self manifests itself, reveals 
another side to ourselves in our dreams, in our fears and nightmares,33 
and in those moments, perhaps during the daylight hours, when it 
seems as if we are no longer in control of ourselves. In these moments, 
these manifestations of being overpowered in the “sleep of reason,” 
opportunities for a deeper integration of the self can occur, if we are 
able to allow it. In ceding the place to the other, the guest and the host 
change places for that moment and invite the prospect of 
relinquishing oneself, that is an important stage of spiritual 
transformation. 
Both Derrida and Habermas share in this spiritual desire for 
integrity and justice in a time in which, after the death of the 
metaphysical conception of God, the former easy answers to the God 
question no longer work. Whilst it may not be uncommon for 
traditional forms of religion and secular movements to perpetuate 
metaphysical representations of God, the majority of people, not tied 
to these institutions, no longer find these ways of thinking of God 
helpful. The resultant “spiritual homelessness” of many has led to the 
search for new forms of living out the spiritual life, which traditional 
religious traditions often struggle to cope with and indeed which 
                                                 
32  See Juliet Flower MacCannell, Figuring Lacan. Criticism and the Cultural 
Unconscious (London and New York: Routledge, 1986); and Juliet Flower 
MacCannell, “Drawing Lines from Kernberg and Haraway to Lacan and Beyond,” 
in Konturen 3, 2010. 
33 Goya’s 1799 print of The Sleep of Reason Produces Monsters represents both the 
beauty and the terror of this and is often seen as a transitional piece in western art 
between the Enlightenment and Romanticism. 
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sometimes seem to undermine their formerly secure power base and 
monopoly. 
In all these various developments, philosophical and practical, the 
centrality of dialogue, of justice, charity, humility and, above all, anti-
idolatry in all its manifestations, has traced out a set of pathways 
along which spirituality has flowed underneath the philosophical 
developments of recent times. Characteristically absent, the presence 
of the spiritual is felt only as a trace in the philosophy of Derrida and 
Habermas, lest it become an idol servicing the idolatry of a false 
universal which both have spent their life’s work fighting against. 
Even for a rationalist, such as Habermas, the sleep of reason is 
manifest in the dark night of death, of suffering, of impotence and of 
the lack of charity, which should never stop us from doing what is 
right!34 The spirituality of modern philosophy like the spirituality of 
the most creative spiritual movements of our times, is 
uncompromising in its search for integrity, for authenticity, and in it 
search for the O/other. The history of spirituality shows how the 
resulting tensions between institution and charism, between 
spirituality and traditional religion, are seldom absent in times of 
enormous change and uncertainty. It also reminds us that despite or 
perhaps precisely because of these tensions and contradictions new 
forms of living the spiritual life can be generated out of this 
uncertainty.  
The spirituality underlying the contrasting but overlapping 
philosophies of JD and JH is perhaps but one form of a new way of 
living out the spiritual life today. It may talk of God more through 
negation and absence and seem to contradict more recently-dominant 
Kataphatic traditions of God-talk, but in reality it is a recovery of a deep 
and richly varied tradition of spirituality which has never been 
content with the simple positivity of presence. Moreover, dissatisfied 
with the individualistic orientation of many currents of philosophy, 
theology, and indeed spirituality, the socialisation of subjectivity in 
inter-relationality with the O/other is the re-emergence of an 
understanding and expression of community and communion which 
                                                 
34 See J. Habermas, An Awareness of What is Missing. Faith and Reason in a Post-
Secular Age (Malden: Polity Presss, 2010), pp. 15-23. Habermas’s successor in 
Frankfurt, Axel Honneth, also speaks of this in his account of secular forms of 
consolation in the face of experiences of finitude. See, Axel Honneth, The I in the 
We. Studies in the Theory of Recognition (Oxford: Polity Press, 2014), pp. 232-238. 
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has been eclipsed in many modern societies. In the story of the 
Derrida-Habermas relationship, both deep currents of the intellectual 
pursuit of truth, authenticity, and justice and the spiritual quest for a 
union that never ends, come together. Not confined to the western 
philosophical tradition, but rather through globalisation, these two 
contemporary thinkers have spread a philosophical-spirituality 
within which both Chinese and western thinkers can better 
understand themselves. Perhaps in thinkers such as Habermas and 
Derrida, we see the deeply held and often practiced beliefs and values 
that underpin our world-civilisations today. Not confined to any 
particular philosophical, cultural, or religious tradition, these enacted 
beliefs are perhaps the emergence, or more accurately the re-
emergence, however faint, of a spiritual horizon for our new global 
intercultural age. 
 
(Heythrop College, University of London, London, United Kingdom)
6. 
A Catholic Theology of Energies 
in Terms of Bernard Lonergan’s 
Transcendental Method1 
JOHN CHENG WAI LEUNG 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Rev. Professor Bernard J. F. Lonergan (1904-1984), a Canadian 
Jesuit priest, has been well known as one of greatest Catholic thinkers 
in the 20th century. Countless Christians and non-Christians have 
benefitted from his systematic thought, in particular his 
transcendental philosophical-theological method for doing theology.2 
On the other hand, the author of this paper has written several books 
on Catholic Theology of Energies or Qis.3 However, these theological 
1 Translated by the author himself, this English version is a summary of the 
longer Chinese paper presented during the conference entitled “Spiritual 
Foundations and Chinese Culture: A Philosophical Approach” organized by the 
Fu Jen Institute of Scholastic Philosophy and Council for Research in Values and 
Philosophy. This Conference was held at Fu Jen Catholic University from Dec. 13 
to Dec. 14, 2013. The original Chinese paper written by the author Cheng John 
Wai Leung (???) is found in the official Conference Proceedings, pp. 273-301. 
2 Cf. Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, Second edition (New York, NY: 
Herder and Herder, 1973). 
3The author has written five English books as follows: Energy and Environment: 
The Spiritual-human- material nexus (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin Mellen Press, 
1993); Carriers and Radiators of Divine Energy (Lewiston, New York: The Edwin 
Mellen Press, 1995); A Comparative Study between St. Thomas Aquinas’s Concept of 
Ipsum Esse Subsistens and the Concept of Qi in the Guanzi’s Four Daoist Chapters 
(Sinjuang, Taipei: Fu Jen Catholic University Ph.D. Thesis, March 3, 2008); 
Radiation of the Holy Eucharist (Toronto, Ontario: Grace Institute Press, 2010); From 
Energy to Energy-Being: An emerging metaphysical paradigm shift in Western 
philosophy (Toronto, Ontario: Grace Institute Press, 2010). Further, the three 
Chinese books by the author are: Cheng Wai-leung (???), Zhongguo Qi Shenxue 
Fazhan zhi Chuyi (Development of Chinese Theology of Qis: A Proposal????
???????:???) (Sinjhuang, Taipei (??????): Fu Jen University Press 
(???????), 2003); Cheng Wai-leung (???), Jidu Qilun Chuyi (Christology 
of Qis: A proposal) ???????? (New Taipei City (???): Fu Jen University 
Press (???????), 2011). Cheng Wai-leung (???), Xin Fuchuan: Wusuo 
98           John Cheng Wai Leung 
works, in retrospect, were composed without the explicit use of any 
method.  
Improvement of any piece of writing is always needed. Therefore, 
in terms of Lonergan’s well-recognized method, the author would 
humbly examine or re-visit the process of Divine Energization. Being 
the spiritual foundation or cornerstone of this Theology, this process 
may represent what this Catholic Theology is all about to a significant 
extent. In this way, the author would see more clearly specific room 
for improvement as regards the future development of this theology. 
Hence, after the present introduction, in section 1, a brief summary 
is provided regarding the Divine Energization process in a Catholic 
Theology of Energies or Qis, 4 this expedition is followed with a 
summary of Lonergan’s transcendental method. The fourth section 
will be a review of this Catholic Theology according to Lonergan’s 
method. Then section are surmmarized in concluding comments. 
 
The Divine Energization Process 
 
To define this Catholic Theology of Energies or Qis, one may begin 
by saying that all the energies or qis in the universe can be divided into 
two categories, i.e., the Uncreated and the created. Thus, being faithful 
to the Magisterium, or teaching office of the Roman Catholic Church, 
this Theology may be defined as a Catholic study of the dynamic 
relationship between God’s Uncreated Energy or Energies5 and God’s 
                                                 
buzai de Jidu (New Evangelization: The omnipresent Christ) ????: ?????
??? (New Taipei City (???): Fu Jen Bookstore (????), 2013). For further 
information, please visit http://catholic-church.org/grace/aitea-index.htm and 
click on theology. 
4 Due to varying nuances in the meaning and history of “energy” in the West on 
the one hand, and the counterparts of “qi” in China on the other, it may be 
important to point out that the intercultural translation of Energies as Qis or Qis 
as Energies is not perfect and may never be perfect. However, it seems that, out 
of these imperfections, scholars today are increasingly recognizing that such an 
intercultural translation can be tolerated and accepted accordingly. To be sure, 
these two terms and their relationship need an ever clearer or much clearer 
definition. 
5 God’s Uncreated Energy or Energies is understood in the sense of the Eastern 
Orthodox tradition of God’s Uncreated Divine Energy or Energies. Accordingly, 
both the singular and plural number may be used for God’s Uncreated Energy. 
For further references on Eastern Orthodox theology, consult the following 
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created energies, such that the latter, in particular human beings or 
human energy-beings 6 , would be increasingly filled with God’s 
Uncreated Energies, even forever in Heaven. 
One may further say that Heaven is when and where created 
energy-beings are forever filled with God’s Uncreated Energy. Hell is 
when and where 7  created energy-beings can never be filled with 
God’s Uncreated Energy. Purgatory is when and where created 
energy-beings are given additional purgation as demanded by divine 
justice, before their entire energy-beings would be forever filled with 
God’s Uncreated Energy. Finally, earth is when and where created 
human energy-beings are given a chance to choose from moment to 
moment whether or not they would be increasingly filled with God’s 
Uncreated Energies. 
The salvation process pronounced in Christianity, therefore, may 
be described as a process of Divine Energization progressing in three 
                                                 
bibliography: Petro B. T. Bilaniuk, Theology and Economy of the Holy Spirit: An 
Eastern approach (Bangalore, India: Dharmaram, 1980); Georges Barrois, 
“Palamism Revisited,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 19 (1975), pp. 211-231; 
David Coffey, “The Palamite Doctrine of God: A new perspective,” St. Vladimir’s 
Theological Quarterly 32 (1988), vol. 32, 329-358; John Paul II, Pope. “Ut unum sint 
(That all may be one),” May 25, 1995, in: The Pope Speaks, vol. 40, pp. 295-343. John 
Paul II, Pope. “Orientale lumen (The light of the East),” May 2, 1995, in: The Pope 
Speaks, vol. 40, pp. 357-379; Vladimir Lossky, The Mystical Theology of the Eastern 
Church (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir’s Seminary, 1976); Vladimir Lossky, The 
Vision of God (Bedfordshire: Faith, 1973); George A. Maloney, S.J., A Theology of 
Uncreated Energies (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University, 1978); John 
Meyendorff, A Study of Gregory Palamas, 2nd edition (Leighton Buzzard, 
Bedfordshire: Faith, 1974); Kallistos Ware, “God Hidden and Revealed: The 
apophatic way and the Essence-Energies distinction,” Eastern Churches Review, 7 
(1975), pp. 125-135; Christos Yannaras, “The Distinction between Essence and 
Energies and its Importance for Theology,” St. Vladimir’s Theological Quarterly 19 
(1975), pp. 242-245. 
6 Human energy-beings are simply human beings who, like any created beings, 
are filled with created energies. 
7  The belief that Heaven is a physical place is accepted by many or most 
Christian theologians and followers of Christ, as it is our whole being, i.e., soul 
and body, which goes to Heaven at the time of our resurrection, following the 
example of the ascension of Christ and the assumption of the Mother of God. 
However, whether Hell and Purgatory are physical places remains a debatable 
issue. Here, the author is taking both Hell and Purgatory as some space which 
accommodates the very being of a person, in his soul at least, when he is living in 
the state of Hell and Purgatory.  
100           John Cheng Wai Leung 
simple stages in this Catholic Theology of Energies: ○ → ? → ?. In 
general, as seen on the left side of this simple diagram picturing the 
whole salvation process in three stages or three processive figures, the 
circle symbolized by ○ represents the Triadic or Triune God8, i.e., the 
Most Holy Trinity, who is infinitely filled with God’s Uncreated 
Energies (Lights or graces as understood in Eastern Orthodoxy). Then, 
moved by divine love, the Triadic God reached out ad extra in eternity 
to create the whole created universe symbolized by the small circle o, 
so that He may share His Uncreated Energies with all creation.  
Hence, ?—as seen in the middle of the diagram—represents the 
whole creation being surrounded and permeated by the infinite 
omnipresence of the Triadic God symbolized by the big circle ○. 
Obviously, ? is not ?. ? on the right side of the diagram represents 
the eschatological fulfillment of the Triadic God ad extra in Heaven in 
which all creatures, except those in Hell, are immensely filled with 
God’s Uncreated Energies forever. On the other hand, ? at the middle 
represents the already-but-not-yet reality of such an eschatological 
fulfillment, i.e., it is still struggling or ceaselessly on earth, to be ever 
more realized.  
This is where this Catholic Theology of Energies may come in, as it 
intends to help people to understand and partake increasingly in this 
omnipresent self-sharing of the Most Holy Trinity who is reaching out 
to share with all creation Its Uncreated Energies, in the salvation 
process depicted as the process of Divine Energization.  
 
Lonergan’s Transcendental Method 
  
Lonergan believes that human knowing is a dynamic structure.9 
Therefore, epistemologically speaking, one may say that the whole of 
Lonergan’s transcendental method is a dynamic cognitional theory 
developed from four universal, self-transcending, successive human 
patterns of operation, namely, experience on the empirical level (in 
                                                 
8  Theologically, according to the tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy, the term 
“Triadic” is more dynamic that the term “Triune.” In general, while the Christian 
East prefers “Triadic” to describe the ongoing interpersonal relationship among 
the Three Divine Persons, Western Christianity traditionally has been using 
“Triune.” 
9 Bernard J. F. Lonergan, “Cognitional Structure,” Collection (Montreal: Palm 
Publishers, 1967), pp. 223 -224. 
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which one has to be attentive), understanding on the intelligent level 
(in which one has to be intelligent), judgment on the rational level (in 
which one has to be reasonable), and decision on the responsible level 
(in which one has to be responsible).10 From these four fundamental 
human operations, Lonergan then distinguishes eight distinct 
interacting functional specialties in one’s process of doing theology or 
any serious scientific thinking properly, i.e., research, interpretation, 
history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, and 
communications.11 
Presupposing that each human being is created as a wonderful 
image of God the Truth, but damaged by sin, Lonergan is convinced 
that one’s “genuine objectivity is the fruit of authentic subjectivity. It 
is attained only by attaining authentic subjectivity.”12 Existentially, it 
is by “his own acts the human subject makes himself what he is to be, 
and he does so freely and responsibly; indeed, he does so precisely 
because his acts are the free and responsible expressions of himself.”13 
However, to attain such authentic subjectivity, “the fruit of truth must 
grow on the tree of the subject.”14 In other words, one has to keep on 
transcending oneself by means of varying necessary intellectual, 
moral and religious conversions, striving to mature ever more from 
one level of consciousness to another.  
As Lonergan has pointed out, there are six related levels of 
consciousness for a person to grow through in his processive self-
transcendence, “something that each person, ultimately, has to do in 
himself and for himself,” 15  i.e., (1) the unconscious; (2) a minimal 
degree of consciousness and subjectivity; (3) experienced 
consciousness; (4) intelligent consciousness; (5) rational 
consciousness; and (6) rational self-consciousness.16 Indeed, one may 
say that self-transcendence promotes progress towards the truth or 
reality about being. At the same time, “the notion of being is not 
                                                 
10 Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 13-20; Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A study of 
human understanding (New York: Philosophical Library, 1973), p. 375. 
11 Lonergan, Method in Theology, pp. 149-368. 
12 Ibid., p. 292. 
13 Bernard Lonergan, “The Subject,” A Second Collection (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1996), p. 79. 
14 Ibid., p. 71. 
15 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 14. 
16 Ibid., p. 80; cf. Lonergan, Insight, pp. 322-324. These levels of consciousness 
will be briefly explained later. 
102           John Cheng Wai Leung 
abstract but essentially dynamic, proleptic, an anticipation of the 
entirety, the concreteness, the totality that we ever intends…It intends 
everything about everything.” 17  Therefore, one may employ 
Lonergan’s transcendental method to study any concrete subject, 
helping him to mature through various levels of consciousness 
accordingly. 
 
Examining a Catholic Theology of Energies in Terms of 
Lonergan’s Method 
 
What follows are attempts to examine the present form of Catholic 
Theology of Energies or Qis in terms of the eight distinct interacting 
functional specialties spelled out in Lonergan’s transcendental 
method. As mentioned, these eight distinct, dynamic, interrelated, 
self-transcending tasks are required in one’s proper process of doing 
theology or any serious scientific thinking, i.e., research, 
interpretation, history, dialectic, foundations, doctrines, systematics, 
and communications. In turn, the author has discovered that there are 
at least two major fields in which great improvement can be gained 
with regards to the future development of this Theology. The first area 
would effectively help a person to improve his or her strategy in 
helping others to experience and partake in God’s omnipresent Divine 
Energies. The second area would help this Catholic Theology of 
Energies to progress systematically on safe and solid grounds in its 
future research and development. 
  
Encountering God’s Omnipresent Divine Energy More Effectively 
 
The following strategic approach is grounded upon Lonergan’s 
eight self-transcending tasks aforementioned: 
 
1. Research of Related Experiences with respect to God’s Divine Energy: 
It is vital to know that each individual person on earth, without 
exception, is living right within God’s universal process of Divine 
Energization, inescapably so. In positive words, God’s Divine Energy 
is everywhere ceaselessly inviting our increasing awareness of, and 
participation in, its transforming presence. As a result, countless 
                                                 
17 Lonergan, “The Subject,” A Second Collection, p. 75. 
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individuals, Christians or not, have already experienced God’s Divine 
Energies to varying extents, consciously, subconsciously or 
unconsciously. Hence, as the first step to initiate God’s Divine Energy 
and Divine Energization to others in the present age of information 
and experience, it is crucial to invite them to do an attentive research 
or recollection from their reservoir of personal experiences, i.e., 
searching for their previous personal countless encounters of God’s 
all-permeating Divine Light, Energy or grace.  
2. Interpretation of Related Experiences as regards God’s Divine Energy: 
As ambassadors for God’s omnipresent Divine Energy, we should 
thus interpret the personal encounters of God’s Energy or grace 
experienced by our respectable clients in terms of comparable 
experiences found in the Holy Bible and the sacred Christian tradition. 
Such face-to-face or subtle encounters with God’s Energy may vary in 
vast degrees, i.e., from St. Paul’s dramatic experience of Christ’s 
radiating Light (cf. Acts 9) in which he was converted to Christianity 
in just a few days, to St. Augustine’s uncountable times of frustrating 
encountering with God’s grace during his long, tortuous, doubts-
filled journey of eventual conversion.  
 On a more ordinary scale, in view of the universal fallen, sinful, 
corrupt human nature, even the day-to-day ability of an individual to 
choose to see, think, act and walk in God’s light should be graciously 
examined in terms of God’s all-pervading Divine Energy, Light or 
grace. In particular, we should encourage people to give thanks to 
God’s omnipresent Light as regards their drastic conversion(s) or any 
gradual change in behavior. It includes their ability to free themselves 
from becoming a slave to a bad thought, instinct, inclination, 
discernment, decision, habit, lifestyle, etc., to enjoying the wonderful 
glorious freedom of a life or way of living truly pleasing to God and 
their true self. As we know, God is Light, in whom there is no darkness 
(cf. 1Jn 1:5). Besides, the Creator deeply desires everyone to be saved 
(cf. 1 Tim 2:4, 2 Pet 3:9) from all sinful darkness and walk constantly 
in His splendid Light or Divine Energy (cf. 1 John 1:5-7; etc.).  
 In this way, the understanding of the personal experiences of 
God’s Energy by the people we help would be appositely connected 
with the Christian God and the time-tested experiences of His faithful 
followers. 
3. History of God’s Divine Energy: In order for novices to arrive at a 
more reasonable judgment, it is pertinent at this point to introduce 
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history to them about God’s Divine Energy or grace. On the one hand, 
we should familiarize newcomers with the history of salvation in 
terms of God’s continuous process of Divine Energization of all 
creation. On the other, we should also show them the Church’s 
historical teachings on God’s Divine Energy or grace. In this way, the 
mind of the newly initiated would be more broadened and deepened, 
able to make a sound judgment about the historical reality and 
concept of God’s Divine Energy or grace. 
4. Dialectic of God’s Divine Energy: Dialectic is a discourse between 
two or three people or positions holding differing points of view about 
a subject, with the aim of establishing the truth of the matter by 
reasoned arguments. As expected, novices often would be confused 
about many aspects or positions of God’s Divine Energy. This is where 
the method of dialectic is to be employed adequately. It is meant to 
help them to establish the truth of matter and choose the correct 
position responsibly for themselves with regards to God’s all-present 
Divine Energy in the process of Divine Energization of all creatures. 
5. Foundations of God’s Divine Energy: As the present Theology of 
Energies is by nature Catholic, it is only logical to help the newly 
aspired to further establish and ground their understanding, faith and 
participation in God’s Divine Energy or grace on the Catholic 
foundations. For example, we can show them that the Sacrament of 
Reconciliation is a Sacrament in which our sinful energy is washed 
away through the Divine Blood-Energy of Christ; and that each 
moment spent before the radiant Holy Eucharist—in which Christ the 
Light Incarnate is fully present—is a personal moment of exposing 
ourselves to Christ’s ceaseless radiation of His supernatural grace, 
healing and transformation.  
6. Doctrines of God’s Divine Energy: The examples shown above 
about the Sacrament of Reconciliation and the Holy Eucharist are only 
two doctrinal aspects of Sacramentology interpreted in terms of God’s 
Divine Energy. There are many other sacred doctrines of the Catholic 
Church which need to be interpreted or understood coherently and 
comprehensibly in light of God’s grace or Divine Energy. In this way, 
novices to God’s Divine Energy and the salvific process of Divine 
Energization would be convinced as never before about their present 
right understanding and sound judgment with regards to the sacred 
doctrines of the Church to whom they have long belonged, loved and 
appreciated. 
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7. Systematics of God’s Divine Energy: If possible, the whole system 
of the Catholic Church, doctrinally, theologically, spiritually, 
hierarchically, historically, eschatologically, sociologically, politically, 
economically, etc., in all their perfections and imperfections, has to be 
understood intelligently and accepted maturely in terms of God’s 
Divine Energy. This is the only reasonable way which can intelligently 
satisfy and assure Catholic novices today of the paramount 
importance of God’s Divine Energy and the transformative process of 
Divine Energization working in and through the Catholic Church. In 
this way, they would feel more comfortable, confident, proud and 
responsible for their newly acquired understanding.   
8. Communications of God’s Divine Energy: For novices who have 
continued to grow and mature considerably according to the seven 
Lonerganian tasks listed, i.e., research, interpretation, history, 
dialectic, foundations, doctrines and systematics, it becomes natural 
for us to encourage them to further reach out, communicate and share 
with others about the Good News of God’s omnipresent Divine 
Energy in the ongoing process of Divine Energization. As mentioned, 
such a process is occurring everywhere for all people without ceasing, 
awaiting the ever keener awareness and participation of each global 
villager. 
 
As newcomers are being led from one Lonerganian task to another, 
they would gradually grow from one level of their consciousness to 
another. All in all, they would progress through the following six 
stages: 
 
(1) the unfortunate unconsciousness, regarding God’s ever 
omnipresent Divine Energy;  
(2) a minimal degree of their subjective consciousness, as regards 
such a divine omnipresence;  
(3) some experienced consciousness of this divine omnipresence, 
through reflections on their personal experience;  
(4) significant intelligent consciousness, upon further 
understanding of similar experiences recorded in the Holy Bible and 
the sacred tradition of the Church;  
(5) rational personal consciousness, in their respective reasoned 
judgment;  
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(6) living in confident rational self-consciousness, as a 
consequence of having made a responsible decision to be open to 
experiencing such a wonderful omnipresence of the Creator, both for 
themselves and others. 
 
Having thus delved4 into the region in which others are being 
helped to encounter God’s omnipresent Divine Energy more 
personally and effectively in the universal process of Divine 
Energization, the following section would seek to help the present 
Catholic Theology of Energies to evolve more systematically in its 
future research and development. 
 
Systematic Development of a Catholic Theology of Energies 
 
“To put method in theology is to conceive theology as a set of 
related and recurrent operations cumulatively advancing towards an 
ideal goal.” 18  Following Lonergan’s eight special functions listed 
above as a series of interdependent sets of theological operation, this 
section attempts to show how Catholic Theology of Energies or Qis in 
the future could be better developed systematically. Dividing the 
eight theological specialties into two phases, Lonergan calls the first 
phase ‘mediating theology’ (research, interpretation, history and 
dialectic) which seeks to introduce us to knowledge about the Body of 
Christ. At the same time, the second phase is called ‘mediated 
theology’ (foundations, doctrines, systematics and communications), 
seeking to help the Church and even the world to deal with current 
and future problems effectively in God’s ongoing process of Divine 
Energization of humanity and the world, based on the knowledge and 
experiences acquired from the first phase.19  
 
1. Research of Experiences as regards Various Energies: One may say 
that this is the textual criticism subscribed to by the present Catholic 
Theology of Energies, in an attempt to research and collect various 
energies experienced by people. In the broader picture, as we know, 
the present Catholic Theology of Energies studies not only God’s 
Divine Uncreated Energy, but also various forms of created energy, 
                                                 
18 Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 125.  
19 Cf. Ibid., pp. 133, 135, 144. 
Bernard Lonergan’s Transcendental Method           107 
 
such as human energy, diabolic energy, angelic energy, sinful energy, 
virtuous energy and material energy in the context of God’s Divine 
Energization of humanity and the world. Hence, the future research 
of this theology should take time to critically research and collect as 
many terms as possible, not only from the texts of the Holy Bible and 
the Catholic tradition, but also traditions from non-Catholic religions 
and cultures. As a rule of thumb, the more energy terms this theology 
can carefully analyze and collect from Sacred Scriptures and varying 
traditions and cultures, the more interest such an approach to 
theology can inspire among today’s scholars and followers of Christ, 
whether or not they are Catholics. 
2. Interpretation of Various Energy Terms: This is the hermeneutics of 
this Catholic Theology of Energies which seeks to analytically and 
faithfully interpret the energy terms collected, i.e., in accordance to 
both the Catholic tradition and God’s salvation process understood as 
God’s Divine Energization of humanity and the world. As the list of 
energy terms being collected could be literally endless, as well as 
immensely confusing and disorientating to scholars and non-scholars 
correspondingly, this task is quite crucial in establishing the very 
focus and undertaking of this energy approach to Catholic theology. 
3. History of Various Energy Terms: Each energy term can involve a 
long history of its own, e.g., the history of God’s Uncreated Divine 
Energy in the Eastern Orthodox Church, the history of human qi in 
Chinese history, and the history of energy in Western civilization. 
Hence, much time may have to be spent in investigating the specific 
history of each energy term. Besides, such a history should also be 
examined in the context of the history of the Catholic Church as well 
as that of God’s Divine Energization of humanity and the world. 
Otherwise, as mentioned, the very focus and undertaking of this 
Catholic approach to theology would easily be disoriented and 
destroyed in the process of doing this Theology. 
4. Dialectic of Various Energy Terms: As we know, dialectic is a series 
of intelligent communications between varying positions about a 
subject under discussion, with the goal of establishing rationally the 
truth of the matter via reasoned arguments. In the course of studying 
various energy terms, people interested in this Theology may be 
confused about many aspects or positions of certain energy term(s). 
Hence, the method of dialect should be employed as often as required 
to help Catholic scholars to establish the truth of the matter and choose 
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the appropriate position responsibly for themselves and for the future 
development of this Catholic Theology.  
Dialectic, therefore, can be conducted at least in three general ways, 
i.e., discussing dialectically (A) the appropriateness of a specific 
energy term itself, for example, the correct use of diabolic energy in 
this modern age or whether such an energy of the evil spirit does exist; 
B) the appropriate use of a specific energy term in the context of some 
other energy term(s), such as the proper use of diabolic energy 
concomitantly existing along with angelic energy within a human 
soul; C) the rightful use of some specific energy term(s) for a certain 
subject or context, e.g., the use of Divine Energy as grace for one’s 
Catholic faith and practice. 
5. Foundations of Various Energy Terms: Since this is a Catholic 
Theology of Energies, the mere existence and employment of various 
energy terms themselves must be decisively integrated, anchored or 
justified in terms of the Catholic faith and practice, according to their 
traditional foundations, historically, philosophically, theologically, 
doctrinally, canonically, morally, spiritually, sacramentally, 
soteriologically, etc.  
6. Doctrines of Various Energy Terms: As the whole of Catholic faith 
and practice are ultimately rooted in and grounded upon Catholic 
dogmas or doctrines, to further connect the appropriate use of various 
energy terms by this Catholic Theology of Energies with the Catholic 
faith and practice, historical developments of Catholic doctrines 
related to various energy terms must be carefully studied. For 
example, the historical doctrinal development of the Catholic use of 
‘grace’ must be ecumenically integrated with and seen in light of the 
sacred tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy. 
7. Systematics of Various Energy Terms: Systematically, it appears 
that in the long run, each branch of Catholic theology, if possible, has 
to be re-interpreted or re-described in terms of various energy terms. 
Such a huge effort may be simply compared with looking at the same 
respectable tradition with a new angle or renewed vision.20 Hopefully, 
a new or renewed faith, hope and love of Catholic faith and practice 
would be reignited as never before for the blessing of many in this age 
in which the traditional concept and reality of each ‘being’ or ‘thing’ 
                                                 
20 Marcel Proust (1871-1922) once said: “The real voyage of discovery consists 
not in seeking new lands, but in seeing with new eyes.” http://www.brainyquote. 
com/quotes/authors/m/marcel_proust.html 
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is understood increasingly in a dynamic manner similar to that of 
‘becoming’, ‘event’ or ‘energy’.21 
8. Communications of Various Energy Terms: In order to communicate 
such a renewed Catholic faith and practice to a larger audience, we 
should share with others not only the various branches of Catholic 
theology systematically renewed, but also a pastoral theology or 
practicable spirituality re-described in terms of various energy terms. 
In this way, both theoretically and practically, this Catholic Theology 
of Energies would be spreading far and wide for the evangelical 
purpose of God the Triadic Light, who is reaching out to share with 
all people on earth His all-pervading Divine Energy, Light or grace. 
 
From one Lonerganian specialized function to another, this 
Catholic Theology of Energies is moving toward a more systematic 
develoments. As a result, people interested in this Theology would 
gradually move to more solid theological grounds, from one level of 
consciousness to another. Overall, with regards to God’s all-present 
Divine Energies, they would progress from (1) an ill-fated 
unconsciousness; to (2) a minimal consciousness; to (3) experienced 
consciousness; to (4) intelligent consciousness; to (5) rational 
consciousness. Finally, they would be living confidently with (6) a 
profound rational self-consciousness, gushing forth from their 
intelligent study, conscious reflection, and prayerful experience with 
respect to God’s Divine Energies and His process of Divine 
Energization of humanity and the world. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The salvation process pronounced in Christianity may be 
described as a salvific process of the Triune or Triadic God’s Divine 
Energization of humanity and the entire universe, proceeding in three 
simple stages in Catholic Theology of Energies: ○ → ? → ?. In this 
process of Divine Energization, God’s Divine Light or Energy is 
everywhere inviting our keen participation. At the same time, 
energistically speaking, it seems that un-Godly darkness in various 
forms, e.g., diabolic energy, sinful energy, unsanctified human and 
                                                 
21  Cf. John Cheng, “An Emerging Metaphysical Macroparadigm Shift from 
Being to Energy-Being,” Ultimate Reality and Meaning, vol. 25, no. 4 (December, 
2002), pp. 314-330. 
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material energies, is also engulfing, binding and preventing us from 
seeing clearly and partaking bounteously in this glorious divine 
omnipresence. Therefore, the more we know about the real blessings 
and obstacles vis-à-vis the current ongoing Divine Energization 
initiated by God the Divine Light, the easier, indeed even more 
personally and effectively, we would begin to walk in His all-
permeating Light, able to appreciate and partake increasingly in this 
amazing invitation.  
It was, hence, the hope of the author that by doing an examination 
of the present form of Catholic Theology of Energies in terms of 
Lonergan’s transcendental method spelled out in eight specialized 
functions, practical improvements would take place in the current 
development of this Theology. Consequently, it is discovered that, as 
shown above, two major advancements may be made accordingly for 
this developing Theology, i.e., (1) how to help others to experience 
and partake in God’s omnipresent Divine Energy more personally 
and effectively in the process of Divine Energization; (2) how to help 
this Catholic Theology of Energies to be better developed 
systematically in its future research. 
Apparently, the eight Lonerganian specialties or specialized 
functions are here to guide a person, and even a theology, to grow and 
mature through their processive ‘self-transcendence’ which is 
something that they have to do in themselves and for themselves.22 As 
indicated, the two major advancements of this Catholic Theology of 
Energies would only help more people to grow from one level of 
consciousness to another. In due course, many would grow, in so far 
as God’s omnipresent Divine Energy and His Divine Energization are 
concerned, from (1) the unfortunate unconscious state; to (2) a 
minimal degree of consciousness and subjectivity; (3) experienced 
consciousness through significant experience; (4) intelligent 
consciousness through proper understanding; (5) rational 
consciousness through sound judgment; and finally to (6) confident 
rational self-consciousness. 
In view of the present metaphysical paradigm shift in the West, in 
which ‘being’ is understood increasingly in a dynamic manner, e.g., 
in terms of ‘becoming’, ‘event’, and ‘energy-being’,23 it is also hoped 
                                                 
22 Cf. Lonergan, Method in Theology, p. 14. 
23  Cf. John Cheng, “An Emerging Metaphysical Macroparadigm Shift from 
Being to Energy-Being,” Ibid. 
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that the present examination of this Theology of Energies or Qis—
which is grounded upon the reality or phenomenon that every ‘thing’ 
is or appears to be ‘energy’ or ‘qi’—would also help many to welcome 
and accept such an inevitable metaphysical paradigm shift sweeping 
gradually across the entire global village, for the blessing of many in 
the present and future generations.  
In addition, let us not forget that God has been viewed analogically 
as dynamic energy or related to ‘energy’, not only in the sacred 
tradition of Eastern Orthodoxy, but also in that of Western 
Christianity. In the words of Armand Maurer, C.S.B. (1915-2008), a 
famous Thomist: “The identification of God with pure esse warns us 
that, for St. Thomas, being is not the mere fact that a thing exists, or its 
presence in the world. In fact, esse is dynamic and energizing act… 
Esse is dynamic impulse, energy, act—the first, the most persistent and 
enduring of all dynamisms, all energies, all acts.”24 As we know, to St. 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), God is not only Ipsum Esse (Act or Act 
of Existence Himself), but also Ens a se (Being by Himself). Hence, 
created in the image of Ipsum Esse and Ens a se, each created being, in 
particular a human being, resembles to some extent the Uncreated 
‘dynamic impulse, energy, act’, whose ultimate fulfillment takes place 
only in and through God, ‘the first, the most persistent and enduring 
of all dynamisms, all energies, all acts.’ 
In truth and reality, the living Most Holy Trinity, being the 
transradiant Triadic or Trinitarian Light present everywhere in the 
whole universe, has been ceaselessly inviting each human being on 
earth to participate more and more in its awesome omnipresence since 
the moment of creation. How are we going to express appropriately 
this most loving divine invitation taking place everywhere constantly, 
i.e., in terms of our beloved Catholic faith and practice? This, then, is 
a truly challenging ‘steering question’ to us intent on doing a reliable 
method for this Catholic Theology of Energies or Qis properly. 
Obviously, in so far as the future or near-future research is concerned, 
the answer, to a significant extent, consists in the more explicit and 
appropriate employment of Bernard Lonegan’s reliable 
                                                 
24 Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, translated with an Introduction and 
Notes by Armand Maurer, C.S.B., second edition (Toronto, Canada: The Pontifical 
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1968), pp. 18-19.  
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transcendental method, which is explicated above in terms of his eight 
functional specialities or distinct tasks of doing theology properly.  
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John Calvin and the Sincerity of 
The Doctrine of the Mean 
FENG CHUANTAO and ZHAO WEIHUA 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The ideas of man as a rational or social animal were often discussed 
in the history of philosophy. Nevertheless, the investigation of man’s 
religiousness also has a long history the phrase homo religiosus was 
often used to describe the human religiosity that humanity inherently 
possesses. Theories about it can be traced back to the age of the 
Enlightenment.1 One big concern about this concept was often given 
to the relationship between the human and the divine. From this 
point, we can say that such ideas as the “knight of faith” of 
Kierkegaard, the “absolute dependence” of Friedrich Schleiermacher, 
the “ultimate concern” of Paul Tillich and, in the most direct way, the 
homo religiosus of Mircea Eliad can be counted as interpretations of this 
concept. Together with the discussion about “what is religion,” the 
question of “whether or not Confucianism is a religion” recently came into 
the horizon of Chinese studies. Emphasis was often laid on the 
comparisons between Confucianism and the diverse characteristics a 
religion has, especially Christianity. 2 The work always concluded 
1  Mark Lilla, “Kant’s theological-political revolution,” The Review of 
Metaphysics52, no.2 (1998), 400. Lilla also made a point that “modern theories of 
homo religiosus originally arose out of dissatisfaction with homo Christianus” (Ibid., 
397). 
2  Many scholars maintain that the debate on the question of whether or not 
Confucianism is a religion goes back to the time of Matteo Ricci. Cf. Li Shen, 
“Confucianism is a Religion” in Confucianism and the Religion of Confucianism 
(RuXue Yu RuJiao), ed. Li Shen (Chengdu: Sichuan University Press, 2005), 113. 
Lin Jinzhou, “Confucianism is not a Religion,” in Collected Papers on the Question 
of whether or not Confucianism is a Religion (RuJiao WenTi ZengLunJi), ed. Ren Jiyu 
(Beijing: Religion and Culture Press, 2005), 164-5. Scholastic discourses on the 
accounts of this question, see Li Shen, “Studies on the Question of Confucianism 
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with the similarities and differences between them, without giving 
much focus on the legitimacy of this kind of comparison, that is to say, 
how this comparison is even possible.  
Human religiosity could provide a common place for discussion 
for both sides who work in Confucianism. The question is, how can 
the religiousness play this role? To answer this question, it is 
impossible to bypass examinations on the following questions: what 
is the religiousness that man has? And how does this human 
religiosity connect with human existence and in what ways?  
Through the investigation of Piety and Sincerity from Calvin and 
The Doctrine of the Mean respectively, this essay first tries to argue that 
religiousness was revealed through these concepts and was defined 
as one’s reverence for, and faith in, God or Heaven. This is unfolded 
in the contexts of the theology of Calvin and The Doctrine of the Mean. 
The religiousness that man has is not a metaphysical presumption, but 
an existential reality, which is to say, it is the starting point of human 
life. It was called by Calvin the “Sense of Divinity,” and was endowed 
by God to the human conscience. While in the context of The Doctrine 
of the Mean, it was revealed in “Sincerity,” which is originally from 
Heaven. Second, this paper intends to illustrate that the connotation 
of religiousness bridges the human starting point and end point: the 
goodness that man pursues. According to Calvin, reverence and love, 
which constitute Piety, not only reveal human religiosity, but also 
pave the way for seeking the good. This is also true for the concept of 
Sincerity. Because, on the one hand, religiousness was shown in one’s 
emotions of “pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy” with “Sincerity.” On 
the other hand, these emotions drive people towards goodness.  
 
Piety and the Sense of Divinity 
 
To clarify questions of how human religiosity was revealed in 
Piety, and how this religiousness connects with human existential 
reality, the meaning of Piety should first be investigated in the context 
of Calvin’s theology. 
                                                 
in Recent Twenty Years,” in Collected Papers on the Question of whether or not 
Confucianism is a Religion (RuJiao WenTi ZengLunJi), ed. Ren Jiyu (Beijing: Religion 
and Culture Press, 2005), 470-479, and Li Huawei, “The Carrier and Influence of 
the Revival of Confucianism as Religion in Contemporary Mainland China, 
“Journal of Religious Studies 60, no.3 (2013).  
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Before that, the reasons why these two concepts, that is, Piety and 
Sincerity, were selected for comparison should first be explained. It is 
well known that, when Piety was talked about in the comparative 
studies of Chinese and Western philosophy, two classical examples 
were often mentioned: Euthyphro’s charge against his father for 
murder in Plato’s dialogue of Euthyphro, and Confucius’ discussion 
about filial piety in Zi Lu Pian of the Analects. For Plato, the ethical 
implications between father and son, which is filial piety, was 
magnified in Piety. Nevertheless, piety points heavily to the 
relationship between the human and the Divine, since it connects with 
justice discussed by Plato. 3  Piety is the key to understanding the 
knowledge of God and self-knowledge in Calvin's context. In the 
Analects, however, Confucius’ understanding of “uprightness” is 
different from that of the neighbor of the Duke of Sheh. 4  Zhu Xi 
interprets this concept as “the way of Heaven and people’s natural 
emotion for the father to conceal the misconduct of the son, and vice 
versa.”5 From this viewpoint, the uprightness that Confucius held is 
the relationship between son and father that follows the order of 
Heaven, which was often called “filial piety” (xiao ?). It is, therefore, 
the relationship between the human and the Divine that Piety dealt 
with, whereas filial piety usually dealt with ethical relationships 
among men. From this viewpoint, it is inappropriate for us to compare 
Piety and filial piety since they focus on different topics. The Sincerity 
of the Doctrine of the Mean, however, not only has its origin in Heaven, 
but also is the foundation for one’s life in becoming a gentleman (junzi 
??).6 Piety has similar functions in the theology of Calvin, as will be 
                                                 
3 For Plato, one thing for sure is the idea that the meaning of Piety relates to 
Justice, “One should only watch whether the killer acted justly or not; if he acted 
justly, let him go, but if not, one should prosecute, if, that is to say, the killer shares 
your hearth and table”. Plato, Euthyphro (4B). Cf. Plato, The Collected Dialogues of 
Plato. ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).  
4 Analects, Tsze-lu (13:18). James Legge, The Chinese Classics. Vol.1. Confucian 
Analects (HK.1861).  
5 Zhu Xi, Commentaries on the Four Books (Sishu Zhangju Jizhu), ed. Li Jingde 
(Taipei: Zhengzhong Press, 1962).  
6 Sincerity as the “interconnectedness” between human beings and Heaven, 
between what was called by Shen as “the true Reality itself and the true self” is a 
traditional understanding of it. Cf. Vincent Shen, “Some Thoughts on 
Intercultural Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 
30, no.3&4 (2003):365. 
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illustrated later. In essence, therefore, it is the religiousness shown in 
these two conceptions, and the similar role they play in the 
relationship between the human and the divine, that makes these two 
conceptions appropriate foci for our analysis.  
By “Piety” Calvin means “reverence joined with love of God which 
the knowledge of his benefits induces” (I.2.1).7 
What is Calvin’s purpose in proposing the concept of piety? As we 
can see, Calvin, at this place, tries to respond to Socrates and Plato in 
answering these two questions that have puzzled philosophers for 
centuries. In the Dialogue of the Minos, with Socrates, Plato held the 
idea that “man is living for good.”8 This principle for one’s living 
raised two kinds of questions. First, what is man? That is to say, 
questions about man’s originality, nature and living condition. 
Secondly, how can man search for the good? That is to say, questions 
about goodness, and the ways to goodness. Socrates thus devoted his 
life to the investigation of the “knowledge of self.” In the context of 
Christianity, especially after Augustine, these two questions 
transformed into questions about sin and justification. Calvin’s 
twofold divisions about human knowledge, the knowledge of God 
and self-knowledge, correspond to his classification of the existential 
situation man lives in. According to Calvin, the situation that man 
lives in was divided by the fall of Adam into two parts. Calvin believes 
that there are two parts of “self-knowledge,” which is, man’s “lack of 
abilities,” as Calvin described, “what we were given at creation” 
(II.1.1), and “the purpose for which he was created,” “the nature of his 
duty,” as Calvin said, “zeal for righteousness and goodness” (II.1.3). 
These two issues echo the question of what is man and how can one 
get to the fulfillment of goodness. What is special for Calvin is his 
concept of Piety in uniting these two questions and revealing human 
religiosity. 
Through the “sense of Divinity,” Calvin clarified his 
understanding of Piety and inquired about its relation to one’s 
religiousness.  
                                                 
7 Institutes?.2.1. Cf. John Calvin, Calvin: Institutes of the Christian Religion. 
Trans. Ford Lewis Battles, Ed. John T. McNeill, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Westminster 
Press, 1960). The reference of the quotation from the Institutes will be marked in 
the form of ?.1.1 in the main text of this paper hereafter unless otherwise 
specified.  
8 G. X. Santas, Socrates (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), Ch.6 especially. 
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First of all, Calvin assumes that people are born with the sense of 
Divinity9 (Divinitatis sensum) which was implanted by God himself 
into the human heart (I.3.1). Our question is, why was Calvin saying 
so? As we shall see, he intends to prove man’s religiousness through 
his own answering of the traditional question of the existence of God, 
and his interpretations of “revelation.”  
For one thing, according to Calvin, human existence correlates 
closely with the belief in the existence of God. Calvin is not going to 
avoid the question of whether God exists or not, which is controversial 
in the history of theology, but, rather to demonstrate it through its 
linkage with human existence. For Calvin, the existence of God is not 
an ontological presumption, but an existential reality. As Calvin has 
put it, “What is God? Men who pose this question are merely toying 
with idle speculation. It is more important for us to know that God is 
and what is consistent with his nature” (:2.2). At this point, Calvin 
follows his way of thinking which was clearly stated at the very 
beginning of his Institutes. The knowledge of God cannot be separated 
from self-knowledge. It is obvious that, later on, Reformed theology’s 
emphasis on the grace of God and the faithful response concerning 
earthly things, is the mainstream of Reformed Christianity, and begins 
with Calvin’s two distinctions about human knowledge. 10The sense 
of Divinity thus was framed by these two dimensions: “existence of 
God” and the belief in it.  
Calvin believes that there is a firm conviction in the human mind 
“from which the inclination toward religion springs as from a seed” 
(I.3.2).To those who deny the existence of God, Calvin continues, the 
“vengeance of divine majesty” strikes their conscience. This existential 
reality itself implies that “some conception of God is ever alive in all 
men’s minds,” even to Gaius Caligula, the Roman emperor who 
                                                 
9 Battles believes that for Calvin, the sense of Divinity can be interchanged with 
“seed of religion,” which is the moral response to God. Institutes?.3.1.note2.  
10 Scholarship in this area always focuses on this point. In his analysis on the 
comparison between Calvin’s understanding of the concept of revelation and that 
of Richard Niebuhr’s, Ottati depicts the main charter of Reformed Christianity in 
this broad way: “For Reformed Christianity, then, emphasis falls on a life oriented 
toward God and God’s encompassing reign,” “It is a reflective enterprise that tries 
to help us envision God, the world, and ourselves in relation”. Cf. Douglas F. 
Ottati, “Reformed Theology, Revelation, and Particularity: John Calvin and H. 
Richard Niebuhr,” Crosscurrents59, no.2 (2009):129.  
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despised the gods in the boldest way (I.3.2). As to what kind of reality 
this existential is, Calvin at this point echoed Augustine who divided 
human existence into two parts: before the Fall and after the Fall of 
Adam. When Adam was created, God bestowed “uprightness” on 
him, in which there was “reason” and “emotion.” At this time, 
according to Calvin, “emotion” was led by “reason” to knowledge of 
God (I.15.3). After the Fall, the uprightness transformed into the sense 
of Divinity which consists in what Calvin called the conviction of the 
existence of God. What is meant here is that without the sense of 
Divinity, there is no human existence. In this sense, we call the sense 
of Divinity the starting point for one’s living. The existence of God for 
Calvin, therefore, is not an ontological presumption, but an existential 
fact. In short, the way in which Calvin addressed the question of the 
existence of God is through its connection to man’s inhabited nature: 
the “sense of divinity is by nature engraved on human hearts” (I.4.4). 
However, though people are born with the sense of Divinity, not 
all of them have a sense of it, especially those who live after the Fall. 
Calvin, on one hand explains reasons for this phenomenon. At the 
same time, he points out that, as channels in receiving God’s 
revelation, reason and faith, which were included in Piety, are the two 
factors that make this sense of divinity visible in one’s mind. 
Calvin said that no real piety remains in this world (I.4.1). Believing 
in man himself, rather than God, is the reason for this. For those who 
deny the existence of God - the atheist, Calvin made reference to the 
fool in Psalms (I.4.2) and the Roman emperor Gaius Caligula (I.3.2). 
The concept of “conscience” was used by Calvin to analyze the 
reasons those people give for their negative attitude to the existence 
of God. Battles claims that the “sense of divinity” and the “seed of 
religion” have identical implications, and both of them are closely 
connected with “conscience,” which refers to “a moral response to 
God” (I.3.1.note.2). But Calvin also maintains that through human 
reason, by which good and evil were distinguished, a judgment of 
what is right or wrong was made (II.2.12), which is an essential 
element of the image of God (II.2.17). In this light, conscience, 
therefore, not only refers to the response to God about good and evil, 
but also implies the measurement based on which judgements about 
right or wrong are made.  
The fundamental reason for Gaius Caligula’s impiousness, thus, 
would be this: he always gave full trust to his own ideas about good 
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and evil, right and wrong instead of following orders from God. When 
people like him have the experience of the shortage of their natural 
ability, they will investigate the criterion itself based on which 
judgments were always made. The result of this examination would 
be, just like what Calvin vividly called “a strike” on their conscience 
(I.3.2). Power, ability, and ideas they always relied on become 
powerlessness, non-ability and helplessness. What is left for the 
conscience would be fear of Almighty God. The people who live in 
this hopeless situation will be startled at “the rustle of a falling leaf” 
(I.3.2). In this respect, we can say that the reverence of God comes after 
one’s experience of one’s own limitations or what Calvin called “lack 
of ability” (II.1.3), and it thus constitutes one of the dimensions of 
human religiosity. 
On the other hand, with the help of reason and faith, God's 
“revelation” comes into the realm of human knowledge. One’s 
conscience, which is the “sense of divinity,” is thus awakened. Two 
kinds of “revelation” were distinguished by Calvin: general revelation 
and specific revelation. The term ‘general revelation’ was not used in 
a clear way in the Institutes, but one thing that is certain for Calvin is 
that knowledge of God can be known through God’s sovereign and 
universal reign among his creatures (I.4.), even though whether 
Calvin approves of natural theology or not is debatable.11 The way 
that God reveals himself through creatures, parallel to his “specific 
revelation,” can thus be called “general revelation”. There are two 
places in the Institutes that clearly mention two kinds of divisions 
about God’s revelation: “besides the specific doctrine of faith and 
repentance that sets forth Christ as Mediator, Scripture adorns with 
unmistakable marks and tokens the one true God, in that he has 
created and governs the universe, in order that he may not be mixed 
up with the throng of false gods” (I.6.2.p.41); and “indeed, the 
knowledge of God set forth for us in Scripture is destined for the very 
same goal as the knowledge whose imprint shines in his creatures, in 
that it invites us first to fear God, then to trust in him” (I.10.2). As for 
general revelation, emphasis falls on the reason which God reveals.12 
                                                 
11 Cf. Emil Brunner, Karl Barth, Natural Theology: Comprising “Nature and Grace” 
by Professor Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply, “No!” by Dr. Karl Barth. 2nd. Trans. 
Peter Fraenkel, ed. Eugene (OR: Wipf and Stock, 2002). 
12 We are not going to give a full discussion here to the meaning of “reason,” 
how it works in knowing God, and questions about “Holy Spirit Certainty” (HSC). 
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Calvin acknowledges that God’s revelation can be known by human 
reason, as expressed by him, the revelation which is explicitly shown 
in the creatures is knowable in “art” and “science.” 13  Works and 
wisdom of God are knowable to all people, but it requires a 
comparatively high intelligence to know how it works (I.5.2). God’s 
specific revelation, however, refers to such spiritual doctrines as 
Trinity, Incarnation or the “specific doctrine of faith and repentance” 
(I.6.2). It centers on faith in opposition to general revelation’s focus on 
the human reason. At this point, Calvin maintains the certainty of 
biblical teachings up to the self-authentication of the Holy Spirit. The 
assumption of this idea is that “truth proves itself to be true.” What is 
needed for this self-proven truth is one’s faithful confirmation of the 
words of Scripture. Calvin said “truth is cleared of all doubt when, not 
sustained by external props, it serves as its own support.”14 In short, 
we thus can see that reason and faith, by the different roles they play, 
by “general revelation” and “specific revelation,” can lead to get to 
know and trust in God. With these, the human conscience develops 
and the sense of the divine becomes known, the seed of religion which 
was once buried in the heart begins to grow up, and human religiosity 
finally becomes visible to one’s knowledge. 
Secondly, piety contains reason and faith by which the sense of the 
divine shows itself. Moreover, it is the purpose for the fallen person to 
pursue. This means that piety, as the starting point of human life, 
which was called the sense of divinity, meanwhile is the purpose for 
one’s devoted living. After one’s fear of God, it always comes with full 
trust and complete dependence on the truth and God, which is 
another dimension that frames human religiousness. Two 
fundamental elements of piety, which are reason and faith, bridged 
these two endings of one’s faithful life to God. Based on Calvin’s 
distinctions on the human living condition, as pointed out by him 
when discussing self-knowledge, “this knowledge of ourselves is 
twofold: namely, to know what we were like when we were first 
created, and what our condition became after the fall of Adam” 
(I.15.1). Calvin gives “piety” three different names for various 
                                                 
For more details, see Charles Partee, The Theology of John Calvin (Kentucky: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 2008), 65ff. Paul Helm, John Calvin’s Ideas (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 255-7. 
13 Institutes?.2.13-6. 
14 Institutes?.8.1. 
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concerns: uprightness before the Fall (I.2.1), sense of divinity or seed 
of religion, as the beginning of one’s life after the Fall (I.3.1), and the 
renewed image of God or the Piety, as the end which one’s life 
searches (I.15.4). The sense of divinity or seed of religion originates 
from “uprightness” which was clearly defined by Calvin when talking 
about the “image of God”: “accordingly, the integrity with which 
Adam was endowed is expressed by this word, when he had full 
possession of right understanding, when he had his affections kept 
within the bounds of reason, all his senses tempered in right order, 
and he truly referred his excellence to exceptional gifts bestowed upon 
him by his Maker” (I.15.3). Emotions or “affections” and “reason” are 
thus two distinctive parts that harmoniously constitute “uprightness,” 
and both of them guide people in glorifying and knowing God (I.2.1). 
As observed by Calvin, reverence and love to God, which is pious and 
emotional recognition of the reality of God, leads people “first to fear 
God, then to trust in him” (I.10.2). “Emotions” and “reason” were not 
lost with the Fall of Adam since the image of God remains in human 
beings. But the sense of divinity was dimmed or obscured by sin, and 
reason leads to emotion instead of glorifying God, to “atheism,” 
“superstition” or “idolatry.” People give their trust to themselves 
rather than believing in God, and forget the reason why they come 
into this world and where they originally come from (II.1.3). As Calvin 
said, they always confuse the Creator with creatures. But this way of 
living ends with fear of God, or the awakening of a sense of divinity 
since the foundation they basically once relied on now collapses. 
Nothing is left but the fear of God and fear always correlates with the 
submission of one’s authority of judgment to the thing feared, which 
is God in the context of Christianity. As noted by Calvin, “the 
knowledge whose imprint shines in his creatures…invites us first to 
fear God, then to trust in him” (I.10.2). The understanding of fear for 
Calvin echoes with that of St. Thomas, who defines fear in this way 
while working on clarifying the relationship between fear and 
wisdom: “man must first of all fear God and submit himself to Him: 
for the result will be that in all things he will be ruled by God.” He 
continues “the fear of God is compared to a man’s whole life that is 
ruled by God’s wisdom, as the root to the tree.”15Foundation they once 
                                                 
15  ST II-II, q.12, a.7. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica Ed. Benziger Bros. 
(CCEL.1947), 2825. 
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depended on for their ethical and rational judgements of good or evil, 
right or wrong, now transfers from their own reason and belief to 
dependence on God, which is the renewed image of God or Piety. 
Therefore, it is by reason and faith which were included in the Piety, 
that the dimmed “sense of divine” becomes visible in the image of 
God, and dependence on God thus becomes the other dimension of 
human religiousness. 
In a nutshell, the reality of God lies with the self-authentication of 
truth or the word of God, and in its correlation with the sense of the 
divine. The seed of religion was planted by God in the human heart, 
but it was obscured by human self-righteousness. Man always give 
his full trust to his own reason or beliefs, and most of the time this will 
result in the observing of one’s conscience regarding the human 
limitations of both one’s ability and knowledge. That is to say, the final 
result of people placing their trust in themselves(which was called by 
Calvin the “carnal judgment”) is the beginning of knowing God in 
fear, which is the submission of oneself to God (divine 
judgment).16God reveals himself in ways of “general revelation” and 
“specific revelation,” through which people get to know God. Trust in 
God as a natural result comes after one’s recognition of one’s own 
“lack of abilities” (II.1.3) in the examination of oneself. Fear of God 
and dependence on him thus would be the implication of human 
religiousness in the context of the theology of Calvin.  
 
Sincerity and Heaven 
 
It is recognized that two main questions have been examined 
through the history of philosophy, namely, what is man, and how can 
man seek goodness. There is no exception for Confucianism, 
especially for the Pre-Qin period. In the Chinese context, these two 
questions were discussed in the following forms: whether human nature 
is good or evil, and how can one be sanctified or to become a gentleman- a 
good person. They are effectively connected with each other till the 
appearance of Sincerity of the Doctrine of the Mean. Man who lives 
according to the Mean was described as one whose life is in 
accordance with Heaven in the Confucian Analects.17 Confucius also 
                                                 
16 Institutes?.1.3. 
17 When Confucius was asked about the nature of Rite (Li ?), he concludes it 
with the statement of the Mean according to Zhu Xi’s interpretation. “Lin Fang 
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claims that “by nature, men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to 
be very different.”18The “nature” (xing ?), however, was not given 
much emphasis. Considering the time in which Confucius lived, it is 
“humanity” (ren ?) and “rite” (li ?) that was focused on by him.19 
This left room for further interpretation on the question of how 
“reason” or “knowledge” (zhi ?), which is the way to the Mean, and 
“nature” are connected with each other. 20  It seems routine that the 
following texts from Mencius and the Doctrine of the Mean were 
compared when “Sincerity” was talked about: “There is a way to the 
attainment of sincerity in one’s self: if a man does not understand what 
is good, he will not attain sincerity in himself. Therefore, sincerity is 
the way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere is the way of man;"21 
and "sincerity is the way of Heaven. The attainment of sincerity is the 
way of men.” 22  Much scholarship deals with the similarities and 
differences of “to think how to be sincere” (sicheng ??) and “the 
attainment of sincerity” (chengzhi ??). Considering the question we 
are discussing here, which focuses on human religiousness, however, 
this essay offers a comprehensive survey of “sincerity,” through 
which human religiousness was revealed, from two angles, namely, 
"sincerity" as containing the driving forces for one’s path to the good, 
                                                 
asked what was the first thing to be attended to in ceremonies. The Master said, 
‘A great question indeed! In festive ceremonies, it is better to be sparing than 
extravagant. In the ceremonies of mourning, it is better that there be deep sorrow 
than in minute attention to observances’”. Analects (3:4), 155-6. Zhu Xi (Chu Hsi) 
gives his explanations to these words in this way: “It is better for the ceremonies 
to be accordance with the Mean” (liguidezhong ????). (Zhu Xi, Commentaries 
on the Four Books. 
18 Analects (17:2), 318. 
19 “If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what has he to do with 
the rites of propriety? If a man be without the virtues proper to humanity, what 
has he to do with music?” Analects, 155. Li, was often refers to the “feeling of 
reverence.” Ibid. 
20  Pang Pu maintained that “It is Confucius that advocates teachings about 
humanity in Chinese history, but he did not raise the question of ‘why people can 
become humanity’ and the answer to it in serious way”. Cf. Pang Pu, 
“Commentary on Wu Xing-Pian (Wu Xing-Pian Shuping ?????),” WenShiZhe, 
no.1 (1988):4. The question Pang mentioned looks like in an epistemological way, 
but as a matter of fact, it is trying to figure out where man’s ability of reasoning 
comes from.  
21 Mencius· Li Lou I:12. James Legge, The Chinese Classics (HK.1861). 
22 The Doctrine of the Mean. James Legge, The Chinese Classics. Vol.1. (HK.1861).  
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and “sincerity” as the starting point for one’s life and also the end 
pursued for one’s entire life. 
Questions remain in comparing this with Calvin’s “piety”: how 
human religiousness was disclosed through “sincerity,” with how can 
“sincerity” be the beginning of human life, and at the same time, the end for 
one’s living, and how do these two endings get together? 
In the first place, “sincerity” is the starting point for one’s living, 
and its origin, which is Heaven, reveals human religiousness. 
“Sincerity” is the initial endowment from Heaven according to the 
teachings of The Doctrine of the Mean, and it becomes the ultimate 
criterion by which judgments about good or evil, right or wrong were 
made because of the oneness between Heaven and Humanity 
(tianrenbuer ????).23 The self-authentication of Heaven reflects 
people’s complete trust in the way of Heaven, making that one of the 
dimensions of human religiousness. Some presumptions about 
Heaven were proposed at the very beginning of The Doctrine of the 
Mean: “what Heaven has conferred is called Nature; accordance with 
this nature is called the Path of duty; the regulation of this path is 
called Instruction.” 24  The meaning of Heaven, however, was not 
further explained. A very possible reason for this is that the author 
supposes it a self-evident prerequisite which was widely accepted at 
that time. As Pang has mentioned, “What on earth is Heaven, and 
what is Fate (ming ?), how was Fate gifted to people by Heaven, and 
in which ways does Nature come from Fate”. The reason why these 
“fatal” questions were not further explained at that time is because 
“they are not really questions at all (at that time)”. 25 Therefore, two 
questions should be investigated at this point, based on what that 
people believes does “sincerity” come from Heaven; and what is the 
meaning of this presumption of Heaven? 
                                                 
23 The phrase of the unity between Heaven and Human (tianrenheyi ????) 
was often used to indicate the ultimate goal for one’s life. The word “oneness” 
(buer ??) was borrowed from Xiong Shili, and the differences between Heaven 
and Human are going to be mainly focused on instead of paying much attention 
to the “unity” between them in traditional way.  
24 The Doctrine of the Mean. 
25 Pang Pu, “The era from Confucius to Mencius: the Position of Chu Bamboo 
Manuscripts of Guodian lives in the History of Chinese Thoughts (Kongmengzhijian: 
guodianchujian de sixiangshi diwei ????—?????????? ),” Social 
Sciences in China (Chinese version), no.5 (1998): 91. 
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Heaven is not a metaphysical presupposition, but the foundation 
of man’s existence. The way of Heaven is the source of humanity. The 
choices man makes that comply with it are the ways of man. Thus, we 
can say that sincerity originates from Heaven. Evidences from 
classical texts suggest that there are three sources and theories about 
heaven: The Book of Poetry, Analects, and correlative parts in the Five 
Elements (wuxing ??) of Chu Bamboo Manuscripts of Guodian. 
For one thing, the last several chapters of Zhongyong mostly either 
begin or end with some quotation from The Book of Poetry, which 
indicates that the author not only tries to find some foundation for his 
arguments, but most likely tries to interpret those quotations from the 
viewpoint of Sincerity. With reference to the discussions about 
Heaven in Sacrificial odes of Zhou (shijing, zhousong ??·??), “the 
ordinances of Heaven, how deep are they and unremitting,” the 
author of Zhongyong shows what is the situation in which sincerity 
lives. “Without any display, it (Sincerity) becomes manifested; 
without any movement, it produces changes; and without any effort, 
it accomplishes its ends.”26 This situation is nothing but the way of 
Heaven. Thus the author used the word “co-equal” of earth and 
Heaven to describe the oneness between Heaven and the Human. This 
relationship between them is not a creation which was often 
understood as from nothing to something in Christianity, but an 
everlasting process. As interpreted by Zhu Xi, “originating in Heaven 
and owned by the human.” Thus, we know that in Zhongyong 
Sincerity is a ceaseless process and it complies with Heaven. 
What is more, the way in which the relationship between sincerity 
and Heaven was dealt with in Zhongyong resembles that of Confucius, 
who focuses on the “awe of the ordinances of Heaven”.27 People’s 
ultimate dependence on Heaven was thus manifested through the 
sentiment of “awe “or “fear.” But Zhongyong takes a further step in 
explaining the “fear” stated by Confucius and attributes it to 
“vigilance in solitude” (shendu ? ? ), and thus established a 
correlation between “fear” and “Sincerity”: “the path may not be left 
for an instant. If it could be left, it would not be the path.”28 Last but 
not the least, the related parts of the Chu Bamboo Manuscripts of 
                                                 
26 The Doctrine of the Mean26. 
27Analects (16:8).  
28 The Doctrine of the Mean1. 
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Guodian are also the direct sources for the School of Si-Meng, and ideas 
about Heaven from them direcly influenced Zhongyong’s 
understanding of Heaven. Zhongyong summarized previous and 
fragmentary discussions about Heaven at the very beginning. Some 
scholars have grasped that the treatment of Heaven in Zhongyong is 
the summary of related texts from the Chu Bamboo Manuscripts of 
Guodian: “The first sentence of Zhongyong, ‘What Heaven has 
conferred is called Nature,’ is actually the integration of these separate 
elements, there is Heaven and the ordinances, Nature comes from the 
ordinances, and the ordinances were bestowed from Heaven”. 29 
Sincerity is close to Virtue in the Five Elements (??). “Virtue is to 
receive” (dezhedeye ??,??) is the original meaning of “virtue,” and 
it shows that what Heaven has bestowed upon man is “virtue,” based 
on which judgements were made. “Virtue” therefore unites one with 
Heaven. 
To sum up, first, it is Heaven where sincerity originally comes 
from, and the state of Sincerity is different, yet united as one with 
Heaven. Sincerity lies with the endless succession of the ordinances of 
Heaven. Heaven and Sincerity, on which man makes judgments about 
good or evil, right or wrong, shows people’s ultimate dependence on 
Heaven. What is more, only through the emotion of “fear” which 
comes from Nature bestowed upon man by Heaven can people get 
some knowledge of Sincerity. Human religiousness thus was 
manifested by Sincerity as fear of Heaven but trust in it.  
Second, Sincerity is also the purpose that people persue through 
reflection on themselves. It is “Sincerity” that makes for the two 
endings: Heaven and the Good, come together. “Sincerity” was 
implanted into human heart by Heaven, and it is also the basis on 
which judgments are made. It is therefore the starting point for living, 
and from this viewpoint we say that dependence on Heaven 
constitutes a dimension of human religiousness. Meanwhile, “the 
attainment of Sincerity,” which is the way of humans, is the return to 
human nature. A question would be, how these two goals connect 
with each other through “Sincerity?” 
“The attainment of Sincerity” is one’s path to goodness and the 
human way. The goodness which one pursues is not something 
                                                 
29 Pang Pu, “The era from Confucius to Mencius: the Position of Chu Bamboo 
Manuscripts of Guodian lives in the History of Chinese Thoughts,”91. 
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outside oneself, but inside, and it is actually the return to one’s 
original condition, which is Sincerity. The situation of “Sincerity,” 
according to Zhu Xi’s explanation, is “reality and honesty, this is the 
Reason of Heaven” (zhenshi wuwang, tianli zhi benran ????,???
??).30 This implies that “Sincerity” itself has the quality of “self-
completion” (chengji ??) and “completes others” (chengwu ??). 
This quality was called by modern scholars the “creativity” of 
“Sincerity.” Mou Zongshan (???) interprets “the unceasingness of 
the ordinances of Heaven” (tianmingbuyi ????) as the “unlimited 
effect.” This effect is nothing but the “creativity” of “Sincerity,” which 
results in the disappearance of a “personal God” in the traditional 
understanding of Heaven.31 This concept later on was given further 
interpretation and emphasis by Tu Weiming and Roger T. Ames.32 
The "creativity" was contained in both Heaven and "Sincerity," and is 
the impetus that forces people to the way to goodness. "Choosing 
good" is the very first action made by man. "He who attains to 
Sincerity is he who chooses what is good, and firmly holds fast to it."33 
The “creativity” in the “Sincerity” makes this choice happen. To the 
people who seek good, it was called on “emotion” (qing ?), in which 
“pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy” were included. 
These emotions are people’s experience of “Sincerity,” and fear of 
Heaven was revealed through them. How the relationship between 
“emotions” and “nature” was dealt with in Zhongyong is similar with 
that in the Chu Bamboo Manuscripts of Guodian, where it says, “the 
Spirit (qi) (?) of pleasure, anger, sorrow, and sadness is nature (xing) 
(?)…the way or Tao originally from emotion, and emotion comes 
from nature (daoshiyuqing, qingshengyuxing ???? ,????)”.34 
Before the emotion was excited, what shows in “Sincerity” is the way 
                                                 
30 Zhu Xi, Commentaries on the Four Books. 
31Mou Zongshan, Lectures on the Philosophy of the Book of Changes (zhouyi zhexue 
yanjianglu ???????), ed. Lu Xuekun (Taipei: Lianjing Press, 2003).133. 
32  Cf. Tu Weiming, Centrality and Commonality: An Essay on Confucian 
Religiousness (New York: SUNY Press, 1989). Roger T. Ames, David L. Hall, 
Focusing the Familiar: A Translation and Philosophical Interpretation of the Zhongyong 
(University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 30-37. 
33 The Doctrine of the Mean. 
34 Chu Bamboo Manuscripts of Guodian ·Nature Comes from the Ordinances of Heaven 
(xingzimingchu ? ? ? ? ):1. Penghao,Chu Bamboo Manuscripts of Guodian 
(guodianchujian ??????) (Beijing: Cultural Relics Press, 1998), 179.  
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of Heaven, the situation in which Heaven and Sincerity are united as 
one. There are no such emotions as “pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy” 
since “Sincerity” at this time is the starting point for living in the 
“reality and honesty” of Heaven. These emotions, therefore, are 
indirectly pointing to Heaven through “Sincerity.” The emotion of 
fear of Heaven, thus, is similar. “Reason” or “knowledge” (zhi ?), 
however, is not a part of “fear.” Similar to Confucius’ understanding 
of “the knowledge of the ordinances of Heaven” (zhitianming ???), 
“reason” was understood as the manifestation of “Sincerity,”35 and it 
is a judgement about “Sincerity” and the result of the creativity of 
Sincerity. In this regard, only when the process of “self-completion” 
and “the completion of others” was finished, can Sincerity live in the 
situation of “reality and honesty.” It is better to say that one has no 
choice but to accept sincerity as the starting point for one’s life than 
make this choice based on one’s own “reason.” “Vigilance in solitude” 
comes after this choice since these judgments about good and evil, 
right and wrong, should first be checked as to whether or not they 
comply with the “nature” one already has, which is “Sincerity.”36 
Therefore, in order to acquire “knowledge of the ordinances of 
Heaven,” one should ceaselessly make one’s judgements at present to 
contrast with “nature.” It is the manifestation of Sincerity itself that 
drives people to good. Meanwhile, the way to good is the process of 
“Vigilance in solitude” and therefore the return to “Sincerity.” 
 
Religiousness: Piety and Sincerity 
 
Back to the questions we raised at the beginning of this paper. We 
can say that the similar understandings of human religiousness for 
both Calvin and Zhongyong pave the way for discussions about the 
questions of Confucianism. There are important and broad 
commonalities between Piety and Sincerity with regard to human 
religiousness. First, both of them are the starting point for one’s living 
                                                 
35 “The possessor of sincerity does not merely accomplish the self-completion of 
himself. With this quality he completes other men and things also. The completing 
himself shows his perfect virtue. The completing other men and things shows his 
knowledge”. The Doctrine of the Mean. 
36 There is nothing more visible than what is secret, and nothing more manifest 
than what is minute. Therefore the superior man is watchful over himself, when 
he is alone. The Doctrine of the Mean 
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in a context and reveal the emotion of fear toward God or Heaven, as 
well as ultimate dependence on God or Heaven. This comes after the 
experience of the limitations of one’s abilities. Fear and dependence 
on God or Heaven thus are the two basic elements of human 
religiousness both for Calvin and Zhongyong. According to Calvin, at 
the time of creation, man has the image of God, which he called 
“uprightness,” and in which these two parts, namely, emotion and 
reason were included. Based on the emotion of reverence, reason leads 
people to know and glorify God. The Fall of Adam, however, 
disturbed the original compatible order between reason and emotion. 
Self-righteousness and ingratitude began to play the leading role in 
one’s mind, and reason is no longer a guide to know God. But Calvin 
also mention that this will lead people far away from God, and one’s 
conscience will suffer, since people’s own understanding and 
emotions, instead of direction from God were considered as the only 
criterion one relies on. People forget the reason why they were created 
and the place where they came from. At the same time, the sense of 
divinity is discerned through the general and specific revelation of 
God. As to the ethical and rational judgments man makes, reason and 
emotion are not going to work anymore. Once God’s revelation is 
discerned nothing is left but one’s reverence and love toward God, 
which is actually “piety.” Human religiousness is thus disclosed in 
Piety as fear and trust in God. In Zhongyong, human religiousness was 
interpreted through Sincerity, the central conjunction at which 
Heaven and people’s path to goodness are connected. According to 
Zhongyong, the attitude to Heaven is the emotion of fear. This is 
obvious in Confucius in his treatment of the phrase, “fear to the 
ordinances of Heaven.” 
What is more, as the purpose for one’s living in each context, both 
“Piety” and “Sincerity” contain elements to connect the starting point 
and ending of one’s life. For Calvin, people show their reverence and 
love, which is Piety, to God’s revelation, and through this the sense of 
divinity is transformed to the “renewed image of God.” As analyzed 
above, “reason” and “emotion,” which were originally included in 
“uprightness” before the Fall, still remain in the “sense of divinity.” 
But the structure when combined becomes disorder. The result of that 
is the experience of one’s limitations, since self-righteousness, instead 
of God’s word, play a fundamental role in making one’s judgments. 
Fear of God then comes into the horizon of self-knowledge. This 
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means that the criterion, which once was one’s own understanding 
and belief now becomes order of God. The trust in God, or ultimate 
dependence on him, plays the main theme of the melody of one’s life. 
“Emotion” and “reason” now return to their original neat order. Thus 
these two elements of the sense of divinity give the connection 
between the beginning and end of human existence. Compared with 
Piety, Sincerity in Zhongyong, plays a similar role. According to 
Zhongyong, the judgments one makes should be based on Sincerity. 
But at the same time, the target one pursues is to return to what one 
originally is, which is also Sincerity. Therefore, one’s way in pursuing 
goodness is just the manifestation of Sincerity itself, forced by its own 
“creativity.” While for Calvin, the sense of divinity is clouded by sin. 
Fear of Heaven is revealed through the emotions of “pleasure, anger, 
sorrow, and joy,” and these make the connection between Heaven and 
one’s way to goodness possible.  
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8. 
Comparing Christian and Buddhist 
Doctrines of Ignorance: 
Nicholas Cusanus and Seng-Chao 
DING JIANHUA 
 
 
 Religion, as a unique facet of culture, reaches for its own ultimate 
goal. Both focusing on this “ultimate goal,” Eastern religion and 
Western religion each have their own doctrines supported by different 
logic. As the representatives of Eastern religion and Western religion, 
Christianity and Buddhism each have their own doctrinal systems. 
Both have attracted many philosophers and monks who devote 
themselves to studying and discussing such doctrines. But as these 
religious systems develop there is a tension between theory and 
practice, rationality and faith. For example, Augustine advocated that 
one should develop faith first, then understanding, while Chan 
Buddhism suggested not relying on the written word. One question 
of great concern is how to regard learning and knowledge. When it 
comes to religion, is knowledge necessary to achieve realization? This 
question has garnered much attention, and has been a key point of 
religious philosophy both historically and in the present day. 
As a representative of Christianity, Nicholas Cusanus attempted to 
answer the question of whether or not knowledge is of benefit to 
religion through his doctrine of “learned ignorance.” Nicholas 
Cusanus is “an important person in the Christian world, and one of 
the most knowledgable figures in Christian history.”1  
Nicholas Cusanus studied philosophy, theology, natural science, 
mathematics, astronomy, and so on. Scholasticism was drawing to a 
close and the Renaissance was gradually rising. At the time, Nicholas 
was one of the most brilliant philosophers and Christian theologians. 
Nonetheless, such an important Christian theologian was overlooked 
by Chinese researchers. This occurred for many reasons. In the 19th 
and 20th centuries, Marxism and Hegelian philosophy had a great 
influence on the study of philosophy in China. Philosophers from the 
1 Heinrich Ott, Das Reden vom Unsagbaren, Lin ke translated (Beijing: Sanlian 
Bookstore, 1994), p. 4. 
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Middle Ages to the Renaissance were not elevated. In addition, 
researchers lacked knowledge of Lain, which, when combined with 
Chinese politics’ sensitivity to religion, caused Nicholas Cusanus to 
be neglected for a very long time. 
Seng-chao, a Buddhist monastic born about 1000 years before 
Nicholas Cusanus, wrote many works, the most famous of which is 
Prajna Ignorance. In this book, Seng-chao explained prajna from the 
perspective of the Mādhyamika School. Like Nicholas Cusanus, Seng-
chao also lived at the end of an era. The metaphysics of the Wei and 
Jin dynasties were in their final years, and the Mādhyamika 
understanding of prajna and emptiness was introduced during the 
Han dynasty. “After Master Zhao, Buddhist thought began to spread 
to the South. Then the Nirvana and Satyasiddhi schools followed and 
rose to prominence. Though the Nirvana school rose out of the 
Prajedweool, its philosophy developed into ‘wondrous existence and 
true emptiness’… But Seng-chao was ‘foremost in explaining 
emptiness’ and his works followed the questions of existence versus 
non-existence and essence versus function to their peak. There were 
some other masters who followed him, but they can scarcely be 
compared to Master Zhao.”2 
In 2004, German Sinologist Karl-Heinz Pohl published the essay 
“Nicholas Cusanus and Chinese Philosophy: Parallels and 
Differences,” which compared Nicholas with Chinese Taoism, 
pointing out the many similarities and differences between Nicholas 
and Chinese thinkers. Pohl found that Nicholas’ Learned Ignorance and 
The Hidden God had a very Eastern flavor. 
Although both Nicholas Cusanus and Seng-chao advocated some 
sort of “ignorance” to deny human understanding and knowledge, 
their views are built on the massive religious frameworks of 
Christianity and Buddhism. To call their views similar based simply 
on their literal expression would undoubtedly be too hasty. But if we 
regard them as completely irrelevant to one another because they 
come from different religions, then neither theory will be able to assist 
the understanding of the other. Such a one-sided view is not helpful 
to research or personal religious development. But we must admit that 
both Nicholas Cusanus and Seng-chao are somewhat obscure. 
                                                 
2 Tang Yongtong, Han, Wei and Jin Dynasty Buddhist history (Hebei People's Press, 
2000), p. 254. 
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Searching for parallels and differences between the two could serve to 
help promote a better understanding of both. 
 
What Is Ignorance? Learned Ignorance and Prajna Ignorance 
 
Nicholas Cusanus stated that humans understood the world by 
comparing things they do not know, to things they already know in 
order to make judgments. Therefore, everything unknown was 
understood as an analogy with something known: “People always 
make judgments by comparing an uncertain object with an identified 
object which is already known. The judgments they made according 
to this method are just similar; therefore, every discussion is a method 
of comparison and analogy.”3  But this method creates a dilemma 
because the method only works when the compared objects are 
relatively similar. It is only an appropriate method of learning when 
there are few differences between objects. Because God is infinite he 
is far beyond our range of previously known objects, so every 
comparison by analogy would be invalid, and that “due to this fact, 
we cannot recognize infinitude. Since it is unlimited, it is beyond 
every comparison, and above all comparison.” 4  Human 
understanding cannot comprehend infinity, and, as a result, a human 
being must face his own ignorance, even though he is constantly 
amassing knowledge. This is the basis of Nicholas Cusanus’ concept 
of learned ignorance: “Because our natural desire of pursuing 
knowledge is not without purpose, its direct object is our own 
ignorance. If we could fully realize this desire, we’ll achieve learned 
ignorance.”5 
 
 The opening words of Seng-chao’s Commentary on Vimalakirti 
Nirdesa Sutra clearly state his purpose and main theme:  
 
The Incredible Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra is full of 
absolutely subtle changes, reaching a name of wonderful 
position. Its theme is deep and sophisticated, 
indescribable with language or images. Its truth is 
                                                 
3  Nicholas Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, Yin Dayi translated (Beijing: The 
Commercial Press, 2009), p.3. 
4 Ibid., p.4. 
5 Ibid., p.5. 
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beyond the three kinds of emptiness, neither Mahayana 
Buddhism nor Hinayana Buddhism can discuss it. It is 
above all names and performances, leaving behind the 
realm of understanding, it is far-reaching. It has no 
artificial events but dominates everything. I do not know 
how this is so, it is truly incredible. Why? Because the 
sage’s wisdom is not dependent on the knowledge to 
detect and analyze all things. The Dharma body does not 
have a fixed appearance, but shows different forms to 
adapt to what is needed for enlightenment. These 
wonders are without words and abound in mystery. 
Without seeking, they unify all things.6  
 
According to the wise, twentieth-century Buddhist monastic 
Taixu, the theme of the Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra is a karmic 
relationship: acquiring prajna wisdom is the cause and attaining a 
pure Buddhaland is the effect. According to the Buddhist concept of 
cause and condition, the cause of prajna wisdom and the effect of a 
pure Buddhaland are not completely separate. They have the 
relationship of being “not the same and not different.” The theme of 
the above passage from Seng-chao’s commentary includes prajna, or 
could even be said to be prajna itself. In the passage, Seng-chao says 
that one outstanding quality of the sutra is that it surpasses words and 
images, which is beyond the realm of what an ordinary person’s mind 
can reach. It is incredible that the sagely wisdom of non-duality may 
seem like ignorance, but that it is capable of understanding all truths. 
Therefore we can conclude that Seng-chao’s “holy wisdom of 
ignorance” is for sages. Mr. Lv Cheng considers the wisdom described 
by Seng-chao to be the prajna of eighth stage Bodhisattvas: “Prajna as 
described by Seng-chao in Prajna Ignorance was the level above the 
eighth stage Bodhisattva who attains wisdom after practice.” 7 
The doctrine of the “holy wisdom of ignorance” advocated by 
Seng-chao and “learned ignorance” advocated by Nicholas Cusanus 
are quite different, although both take a negative view of human 
knowledge within religion. There are essential differences between 
these two kinds of ignorance, including the two aspects of object 
                                                 
6 Seng-chao, Commentary on Vimalakirti Nirdesa Sutra, Taisho-pitaka 38, p. 327. 
7 Lv Cheng, Chinese Buddhist Origins (Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company, 2011), 
p. 107. 
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description and object negation. Specifically, they answer these 
questions differently: “Who is ignorant?” and “Who is not ignorant?” 
In answering “Who is ignorant?” Seng-chao described the 
ignorance of a sage: “Holy wisdom is subtle and deep, so it is difficult 
to measure. Because it is neither a form nor a name, it is difficult for 
any words or images to describe. Just try to describe the world 
imagined from a holy heart in so-called crazy words. Can we even say 
we are capable of discerning the holy heart?”8 Nicholas Cusanus said 
that ordinary people were ignorant, specifically as they seek God: 
“The deeper he knows himself to be ignorant, the more knowledge he 
can obtain. I just remember this point to remind me to undertake the 
task of briefly discussing learned ignorance.”9 
In answering “Who is not ignorant,” Seng-chao’s description of 
prajna ignorance depicts the sage as having no ordinary or illusory 
understanding, that is, ordinary knowledge is “ignorant” when 
compared to prajna wisdom. Nicholas Cusanus’ learned ignorance 
states that ordinary people do not have knowledge of God and truth, 
but only have ordinary knowledge. 
In summary, Seng-chao’s view of prajna ignorance is that sages 
lack ordinary knowledge (which is false and individual), while 
Nicholas Cusanus’ view of learned ignorance is that ordinary people 
do not have knowledge of God. Thus it can be seen that both want to 
express the relative relationship between aspects of knowledge. Both 
of them wish to express that ordinary knowledge is not “knowledge” 
in the presence of God or prajna. 
 
Why Ignorance? Emptiness and God 
  
Both Seng-chao and Nicholas Cusanus state that human 
knowledge is the same as ignorance before religious truth, but both of 
their doctrines are grounded in the complete religious systems of 
Buddhism and Christianity, respectively. In Buddhist and Christian 
history, there were others who put forward similar or contrary 
propositions, but in each case their theories conformed to the larger 
religious system of Buddhism or Christianity. Otherwise, their 
doctrines would be regarded as heresy. So how did Seng-chao and 
                                                 
8 Seng-chao, Chao-lun, Taisho-pitaka 45, p. 153. 
9 Nicholas Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, Yin Dayi translated, p. 5. 
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Nicholas Cusanus use their religions’ doctrines to express their ideas 
of “ignorance”? 
Seng-chao describes prajna as ignorance because he claims that a 
sage’s prajna wisdom is different from an ordinary person’s 
knowledge: “Prajna is a Sanskrit word which means ‘wisdom.’ With 
no wisdom one could not attain knowledge through objects. Ordinary 
people think prajna is just like the wisdom from knowledge obtained 
through objects. But this latter kind of knowledge has attachment. 
With attachment, it cannot understand how to transcend the world of 
delusion. The prajna that I discuss is real wisdom—without 
attachment or object-oriented knowledge. This prajna grasps the holy 
truth, but it is not attached to the holy truth, thus it is called 
ignorance.”10 Ordinary people have knowledge attained from objects, 
which is the result of partial, illusory understanding. Such knowledge 
distinguished between what exists and does not exist, and what can 
and cannot be attained. Prajna does not distinguish between objects 
that exist or do not exist, or can and cannot be attained, nor does it 
have partial, illusory understanding. In this sense it is “ignorance,” 
but because it knows ultimate truth it is a sort of “knowledge.” Based 
on this understanding, Seng-chao presented the concept of “ignorant 
but knowing:” “A man who knows all still has some ignorance. But if 
he has a holy heart’s ignorance, it can know all. The knowledge of 
ignorance is knowing everything.”11 
Seng-chao’s concept that prajna ignorance is the same as complete 
knowledge is grounded in the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness. Prajna 
is the understanding of emptiness: that there is no duality between 
ultimate truth and emptiness. Seng-chao defines holy wisdom by 
saying, “We may say it exists, but it is without shape or name. We may 
say it is non-existent, but it sanctifies the spirit. It sanctifies the spirit, 
and therefore it is silent without giving up manifestation. It is without 
shape or name, and therefore it is manifest without giving up silence. 
It is manifest without giving up silence, and therefore it is among all 
things but does not cease. It is silent without giving up manifestation, 
and therefore it is in accord with everything as they change. Therefore, 
the function of holy wisdom cannot be nullified; but if we want to find 
it in any shape or object, we will never attain it.” 12  This passage 
                                                 
10 Yuan Kang, Commentary on Chao-lun, Taisho-pitaka 45, p.174. 
11 Seng-chao, Chao-lun, Taisho-pitaka 45, p.153. 
12 Ibid., p.153. 
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described holy prajna wisdom as neither existent nor non-existent. 
Because it can manifest all things, it is not non-existent. Because it 
lacks a real shape or name, it is not existent. Not existent means it lacks 
self-nature. Not non-existent means it arises due to causes. The precise 
meaning of “emptiness” is dependent origination and the emptiness 
of nature. Based on this concept, “prajna ignorance” means prajna is 
constantly silent and manifest, and is without distinction between 
subject and object or between knowledge and ignorance. 
In the world of emptiness, there is no difference between subject 
and object. The distinction between subject and object is a false 
phenomenon that arises from the delusion of ordinary people. In the 
eyes of ordinary people, all phenomena seem to actually exist, when, 
in fact they are false and based on attachment to the self. Of course the 
knowledge gained through the false understanding of ordinary 
people is not real. As one can see, the concept of “prajna ignorance” is 
grounded in the doctrine of emptiness. Though prajna denies that one 
is able to acquire knowledge, this is the knowledge of ordinary people, 
not the sage’s prajna wisdom. 
That is how the world of emptiness is without the distinction of 
subject and object. In addition, Seng-chao further explains how 
“prajna ignorance” is the same as “complete knowledge” from four 
perspectives, including name and form, and life and death. The reason 
he used four perspectives and nine arguments to explain is because 
ordinary people could not understand how ignorance and complete 
knowledge could coexist. Ordinary people consider that ignorance 
and knowledge cannot coexist in the same way that light and darkness 
cannot coexist. The root of this way of thinking lies in ordinary 
people’s sense of self. The attachment to phenomena lies in the 
existence of a self.  
The Buddhist doctrine of emptiness helps to remove the false 
understanding that arises from attachment to the self. In the world of 
emptiness there is no distinction between subject and object, no 
difference between things and knowledge of things, no opposition 
between living and dying, no contrast between real essence and name. 
Buddhism considers this world, the world of emptiness, to be the real 
world. Prajna is not different from holy truth and emptiness. They are 
one. 
In addition to Prajna Ignorance, Seng-chao also analyzed these 
concepts deeply from different perspectives in the works Objects Never 
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Move and Unreal Emptiness. Objects Never Move is regarded as a 
Chinese interpretation of the Treatise on the Middle Way’s 
Contemplation of Going and Coming Chapter. The two are similar in 
that they both analyze the meaning of emptiness by observing the 
movements of objects. Ordinary people use the self as their foundation 
to see and understand things, therefore they see movement. Sages use 
emptiness as their foundation to see and understand things, therefore 
they do not see movement. Unreal Emptiness discusses what is real and 
unreal from the perspective of emptiness. “Real” is defined as 
possessing self-nature. “Unreal” is defined as being based on 
dependent origination and the emptiness of nature. Thus all 
phenomena do not exist, because they do not have self-nature. 
However, all phenomena are also not non-existent, because such 
qualities as “true existence” or “true non-existence” are a sort of self-
nature. Instead, they are empty. 
Although three books are mentioned above, the doctrine of these 
three books only varies by the perspective they examine. Objects Never 
Move examines the perspective of movement, Unreal Emptiness 
examines the perspective of existence, and Prajna Ignorance examines 
the perspective of understanding. In each case, the meaning of 
emptiness was the theoretical foundation of Seng-chao’s writing. 
Through the concept of “learned ignorance” Nicholas Cusanus 
expressed his doubt that absolute truth can be encompassed by 
human understanding: “It is clear that whatever we know about the 
absolute truth, according to its nature, we are never able to fully know 
it.”13 The knowledge possessed by people is “ignorant” in light of 
absolute truth: “the absolute truth has enlightened our darkness 
toward ignorance in a way that we cannot understand. That’s exactly 
what we have been seeking - learned ignorance.”14 In his opinion, the 
absolute truth is God: “God, You are the infinite one who meets my 
only pursuit during my constant seeking. Except knowing the fact that 
this infinitude is infinite, I cannot know it closer.”15 In a sense, the 
cause of this ignorance is God. It is from this ignorance of God’s 
infinitude that Nicholas Cusanus bases his concept of “learned 
ignorance.” 
                                                 
13 Nicholas Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, Yin Dayi translated, p. 8. 
14 Ibid., p. 59. 
15 Ibid., p.100. 
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Why can’t people know God? Because the nature of God is 
unspeakable. To say nothing of God’s true nature, God is sometimes 
called “infinity,” “oneness,” “greatness,” and so on. This view is 
expressed in a short but snappy dialogue to some pagans in The 
Hidden God, “I worship God, but not the God you mistakenly think or 
know; in fact it is God Himself, who is unspeakable truth.”16 This God 
of truth is different from the God worshipped by others. The 
important difference is that the God worshipped by Cusanus is eternal, 
absolute, pure, unspeakable truth itself. The God worshipped by the 
pagans mentioned in the passage is not absolute truth itself, but 
instead their truth is to be found in God’s creation. 
The reason why God cannot be known or explained by language is 
because God is absolutely great and nothing exists which is his 
opposite. Whatever language is used to describe God, it will result in 
a dualistic contradiction: “Because any word is always special, it 
marks a difference and implies its opposition.”17 “There is not any 
name in line with infinity, because any name can have an opposite 
side. But there is no name which can also contain its opposite.”18 For 
example, if we say that God is truth, the opposite is falsehood. An 
infinite God would also contain falsehood. If we described God with 
virtues, the existence of vices are implied, and so on. Cusanus 
declared that God is beyond everything that we know: “What I have 
already known is not God, and what I have concluded is not similar 
to God, but rather God far transcends those things.”19 “He is the only 
origin and prior to any formed thought related to Him”20 
Both concepts of ignorance are grounded in the idea that the 
ultimate existence of Buddhism and Christianity transcends 
contradictions. Seng-chao and Cusanus agreed that relative language 
could not recognize or describe ultimate existence. However, the two 
differ greatly on what they understand ultimate existence to be. 
Cusanus regarded truth as God. The truth, as he stated it, actually has 
many similarities to how the holy truth of Buddhism is expressed, 
most especially when God is compared to emptiness. 
                                                 
16 Nicholas Cusanus, De Deo Abscondito, Li Qiuling translated (Beijing: SDX Joint 
Publishing Company, 1996), p.6. 
17 Nicholas Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, Yin Dayi translated, p.52. 
18 Nicholas Cusanus, De Deo Abscondito, Li Qiuling translated, p.92. 
19 Ibid., p.6. 
20 Ibid., p.7. 
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Cusanus wrote, “Only absolute greatness is infinite, while 
compared to it, everything else is finite and limited.”21 Finite existence 
and an infinite God are opposites. Things with a beginning and end 
must arise from infinite existence, because another finite existence 
could not provide a beginning or end. “The beginning and the end of 
every finite thing is inevitably absolute greatness.” 22  Cusanus 
regarded the universe as great, the same as God, but the universe was 
secondary and God was primary: “The universe cannot truly be 
infinite because, although it covers everything, it does not include 
God,” “It [the universe] is created, so of course it obtains its existence 
from the absolute existence that is God.” 23 
As a created thing, the universe is not as complete and perfect as 
God. This is very different from the equality present in the world of 
emptiness. Cusanus’ view is similar to the Buddhist view of “original 
non-existence” which Seng-chao was critical of. The doctrine of 
“original non-existence” states that all things begin with non-
existence. Tanji described this as “Non-existence comes before change, 
emptiness is the beginning of all objects, thus, it is called non-
existence.”24 In this sense, “non-existence” can be understood as the 
infinite existence from which many finite existences are derived. Seng-
chao found this theory inconsistent with the Buddhist understanding 
of prajna, and criticized it in this way: “Regarding original non-
existence, the more we talk about it, the more we will feel non-
existence. This is not existence, because existence is also non-existence. 
It is also not non-existence, because non-existence is also non-
existence. Those who seek say existence is not real existence, and non-
existence is not real non-existence. But why say that existence is being 
existence, and non-existence is being non-existence? Such a discussion 
of non-existence is in line with the ways of the mundane world.”25 
Seng-chao considered the view of original non-existence to have a 
preference for non-existence, and to explain emptiness as the non-
existence that all things come from and ultimately return to. This view 
is opposed to the prajna view of emptiness explained earlier, and was 
thus criticized by Seng-chao. 
                                                 
21 Ibid., p.12. 
22 Ibid., p.12. 
23 Nicholas Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance, Yin Dayi translated, p.65. 
24 Tan-ji, Biography of Famous monk, Manzizoku-pitaka 77, p.354. 
25 Seng-chao, Chao-lun, Taisho-pitaka 45, p.152. 
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How To Do? Apophatic Theology and Exposition by Negation, 
Touching Truth and Contemplating God 
 
Human knowledge is nearly powerless in the pursuit of religious 
goals. Nicholas Cusanus and Seng-chao both articulated doctrines of 
ignorance to illustrate this point. Their intention was not to deny the 
possibility of humans seeking religious goals, but to show the right 
way to pursue such goals. 
Based on his doctrine of learned ignorance, Nicholas Cusanus 
articulated an “apophatic theology,” a theology of negation, as an 
approach to seek God: “Holy ignorance teaches us that God is 
unspeakable, because God is infinitely greater than anything which 
could be expressed by words. Since this is true, if we want to be closer 
to the truth about God we must adopt the method of elimination and 
the proposition of negation.”26 Apophatic theology supposes God is 
“not something” rather than God being “something,” in order to 
better understand and describe God through language, and assist one 
in seeking God. 
Cusanus believed apophatic theology was as important as positive 
theology, and that it should not be neglected. Without apophatic 
theology, God will not be seen as truly infinite and as a result God 
may become an idol in the relative world. Also, when compared to 
positive descriptors, negative descriptors are more reflective of 
reality: “In theology, a negative descriptor may make you wonder 
how it can be true, but a positive descriptor will be insufficient.”27 
Why is this so? Negative descriptors are more sufficient because God 
transcends language and thought. Any recognition of God is just a 
one-sided description of God. As previously stated, this is problematic 
because it causes an infinite God to also be described by its opposite, 
while apophatic theology avoids these problems. 
Through apophatic theology, Cusanus discusses how to seek God: 
“God Himself is theos, that is, contemplating and running. He is 
watching everything, existing in everything, and is running over 
everything. Everything is watching Him, as they would watch their 
King. Everything moves and runs according to His instructions. Even 
if they have the goal of rest, their goal is to run towards Him. 
                                                 
26 Nicholas Cusanus, Of Learned Ignorance,Yin Dayi translated, p.59 
27 Ibid. 
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Therefore, everything is theos. Theos is the origin from which all things 
flow, the center of which we are in, and which all things return to.”28 
Through contemplating and running, Cusanus describes God as 
closely related to all things, stating that all things are formed and 
return to God as their origin. In addition, Cusanus explains other 
ways to seek God, including seeking God through humanity. For 
example, one looks to see if there are any similarities between humans 
and God, and in finding none, “You conclude that God as the reason 
of your rational soul, the origin and the light of life, which transcends 
all things.” 29  This is the embodiment of apophatic theology: by 
denying oneself as a human, everything in the universe comes closer 
to God. 
Compared to Cusanus’ principle of apophatic theology and other 
ways to seek God, Seng-chao did not specifically deal with how to 
attain prajna in Prajna Ignorance. However, in discussing prajna as 
“ignorance and complete knowledge,” he showed the Buddhist 
approach to attaining such “ignorance:” giving up the self, i.e., losing 
egocentrism. Various Buddhist schools each have different ideas 
about how one loses egocentrism. For example, the Consciousness-
Only School’s “five principles of consciousness-only,” the Tiantai 
School’s “one mind with three perspectives,” and the Chan School’s 
“illuminate the mind and see one’s nature,” and so on. 
Similar to Cusanus’ apophatic theology, Seng-chao also was good 
at using the Buddhist method of “exposition by negation.” For 
example, he describes prajna by describing what it is not: “The holy 
heart is subtle without form, it cannot be regarded as existent. But as 
it has many functions, it cannot be regarded as non-existent.” 30 Prajna 
is formless, thus you might call it non-existent, but it functions to 
constantly give rise to existence, so you might call it existent. When it 
comes to formlessness, prajna ignorance does not refer to how an 
ordinary person has knowledge of objects. Seng-chao took it one step 
further and said that prajna ignorance is both ignorant and complete 
knowledge. Because prajna functions to constantly give rise to 
existence, thus it is complete knowledge. 
In summary, these two approaches of “apophatic theology” and 
“exposition by negation” are the same insofar as they explain things 
                                                 
28 Nicholas Cusanus, De Deo Abscondito, Li Qiuling, p.21 
29 Ibid., p.32 
30 Seng-chao, Chao-lun, Taisho-pitaka 45, p.153. 
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through negation. But we should also be aware of the differences 
between them. Exposition by negation is not a way to attain prajna, 
but is a Buddhist method of explanation. Cusanus’ apophatic theology 
is a way to explore God. This approach itself is “learned ignorance.” 
Cusanus’ approach to knowing God through examining the 
universe and humanity is similar to what Seng-chao calls “touching 
the truth.”31 This means to experience the emptiness that is the true 
form of all compounded phenomena. This view is consistent 
throughout Buddhism. The Huayan School’s doctrine of “no 
obstruction between principle and phenomena,” the Chan School’s 
“without feeling but with characteristics,” and other such views are 
different extensions of this same concept. 
Because of the fundamental differences between God and 
emptiness, the similarity of these approaches is superficial. To attain 
“prajna ignorance and complete knowledge” you must lose 
egocentrism, as the knowledge of ordinary people is illusory and 
partial and shouldn’t be pursued. In contrast, in seeking God, one 
continues to look into one’s own human knowledge and see it as 
ignorance. In this sense, this process increases the sense of self, though 
the final goal is to grasp the truth, that is, clear perception of God. 
Nicholas Cusanus said, “except through truth itself, how can the truth 
be grasped? If there is a grasper then there is an object to be grasped.”32 
Though the process is completely different, the end is the same: 
abandoning the smaller self for the greater self. 
 
Conclusion: Limitations of Knowledge 
 
After a comparative analysis of Nicholas Cusanus and Seng-chao’s 
doctrines of ignorance from three aspects, we can see that ignorance 
is not a lack of knowledge, but rather a negation of knowledge in the 
face of absolute truth. What is the basis of this negation? The need to 
negate the “knowledge” of how things are. In this sense, religious 
ignorance does not instruct us to go back into blindness, but seeks to 
help us understand the limitations of human knowledge. 
In Buddhism, the meaning of language, understanding, and 
knowledge are all the same: they are the illusions and delusions of 
                                                 
31 Ibid. 
32 Nicholas Cusanus, De Deo Abscondito, Li Qiuling, p.4. 
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ordinary people. Buddhism has always declared the limitations of 
language, but at the same time it does not completely abandon 
language. Prajna Ignorance contains a famous passage: “Concerning 
language, though it [the truth] cannot be spoken of with language, if 
there were no language, nothing would be passed on.”33 This concept 
Seng-chao derived from Nāgārjuna, the founder of the Mādhyamika 
School. Nāgārjuna declared in the Treatise on the Middle Way: “If you 
do not depend on worldly truth, you will not obtain the highest truth. 
If you cannot obtain the highest truth, you will not obtain nirvāna.”34 
Qingmu considered language a worldly truth, and if we do not 
depend on worldly truth, the highest truth cannot be spoken.  
The type of prajna discussed by Seng-chao is the “prajna of true 
reality.” Prajna is variously classified into three kinds of prajna or five 
kinds of prajna. For example, one type is the prajna of language. In 
this method of prajna one’s language is pure as “the explanation of 
meaning and content of the sutras and so forth.” Zibo Zhenke, one of 
the four eminent monks of the Ming Dynasty, considered the first 
stage of prajna to be the prajna of language, followed by the prajna of 
contemplation, then finally the prajna of true reality. If we hope to 
attain Buddhahood immediately but blindly exclude language and 
knowledge, such is just as much an illusion as drawing a picture of a 
cake to allay hunger. 
If we discard knowledge because of its limitations, that is like 
giving up eating for fear of choking. From their own experiences, we 
can see that both Nicholas Cusanus and Seng-chao were learned 
persons. And the more learned a man is, the more he will have a 
profound understanding of the limitations of knowledge, just as 
Aristotle knew himself to be ignorant. This is the real meaning of 
religious “ignorance.” 
 
(Zhejiang Gongshang University, Zhejiang, People’s Republic of China)
                                                 
33 Seng-chao, Chao-lun, Taisho-pitaka 45, p.153 
34 The Madhyamaka-śāstra, Taisho-pitaka 30, p.33 
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Similarities in “Sheng-Sheng,”Meet in 
“Love”: Confucianism and Christianity 
EUM JIN TAIK 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Christian thought is based on the relationship between God and 
man, and accepts transcendental theology as the foundation. The 
thought of “unity of heaven and human” is the highest realm of 
Christian thought; ethics is an important component. Confucianism is 
based on ethics, emphasizing national isomorphism and “Harmony 
between heaven and the human.” This thought has the tendency of 
pan-moralism. 
Ding Guangxun said, “God is love, and this is the most important 
fact in all facts in the whole universe.” Unlike Ding Guangxun, Wang 
Weifan 1  found that the meeting point between Christianity and 
Chinese culture is sheng (?: giving birth) — giving birth, keeping 
active, being positive in the cycle of life. 
According to Luo Guang2, “sheng-sheng, the first ‘sheng’ means 
giving birth, which resulted from intercourse of Heaven and Earth, 
the performance of Yin and Yang. The last 'sheng' means all living 
things.” “Intercourse of yin and yang is the concept of dao (?) in 
which the nature is obtained.”3 
Li Chenggui4 said, “sheng-sheng became an intrinsic dimension of 
Confucian thought; because not only was it the fundamental concept 
1 Wang Weifan, born in Taizhou, Jiangsu Province in 1927, professor, priest, 
theologian, and theological educator of Nanjing Union Theological Seminary. He 
first advocated the theory of “sheng-sheng theology”. He is the author of 
Encyclopedia of China• Religion Volume, etc. 
2 Luo Guang (1911?2004), born in Hengyang, Hunan Province. His other name 
is Zhuozhao. Doctor of Philosophy and Doctor of Sacred Theology of Pontificio 
Universita Urbaniana, Roma. Doctor of Judicial Science of Pontificia Università 
Lateranense. He is the author of Outline of History of Chinese Philosophy, etc.  
3 Luo Guang, Confucian Philosophy of Life (Taiwan: Taiwan Studentbook Press, 
1995), pp.101-103. 
4 Li Chenggui, born in Wannian, Jiangxi Province in 1963, professor of 
Philosophy Department of Nanjing University, member of Academic Committee, 
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of Confucianism, but it had the richness of a basic idea for all 
Confucian views and thoughts. It not only clearly presented the sheng-
sheng concept of Confucianism, but also fully described its meaning. 
The basic idea of sheng-sheng thought is as follows: 1) to create sheng, 
2) to cultivate sheng, 3) to maintain sheng, 4) to become sheng, 5) to 
cherish sheng, and 6) to fulfill sheng.”5 This idea focused on the process 
of generation, change, development and extinction which is stressed 
in the Book of Changes. The opposition and the extinction become the 
possibilities of another important cycle of generation and 
development. At the same time, it is found that death is the reason for 
the desire for life. 
 
The Meeting Point of “Sheng-Sheng” Thought in the Holy Bible 
and the Book of Changes 
 
Popular Belief of the Folk: Eight-Trigram (??) in the Book of Changes and 
the Cross in the Holy Bible 
 
The eight-trigram (??) in the Book of Changes is widely spread and 
became a popular folk belief. People adopted the eight-trigram 
schematic as the sacred flag, and believed that it could expel demons 
and guarantee safety and happiness. It is similar to the cross which is 
recognized as the symbol of the Savior of mankind in the Western 
Christian world. The cross includes the entire Christian truth, the 
gospel of the Savior Jesus Christ, and the symbols. The schematic of 
the cross is simple, and it contains only two writings on one horizontal 
line and one vertical line. The cross schematic is similar to the basic 
two parallel lines in Chinese two primary forms (??) of the supreme 
Ultimate (??) schematic. 
 
 
                                                 
responsible officer of Traditional Chinese Culture Research Center of 
Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism in the Important Research Base of 
Humanities and Social Sciences of Colleges and Universities in Jiangsu Province. 
He is the author of The Origin of Morality and Virtues - Study on the transformation 
of Chinese Traditional morality, etc.  
5  Li Chenggui, “sheng-sheng, Intrinsic Dimension of Confucian Thought,” 
Academic Research, vol 5 (Guangzhou: Guangdong Social Sciences Association, 
2012), pp.3-8.  
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The Title of Human “Father”— “Heaven” and “God” 
 
In Christian doctrine, the God who created everything in the world 
is not only called “God,” but also there is another title, that is, 
“heavenly Father.” For example, in Matthew, the verses are as follows: 
“For if you forgive men when they sin against you, your heavenly 
Father will also forgive you. But if you do not forgive men their sins, 
your Father will not forgive your sins.”(Matthew 6:14-15). 
Confucianism declared “heaven” as the common source of all 
things in the universe, in fact, that could be said to announce the 
organic integrity of the natural world. What we can find is interesting 
because Confucianism is similar to Christianity, for Confucianism 
usually called the “father” for “heavenly,” as in “Heavenly Father, 
Earthly Mother.”6 
 
Mankind’s Initiative among Heaven, Earth, Human 
 
The idea of the harmony between Heaven, Earth and the Human 
in the Book of Changes is apparent. Interestingly, the condition of 
realizing harmony between human beings and nature in the Book of 
Changes is human initiative. 
The Holy Bible also recorded that human ancestors - Adam and Eve 
- ate the fruit which could let them know what is good and what is 
evil so they were driven out of the beautiful Garden of Eden. So the 
eventual attainment of unity between heaven and the human depends 
on human initiative, and from this point of view, there is some 
similarity between the Book of Changes and The Holy Bible. 
 
The Process of “Sheng-Sheng” is “Changing” - the Intercourse, Dynamic 
and Organic Cycle of Yin and Yang 
  
The principle of life in the Book of Changes is hidden in the changes. 
Change results from events in the universe following upon each other. 
The nature of the universe is always unceasingly moving and 
                                                 
6 Shangshu, Zhoushu, Taishi ?said, “Only heaven and earth could be father and 
mother of all things; only human beings could be superior to all things. Your 
temperament is wise and if you could be Lord of the nation you should be father 
and mother of citizens.” (???·??·????: “???????,???????
??????, ???????”) 
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changing because of this push-over principle. The Yin and Yang 
principle is described as follows: 
 
The sun is gone and then comes the moon; the moon is 
gone and then comes the sun. The sun and the moon are 
pushed over each other and make the day and night. The 
winter is gone and then comes the summer; the summer 
is gone and then comes the winter. The winter and the 
summer are pushed over each other and make the year.” 
(The Book of Changes, the Survey Part I: Chapter 2) 
 
The power of the things in the universe is not endless. When power 
reaches the extreme, it needs to recuperate in order to recover the 
natural state of infinite cycle.7 The Holy Bible also shows an operating 
regularity of all things in the universe, and this regularity never stops 
in the world. The circulation changes are expressed as follows: 
 
Generations come and generations go, but the earth 
remains forever. The sun rises and the sun sets, and 
hurries back to where it rises. The wind blows to the 
south and turns to the north; round and round it goes, 
ever returning on its course.…What has been will be 
again, what has been done will be done again; here is 
nothing new under the sun. Is there anything of which 
one can say, “Look! This is something new”? It was here 
already, long ago; it was here before our time. 
(Ecclesiastes 1:4-10) 
 
The Holy Bible also states how to get the portion which was gained 
by your hard labor under the sun when you were young. The 
statement is as follows: 
 
Remember your Creator in the days of your youth, before 
the days of trouble come and the years approach when 
you will say, “I find no pleasure in them.” (Ecclesiastes 
1:1, 13, 14) 
                                                 
7 Kim Min-Soo, Study on Life Philosophy in the Book of Changes (Seoul: Sung Kyun 
Kwan University, 2010), pp. 2-3. 
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The Old Testament of the Bible is a fall and restoration of the 
history of mankind. 
 
The Praise for Life. 
  
The Book of Changes has another important characteristic—the 
praise for life. The Book of Changes uses the virtue of heaven to describe 
the accessibility of life and the inheritance of life. For example, Tai 
Hexagram (??) and Xian Hexagram (??), which blend between 
Yin and Yang, represent the symbolic meaning of life creation. While 
Pi Hexagram (??) and Bo Hexagram (??), which do not blend 
between Yin and Yang represent the bad luck signs foretelling the 
dying life.  
It was recorded in Genesis of the Holy Bible that “In the beginning 
God created the heavens and the earth.” There was always an 
evaluation sentence after God’s everyday creation — “And God saw 
that it was good.” (Genesis 1: 10, 12, 18, 21, 25). After the sixth day’s 
creation of human, there was a conclusive evaluation — “God saw all 
that he had made, and it was very good.” (Genesis 1:31). Here the 
word “good” is “well,” and the Hebrew word is “ ” 
(transliteration word is towb, in English is “good,” “well”). The word 
of “well” or “good” has appeared 558 times in the Bible. This 
expression“ ” in the Bible is similar to the expression of 
“goodness” in the Book of Changes. In the Book of changes, the verses are 
as follows: “The intercourse between yin (?) and yang (?) could 
cause reproduction, which is called dao (? ). To continue dao is 
‘goodness’.”8 (The Book of Changes, Survey part I: Chapter 5). 
 
The Source of “Sheng-Sheng,” “Tai chi” and “God” 
  
The first sentence in the Bible is, “In the beginning God created the 
heavens and the earth.” (Genesis 1:1).The fifth verse of the twenty-first 
chapter of the last book of the Bible is, “He who was seated on the 
throne said, ‘I am making everything new!’” (Revelation 21:5) 
Corresponding with God’s first action “to create,” it is not “to destroy,” 
but “to renew.” 
                                                 
8 The Book of Changes, Survey part I: chapter 5, “???????, ?????.” 
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“I am the Alpha and the Omega, says the Lord God, who is and 
who was and who is to come, the Almighty.” (Revelation, 1:8) This 
means that “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth” 
“the crucifixion of Jesus,” “His resurrection” and “the new heavens 
and new earth.” The word “I” just represents the God who can 
implement endless creation and a virtuous cycle. 
This expression in the Bible is similar to the expression of life 
reproduction and enlargement in the Book of Changes: “The changes 
have the supreme Ultimate. The supreme Ultimate gives birth to 
primary forms (yin and yang), the two primary forms give birth to the 
four basic images (greater yin, greater yang, lesser yin and lesser yang), 
and the four basic images to the eight trigrams. Changes of the eight 
trigrams can determine good fortune or disaster. Determination of 
good fortune and disaster can help people accomplish great causes.” 
(The Book of Changes · the Survey I, Chapter 11). (“God created the 
world,” “the crucifixion of Jesus Christ,” “His resurrection,” “new 
world,” “supreme Ultimate,” “eight trigram,” “good fortune or 
disaster,” “great causes.”) 
In the opinion of Wang Weifan, to realize the Bible in the thought 
of the unity of creation and salvation is an inevitable conclusion of 
traditional Chinese dialectical thought. This is quite different from the 
Western dualism theory, which keeps God’s creation and salvation 
separated and even opposite. Wang Weifan’s “endless sheng-sheng” 
view of God is the theological explanation of the image of God with 
Chinese culture characteristics. He described God with the character 
of endless sheng-sheng, and in this way he made the image of God fit 
better into the Chinese culture perspective. Thus it could be more 
easily accepted by Chinese Christians. His conception of God is based 
on his understanding of Chinese culture.  
His view of God endlessly giving birth perfectly fits the 
“cosmology of constant reproduction change,” that is the “intercourse 
between yin and yang to cause the constant reproduction to be the 
essential concept of change.” “Intercourse of yin and yang is the 
concept of dao (?).” (The Book of Changes, the survey part 1, Chapter 
5). He realized that dao has endless continuous creation ability, and 
everything now is rooted in dao. “The dao produced One; One 
produced Two; Two produced Three; Three produced all things.” 
(The Dao De Ching, 42). 
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The first verses of the Gospel of John in the New Testament said, 
“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the 
Word was God. The Word became flesh and made his dwelling 
among us.” (John, 1: 1, 2, 14). This Word is Jesus, the Jew from 
Nazareth, the son of a carpenter. The above “Word” in those verses is 
logos meaning “word and principle” in Greek (Hellas). All English, 
Korean, and Japanese versions of the Bible translated it into “Word”9, 
but only the Chinese version of the Bible translated into “dao (?).” I 
think this is the influence of dao thought in the Book of Changes and the 
Dao De Ching. So the Bible translator thought the Chinese concept of 
dao is similar to the basis of the Christian God. 
  
One of the Principles of “Unchanging,” the Moral Centrality 
  
The Qian Hexagram in the Book of Changes said, “The superior man 
works tenaciously all day long and keeps vigilant at night. There is a 
danger but no harm.” The Six at the fourth line of the Kun Hexagram 
said, “He keeps silent as if a sack was tightly fastened at the mouth, 
and he can avoid harm and does not expect honor.” It means that the 
fate of humanity can be changed according to their noble virtues of 
introspection and self-cultivation. 10 
The Qian Hexagram symbolizes heaven which manifests itself in 
the four virtues of origination, prosperity, harmony and perseverance 
(The supplement of the Qian Hexagram). These four virtues in 
Confucius have been explained as “benevolence, rites, righteousness 
and intelligence.” All the images of the Hexagram have explained the 
road of life to becoming a gentleman. And from this point, we can see 
                                                 
9 Eng (NIV, John1:1) In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with 
God, and the Word was God. 
Chinese (??) ? ? ? ?, ? ? ? ? ?, ? ? ? ?. 
Korean (????) ??? ??? ????, ? ??? ???? ?? ????, 
? ??? ? ???????. 
Japanese (spoken language) ????????. ?????????. ????
???. 
Greek (hellas) Ἐν ἀρχῇ ἦν ὁ λόγος, καὶ ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, καὶ θεός ἦν 
ὁ λόγος 
10 Chui Young-Jin, Philosophy Pursuit of the Thought in the Book of Changes (Seoul: 
Sung Kyun Kwan University graduate school, 1989), p. 18. 
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that the purpose of the change of Yaoci in the Book of Change is to 
generate and develop all living things in nature. 
The Holy Bible also emphasizes the Law. The Holy Bible has recorded 
that Moses was there with the LORD forty days and forty nights 
without eating bread or drinking water. And He wrote on the tablets 
the words of the Ten Commandments. In the New Testament, a man 
came up to Jesus and asked, “Teacher, what good thing must I do to 
get eternal life?” “Why do you ask me about what is good?” Jesus 
replied. “There is only One who is good. If you want to enter life, obey 
the commandments.”(Matthew 19:16-17. An expert in the Law, asked 
Jesus, “Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the Law?” 
Jesus replied, “Love the Lord your God with all your heart and with 
all your soul and with all your mind.” This is the first and greatest 
commandment. And the second is like it, “Love your neighbor as 
yourself.” All the Law and the Prophets hang on these two 
commandments.”(Matthew 22:36-40). 
 
A Comparative Study between Confucian “Benevolence” and 
Christian “Love” 
 
Both Confucianism and Christianity attach great importance to life 
and morals, especially “benevolence” and “love.” So I will compare 
Confucian “benevolence” and Christian “love” from the view of the 
Holy Bible and The Analects of Confucius. 
 
The Essential Source 
 
The basic meaning of “benevolence” is as follows: (1) the friendly 
relationship of family members; (2) the thoughts of “pan-loving all 
men,” “the benevolent people love all men” and “nothing is not loved 
by the benevolent people” shows a friendly attitude towards all men 
according to the way of treating family members; (3) “the benevolent 
people love all men” performed by a ruler is to have a loving heart 
towards the citizens. The government ruler should adopt benevolent 
governmental supervision, taking part in the worries and joys of the 
citizens.  
The Holy Bible says, “Whoever does not love does not know God, 
because God is love.” (1John 4:8). “For God so loved the world that he 
gave His one and only Son, [Or His only begotten Son] that whoever 
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believes in Him shall not perish but have eternal life.” (John 3:16). 
Finally, when Christians talk about the connotation of “love” there is 
a very important word “Agape, “which means “God Himself is love,” 
and there is no any requirement to pay back as conditions.  
 
The Approach for Its Realization 
 
The approach for realization of “benevolence” is reasonable and 
logical — the natural development of divinity in human nature. 
Its specific performance is “to exercise self-restraint and resume the 
rules of propriety” and “to love all men.” The Master said, “To 
exercise self-restraint and resume the rules of propriety will mean 
benevolence.” (The Analects of Confucius, Yan Yuan).  
Because the source of Christian “love” is God, the approach to its 
realization could not be separated from God. I think the approach is 
embodied in the word of “Immanuel.” In the Holy Bible, “Immanuel” 
has at least two meanings: 
“Emmanuel” is the name of Jesus, and Jesus was born by a virgin 
named Mary upon whom the Holy Spirit comes. He is a complete man 
(born by a virgin) and a complete God (conceived by the Holy Spirit). 
Incarnated Christ Jesus is an absolute perfect model of “unity” of 
heaven and humanity, and they find Him the “ladder” 11  through 
which a sinner could return to God.  
“Emmanuel”12 has another meaning of “God is with us” which 
indicates that only when God is with man, the Agape “love” could 
transform reality. As Jesus said, “On that day you will realize that I 
am in my Father, and you are in me, and I am in you. (Unity of heaven 
and human). Because if a man is apart from me you can do nothing.” 
(John 14:20, 15:5)  
Jesus said to them all: “If anyone would come after me, he must 
deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me.” (Luke 9:23). 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Wang Weifan, “Full of Grace and Truth,” Jinling Theological Review (Nanjing: 
Jinling Theological Press, 1999(2), pp. 14-16. 
12 The Holy Bible, Matthew 1:23, The Virgin will be with Child and will give birth 
to a son, and they will call him Immanuel — [Isaiah 7:14] which means, God with 
us. Immanuel (im: with, manu: us, el: God, God is with us). 
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The Specific Performance 
 
The Aspect of “Loving Relatives.” Confucianism is a humanistic 
religion. During its process from the lower level unto transcendence, 
there is not any stable natural instinct basis; “love” is almost 
impossible and unless this “loving relatives” which is built on the 
basis of family radiates gradually, then it will not reach the extent of 
“loving all men.”13 
 “Honor your father and your mother, so that you may live long in 
the land the LORD your God is giving you.” (Exodus 20:12; 
Deuteronomy 5:16). Besides, the Holy Bible counts that the basic 
performance is to “love relatives” when love of God acts on man. “If 
anyone does not provide for his relatives, and especially for his 
immediate family, he has denied the faith and is worse than an 
unbeliever” (1 Timothy 5:8). 
The Aspect of “Loving All Men.” So we can see that in the view of 
Confucianism, “serving one’s father” and “loving relatives” could 
generate naturally moral feelings and behaviors of “serving his prince” 
and “respecting his rulers,” i.e., moral feelings and behaviors of 
respecting nation and family ancestors. 
Secondly, from one side, Christianity approved the human 
relationship based on blood ties of “loving relatives” but at the same 
time, it denied this from another higher level, because in the view of 
the Holy Bible, God’s house is a group that goes beyond blood ties, and 
people need to love one another much more than “love all men”. In 
the Holy Bible, someone told Jesus, “Your mother and brothers are 
standing outside, wanting to speak to you.” He replied to him, “Who 
is my mother, and who are my brothers? Here are my mother and my 
brothers, for whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my 
brother and sister and mother” (Matthew12:47-50).  
Here we can see that the relationship Jesus valued is far beyond 
human relationship based on blood ties, and it seems that such 
relationship is even more transcendental than human relationship. 
Because Jesus had put forward a higher requirement for human group 
to have a vertical relationship with God. 
 
                                                 
13 Zhu Hong, and Xun Ling, “Meeting in Love,” Journal of Ningbo University, 
Volume18, No.4 (Ningbo: Liberal Arts Edition, 2005), p. 31. 
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Summary 
 
Through comparison of specific performance of these two kinds of 
“loving relatives” and “loving all men,” we can see that Confucian 
love is mainly to practice self-cultivation, to improve social life, and to 
gain acknowledgment from others. So they could “love relatives,” and 
“love all men.” At this point Confucian “benevolence” is wonderfully 
equal to Christian “love.” 
But they could not love the enemy or the avenger who they think 
doesn’t deserved to be loved. Because if they love them, it is a 
compromise to others and it is against the realization of “benevolence.” 
No wonder the Master said, “It is only the virtuous man who knows 
how to love and hate.” (The Analects of Confucius, Neighborhood).  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have seen that “sheng- sheng” and “love” are 
similar to each other in many aspects. The priest Fang Zhirong14 said, 
“we do not have to prove how many similarities or implications there 
are between the Holy Bible and the Book of Changes, we only need to 
understand how the Holy Bible could help people to understand the 
Book of Changes, and how the Book of Changes could help people to 
understand the Holy Bible.” 
We need to find out the essence and to explore the origin. If we 
wish Christianity and Confucianism to be accommodated to each 
other and that they achieve mutual benefit, we need to look forward 
a time when the Holy Bible and the Book of Changes may be able to know 
each other and be in dialogue. We hope that Christian thought and 
Chinese Confucianism might communicate and accommodate with 
each other further and finally realize an integration of Christianity and 
Confucianism. 
 
(Center for the Study of Confucianism, Nanjing University, Nanjing, 
People’s Republic of China)
                                                 
14 Father Fang Zhirong S.J., born in Guichi, Anhui Province on 23rd, Nov., 1926. 
He is a priest of the Society of Jesus of the Catholic Church and professor of Fu 
Jen Catholic University Faculty of Theology. He is the author of The Apostle Paul: 
His Life, Letters and Theology, and other works. 

10. 
Confucius’ Cosmology Integrates “The Way 
of Heaven” and “The Will of God”:  
A Comparison with the Concept of 
Creation in the Bible 
LAM YUET PING 
 
 
In the terminology of Otto, the modern philosopher of religious 
phenomenology, “Heaven” (tian ?) is indicated as “the Sacred One” 
(shenshengzhe ???) and it is believed that the foremost premise of 
all religious faiths is to “awaken” this Sacred Entity within one’s own 
heart.1  
“The Will of God” (tianming ??) of The Analects of Confucius??
??refers to the will and decisions of “the Sacred One” mentioned 
above, including the separate, individual existential callings of the 
individual located in the human world; it is a force that cannot be 
swayed by human power. The “Way” (dao ?), from a philosophical 
point of view, is the basic governing principle of events and objects. 
Therefore, “the Way of Heaven” (tiandao??) is the essential cosmic 
governing principle of generating and operating in the universe.  
It was certain that Confucius had fully inherited the “Three 
Generations” of the ancient traditions. Similarly, that religious 
thought appeared in ancient literature is also an indisputable fact. In 
the Book of Shangshu????, the concepts of “Heaven,” “the Will of 
God,” “the Way of Heaven” in a religious sense, and “impartial 
justice” (Zhongzheng??, the highest goodness)—a moral ontology of 
“Heaven,” [X1]their earliest recording in the Book of Yushu • Da Yu 
Discussion???•???? . The opening passage of the Da Yu 
Discussion recorded the discussions between the Emperor Shun ?, Bo 
Yi ?? , Da Yu ?? , and Gao Yao ?? . They reminded and 
encouraged one another to obey “the Will of God,” to practice “the 
1 (Germany) Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy (Chengdu: Sichuan People Press, 
1995), p. 29, trans. Cheng Qiong??, Zhou Bangxian???. Quoted from Zhao 
Fasheng ??? . 2011. “Confucius’ Concept of the Will of Heaven and 
Transcendence Ideology.” Journal of Tsinghua University. Vol.26, no.6, p. 81. 
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Way of Heaven,” to operate “impartialy” (Zhong ?) and to be good 
and kind towards people:  
 
(Bo Yi encouraged Shun), “Great ‘Heaven’ cared (Yao ?); ‘The Will 
(of God)’ made (Yao) the king of the world within the four seas.” 
 … 
(Yi encouraged Shun), “Ah! Be watchful! Warn yourself from 
mistakes! Don’t give up laws and regulations…don’t break ‘the Way 
(of Heaven)’ to get compliments from people…” 
 … 
(Shun praised Gao Yao), “The application of punishment makes 
people suitable for ‘impartiality.’ This is your credit, you really did 
well!”  
 … 
(Shun encouraged Yu), “People’s hearts and minds are dangerous, 
and ‘the Way (of Heaven)’ is imperceptible, but concentrate yourself 
carefully, be sincere and single-minded to keep ‘impartiality’…Be 
respectful! Treat your emperor’s throne carefully. Devoutly cultivate 
virtues, have pity on poor people within the four seas and make them 
live peacefully, then your throne will be blessed by ‘Heaven’ forever.”  
 … 
(Yi helped Yu), “Only virtues could move ‘Heaven’, there is no one 
else could reach farther than virtues. Pride hurts, modesty benefits. 
This is ‘the Way of Heaven.’” 
 
Confucius “was enamored of The Book of Changes in his later years.” 
The writers of The Jing Series ?? of the Book of Changes????were 
Emperor Wen Wang ?? and Zhou Gong??. Both the concept of 
“Heaven” and the concept of “Way” expressed by them in The Jing 
Series similarly had a religious sense. The virtue of “impartiality” with 
personality traits was one of the core ideas of The Book of Changes. 
“Heaven” appeared three times in The Jing Series of the Book of Changes, 
respectively in Dayou Hexagram (???), Kui Hexagram (??), and 
Gou Hexagram (??). Dayou Hexagram Yao Ci ??, ‘Heaven’ blesses 
those who practice virtues, making them harmonious and prosperous 
without bad fortune or disadvantages.” “The Way” appeared one 
time as the meaning of “natural law,” Fu Hexagram (??) Gua Ci ?
? said, “…Repeatedly after seven days, Yang Qi ??  returned 
according to the ‘natural way’ , thus it is helpful to go forward.” The 
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signs which implied a religious sense appeared three times in 
Xiaoxu Hexagram (???), Lv Hexagram (??) and Sui Hexagram (??
). Lv Hexagram Yao Ci said, “Nine-Two: Those who are hindered and 
in danger could modestly decline and keep ‘impartiality’ to obtain the 
blessing to relax.” The positive expressions of prosperity beyond 
illness and disasters because of keeping ‘impartiality’ and practicing 
righteousness appeared in seven signs, which are Song Hexagram (?), 
Tai Hexagram ( ? ), Jiaren Hexagram ( ? ? ), Yi Hexagram ( ? ), 
Guai Hexagram (? ), Feng Hexagram (? ), Weiji Hexagram (?? ). 
Song Hexagram Gua Ci said, “Even if there are obstacles and 
difficulties, if one has sincerity and is alert to practice ‘impartiality’ 
then he will gain blessings and fortunes.” Weiji Hexagram Yao Ci said, 
“Nine-Two: If one gains harmonious and prosperous blessings, it is 
because he has practiced ‘impartiality.’” 
The “Way” was born from the “Will” (ming ?), namely Confucius’ 
integrity thought of “the Way of Heaven” and “the Will of God”. “The 
Way of Heaven” in ancient literature was directed at the principle by 
which “the Way of Heaven” operates in the world, that is, 
“impartiality,” the virtue of the Dominate Personality (????). 
Confucius considered that “the Way of Heaven” manifested itself 
through the motions of all terrestrial objects and so “rite” (li ?) was 
the specification of persons and events according to the embodiment 
of “the Way of Heaven”. Again, as noted above, Confucius “was 
enamored of the Book of Changes in his later years.” It conveyed a deep 
understanding of the virtue of “impartiality” with respect to the 
Dominant Personality. He regarded “the Way of Heaven” as the 
creation of heaven and earth, which developed this comprehension of 
of the consciousness of the universe. This comprehension of “the Way 
of Heaven” was more complete and mature.  
 
The Process for Confucius from His Personality-Dominated 
Concept to Cosmology That Integrates “The Will of God” and 
“The Way of Heaven” 
 
Confucius’ Personality-dominated concept in His Early and Later Years: 
“Respecting Ghosts and Gods, but Keep a Certain Distance from Them” 
(jinguisheneryuanzhi ??????) 
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Confucius’ Concept of “the Will of God” in His Later Years. Confucius’ 
feeling of “the Will of God” was very strong in his later years; he 
himself stated “at fifty, I comprehend the Will of God.” (The Analects 
of Confucius?Wei Zheng (??)). The earliest reference in literature was 
documented in Ding Gong ?? Twelve Year (498 BC). At the time 
Confucius was 54 years old, Gong Boliao ???was jealous of Zi Lu 
??. Confucius said, “Will the Way of Heaven operate in the world? 
It is God’s Will to determine. Will the Way of Heaven terminate in the 
world? It is also God’s Will to determine. What can Gong Boliao be if 
God’s Will is determined?” (The Analects of Confucius • Xian Wen (??
)) At the age of 56, he visited Nan Zi ??, the wife of Weiling Gong 
???. Zi Lu displeased and criticized him. The Master swore, saying, 
“Wherein I have done improperly, may Heaven reject me! May 
Heaven reject me!” (The Analects of Confucius • Yong Ye (??)).When 
he was 57 years old, he left Wei ? and went to Cao ? and then Song 
? , Si Ma Huan Tui ????  of Song Guo hated Confucius and 
threatened to do harm to him, he said, “Heaven produced the virtue 
that is in me. Huan Tui - what can he do to me?” (The Analects of 
Confucius •Shu Er (??)). At the age of 60, when he was crossing the 
Yellow River going west towards Zhao?, he heard Zhao Jianzi ??
? had killed the officials Dou Mingdu ??? and Shun Hua??, so 
he decided to go back and he thought it was God’s will, sighing at the 
edge of the Yellow River, he said, “What beautiful water, magnificent! 
I (Confucius), could not cross, it’s God’s Will!”(Shiji????• the 
Biography of Confucius (kongzishijia ????)). When Confucius was 70 
years old, Yan Yuan ?? died. He was very sad and said, “Heaven is 
destroying me!” (The Analects of Confucius • Xian Jint (??)). In the 
spring at 71 years of age, Shu Sun Shi ???  hunted a Chinese 
unicorn. Confucius thought it was an ominous sign to him shown by 
Heaven. He said, “My hope of practicing the Way is gone!” (the 
Biography of Confucius) Sighing with lamentations, the Master said to 
Zi Gan ?? 2, “Alas! No one understands me…But there is Heaven - 
                                                 
2 I agree with The Analects of Confucius Dingzhou Han Bamboo-slip Script???
??????. Gong ?: contributions; Gan ?: grant. Han Dynasty Xipingshijing 
????, Tang Dynasty Lu Deming ???, Five Dynasties Xu Kai ??, Song 
Dynasty Hong Mai ??, Qing Dynasty Duan Yucai ??? and Liu Baonan ??
? all agreed with this version, and Dingzhou Han Bamboo-slip Script confirmed 
this. 
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it understands me!” (Xian Wen). At the age of 73, he was very sick; Zi 
Lu asked, “Could I pray for you?” The Master said, “My praying has 
been for a long time.” (Shu Er). Therefore, if we believe it is because 
Confucius “was enamored of the Book of Changes in his later years” that 
he tended to a naturalistic view of “the Way of Heaven”; or we think 
“the Way of Heaven” in the Book of Changes was a kind of natural way; 
both are difficult to establish. 
Analysis of “Respect ghosts and gods, but Keep a Certain Distance from 
Them.” It is noteworthy that Fan Chi ?? asked what constituted 
wisdom. The Master said, “Lead the people to justice; respect souls 
and spirits but keep a certain distance from them.” This also happened 
in his later years. Fan Chi was born in Lu ? and he was 36 years 
younger than Confucius. According to what Confucius answered, we 
could see that Fan Chi was involved in politics. When Confucius lost 
political advantages and left Lu, Fan Chi was only 19 years old and 
could not be an official or have the responsibility of “leading the 
people to justice”. Fan Chi made contributions by suppressing Qi ? 
with another disciple Ran You ?? in Ai Gong ?? Eleventh Year 
(484 BC), so Ji Kangzi ??? welcomed Confucius to return to Lu. 
This implied Fan Chi had already reached the upper status. And if so, 
the earliest time this dialogue occurred was after Confucius spent 14 
years traveling around nations and came back to Lu at the age of 68. 
What Confucius said in Li Ji?????Biao Ji (??) was in line with 
his ancestors. The Master said: 
 
The principle of the Xia ? Dynasty was the fear of God’s 
will, serving ghosts (gui ?), respecting gods (shen ?), but 
keeping a certain distance from them, the most important 
thing was to teach people faithfully. The principle of the 
Zhou ? Dynasty was the fear of rites, serving ghosts, 
respecting gods, but keeping a certain distance from 
them, the most important thing was to teach people 
faithfully. 
 
The Korean Version of The Analects of Confucius recorded what Zhai 
Hao ?? said in the Book of Si Shu Kao Yi??????, “The sentence 
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‘to teach people faithfully’ is equivalent to the meaning of ‘lead the 
people to justice.’”3  
As for the doubt of serious conflicts within Confucius’ thoughts, 
we could solve the confusion with the different concepts of “God” (di 
?), “god” and “ghost” in pre-Qin Dynasty. In addition, to investigate 
Ji ? the family’s excessive sacrifice at that time will also help us to 
understand the reasons. Guo Moruo ??? and Wang Guowei ??
? considered the Chinese character “God” was like a flower stalk as 
the source of life.4 Oracle bone script “God” was , Xu Zhongshu ?
?? said in Oracle Dictionary?????: 
 
Put up or bundle wood to burn sacrifices for heaven 
worship…Later, the meaning was extended from Heaven 
worship to God worship. In the concept of the people in 
the Shang ? Dynasty, the Sacred One, also known as 
God, dominated the wind and rain and the human future 
and destiny.5 
 
Ye Yusen agreed and believed that “stacked wood or bundle of 
wood” was indeed a sign of a sacrificial altar.6 What Xu and Ye said 
were coordinate with Liji “rearing a burning pile to God.” Thus it is 
obvious that the concept of “God” was from “Heaven,” the figurative 
expression of abstract “Heaven”; both “Heaven” and “God” have the 
same etymology. It is clear that “Heaven” has originally a religious 
implication. Regardless of whether the ancients adopted the symbolic 
meaning of “flower stalk” or they “put a bundle of wood to burn 
sacrifices for Heaven worship” to express their concept of God, both 
illustrated the ancient people’s progressive religious thought about 
“God” with a “metaphysical” nature. 
                                                 
3 Huang Huaixin ???, ed., Collected expositions on the Analects of Confucius ?
???????, Zhou Haisheng ??? and Kong Deli ??? participated in the 
writing. Vol.1 (Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Press, 2008), p. 521. 
4 Kang Yin ??, Analysis of Words Origin???????? (Beijing: Beijing 
Rongbaozhai Press, 1979), p. 593. 
5 Xu Zhongshu ???, ed., The Oracle bone script Dictionary??????? 
(Sichuan: Sichuan Dictionary Publishing House, 2006), p. 7. 
6 Liang Yancheng ???, Reconstruction of Chinese Philosophy?????????
(Taipei: Cosmic Light Holistic Care, 2004), p. 234. 
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Li Ji• Ji Yi (??) recorded: 
 
Zai Wo?? said, “I have heard the names of ghosts and 
gods, but I do not know what they mean.” The Master 
said, “The spirit is the main feature of gods; the soul is the 
main feature of ghosts.” He also said, “All the living 
creatures must die, and after death, what returned to the 
ground is the body from which the soul and spirit 
separate. The bones and flesh are buried below and 
covered by soil in the wild. Their spirits could reach the 
realm of glorious brightness. The fumes ascending are 
mixed with sweet and disgusting smells among these are 
the good ones and evil ones of the spirits. The most 
splendid ones among all the spirits upgrade to gods 
whereas the ordinary souls and spirits are ghosts. ”  
[X2] 
So we can see that Confucius’ concept of “god” was a purified 
“spirit” with a higher grade essence; these two things were also 
produced from human variation. This idea originated from his 
ancestors. We can get evidence from the character  (“god”?) in 
The Analects of Confucius • Ba Yi (??) of the Dingzhou Han Bamboo-
slips Script Version: 
 
□□□□□□as if it was present.7 He sacrificed to the gods
, as if the gods  were present…8  
 
In the Bamboo-slips Script Version, the Chinese character “ ” 
was constituted of two Chinese characters: “?” with the meaning of 
changing fantastically and unpredictably, and the character of “?”.9 
                                                 
7 Bamboo-slip words are incomplete and cannot be identified; the number of 
words cannot be determined. Dingzhou version noted by symbols of “…”; in order 
to distinguish from the ellipsis in this paper, so here write “”to replace it. 
8 Hebei Cultural Relics Research Institute Bamboo-slips of Han-Dynasty Tomb 
in Dingzhou Organizing Group, Dingzhou Han Tomb Bamboo-slips - The Analects of 
Confucius (Beijing: Cultural Relics Publishing House, 1997), p. 17. 
9  “God” (? ) is an associative compound of Chinese characters. It was 
constituted by two Chinese characters “?” and “?”. The bronze inscription 
(jinwen ??) of “?” is a lightning shape in the sky. The ancient people considered 
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Oracle bone script of “ghost” (gui ?) was ; Xu’s explanation was 
as follows: 
 
The abnormal shape was like a monster with human 
body but a giant head, and was used to represent 
difference from a living human being…Guo Pu ?? 
annotated Er Ya???? by quoting Shi Zi????, “The 
ancient people called the dead men (gui ?) were those 
who returned (gui ?) to the ground. ” The concept of the 
people in Shang Dynasty had considerably developed. 
The character gui was derived and transformed from the 
character ren ? illustrated ghost is derived from human 
being.10 
 
From bamboo-slips Chinese character “ ,” we could see that the 
concept of ghost and god in the pre-Qin period implied that, in 
addition to “god” being the purified vital essence from “spirit,” there 
was also another layer meaning to the trait of changing fantastically 
and unpredictably; this was the same as the Chinese word “immortal” 
(xian ? ), 11  which was so-called “celestial being”. “Becoming 
immortal” means the “spirit” and “soul” upgraded to a “god” with a 
fantastical and unpredictable essence.  
                                                 
lightning in the sky was powerful and changing fantastically and unpredictable, 
so they referred lightning to represent gods with the trait of changing fantastically 
and unpredictably. This is different from the understanding that “god” 
“generated all things” in Shuo Wen????. In ancient Chinese literature, the one 
who “generated all things” was “God” (??) but not “god” (?). 
10  Xu Zhongshu, ed., The Oracle Dictionary (Sichuan: Sichuan Dictionary 
Publishing House, 2006), p.1021. 
11 The associative compound of Chinese character, it was written as “?”. The 
right side means someone climbs to a higher place for the bird's nest, and the left 
side adds a character of “?” to show a person could reach higher to be immortals. 
Shuo Wen said, “Immortals, live long and move to a higher place.” The first ancient 
literature that directed “immortals ?” as “god ?” was Lie Zi????•Huang Di 
(??). That passage said, “There is god in the mountain, who breathed wind, 
drank dew and did not eat grains. His heart was like the flowing fountain and His 
shape was like a virgin; He was not dependent on others and did not love others; 
immortal saints were His servants.” 
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“Lead the people to justice; respect ghosts and gods but keep 
certain distance from them.” Fan Chi asked what wisdom was. 
Confucius answered from a political perspective and his answer 
seemed as if his choice between “benevolence and righteousness” and 
“ghosts and gods,” or between “reality” and “emptiness” (religion). 
But it was definite that Shu Er said clearly, “The things on which the 
Master exercised the greatest caution were: sacrifice, war and 
sickness”. Li Ji• Li Qi (??) even recorded: 
 
Confucius said: “to recite a poem three hundred times is 
not more worthy than to offer a gift of sacrifice, a gift of 
sacrifice was not more worthy than offering Da Xiang ?
?, the grand sacrifice of Da Xiang, is not more worthy 
than offering Da Lv ??, (Zheng xuan?? annotated: 
“Da Lv,” was a sacrifice to worship Five Emperors) Da Lv 
completed but is still not sufficient to satisfy God.” 
 
 
When the Duke granted him a gift of fresh meat, he would have it 
cooked, and offered it to the ghosts of his ancestors; on a sudden 
striking of thunder, or a violent wind, he would change countenance. 
(The Analects of Confucius • Xiang Dang (??)). These records revealed 
Confucius was in fear of God, and attached great importance to 
sacrifice. Then why did Confucius’s words sound self-contradictory? 
It was said in Li Ji• Li Yun (??), “Confucius said, ‘It was by those 
rites that the ancient kings sought to inherit the Way of Heaven, and 
embodied it in everyday life. Therefore he who neglects or violates 
them may be spoken of as dead, and he who obeys them, as alive. 
They extend to funeral rituals, sacrifices…Thus the sages made these 
rites known to it / the sages made these rites to illustrate it? (the Way 
of Heaven), and so that the kingdom, with its states and clans, to reach 
its correct condition by rites.’” Also Li Ji• Jiao Te Sheng (???) said, 
“Heaven hangs out its brilliant figure, and the sages imitated them. To 
sacrifice to God in the suburb of the capital is to illustrate the Way of 
Heaven.” Therefore, what he pursued was “the Way of Heaven” 
embodied in the sacrifice ceremonies.  
However, the unjust sacrifice of the Ji family was perpetrated to 
obtain status, to seeking blessings through flattery. Then what was the 
content of “the Way of Heaven” embodied in the sacrifice ceremonies? 
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Li Ji • Yue Ji (??) said, “Similarity and union are the aim of music; 
difference and distinction, that of rite.” Zheng annotated: “Similarity 
or union is called the coordination of likes and dislikes; difference or 
distinction is called discrimination between the noble and the humble 
ones.” Li Yun said:  
 
The reason that they sacrificed to God in the suburb of the 
capital was to establish the throne of heaven. The reason 
that they sacrificed to the god of land in the state was to 
consecrate the benefits derived from the earth. The reason 
that they sacrificed in the ancestral temple was to show 
their fundamental sentiments of humanity. The reason 
that they sacrificed in the hills and streams was to mark 
their respect to the gods and ghosts. 
 
Li Ji• Zhong Yong (??) also said, “Suburb sacrifice is to serve God; 
the sacred core of the ceremony is to worship their ancestors.” This 
echoed Confucius’ thought of ghosts and gods to a certain extent, and 
he considered that “the Way of Heaven” showed the “order” (zhixu ?
?), that was the core value of the “Rite” of Confucius. It was in 
response to the confused and disordered political situation in the late 
Spring and Autumn (Chunqiu ??), that Confucius stressed that the 
sacrifice ceremonies of superiority and inferiority must be clearly 
distinguished respectfully. Furthermore, Li Qi said, “The point of 
ritual is to return to its source and to learn not to forget its origin.” 
“Not to forget their origin” is thus a tribute to the origin of life.  
Confucian disciples collected the circumstances of the Ji family’s 
sacrifice, as well as Confucius’ criticisms and edited them into The Ba 
Yi. The head of the Ji family, which could only be seen and enjoyed by 
the monarch, Confucius said, “If this can be bearable, what may not 
be bearable?” As the chief of the Ji family was about to sacrifice to the 
Taishan ??, Confucius said, “Alas! Will you say that the Taishan is 
not as discerning as Lin Fang ??  and that he will accept the Ji 
family’s sacrifice?” The three families of Lu sang the Yong ode ????
??, which was only sung by the emperor while the oblations were 
being removed at the end of the sacrifice. The Master said, “‘In 
attendence are the princes; the son of heaven looks profound and 
solemn’ - what application can these words be in the hall of the three 
families?” Unauthrorized the chief of the Ji family took the monarch’s 
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high “imperial ancestral sacrifice ceremony” to ancestors (Dili ??). 
The Master sighed and said, “I can’t stand this anymore and I have no 
wish to look on.” 
Confucius encouraged Fan Chi to “jin gui shen er yuan zhi.” It was 
in the context of the false sacrifice of the Ji family. Confucius put 
forward this statement to point out that the Ji family didn’t have 
concern for superiority or inferiority, but rather habituated to luxury 
and idle living by self interests. Therefore, when Lin Fang asked what 
the most important element of ceremonies should be focused, the 
Master replied, “In sacrifice ceremonies, it is better to be sparing than 
extravagant. In the ceremonies of mourning, it is better to be in deep 
sorrow than to make extravagant exertions.” “If a man is without 
kindly virtues, how will he perform the rites with propriety? If a man 
is without kindly virtues, how will he deal with music?” “In positions 
of honour with no generosity; ceremonies performed without 
reverence; mourning conducted without sorrow—how can I meditate 
upon such ways?” 
Fan Chi, was powerless to prevent the inordinate sacrifice of Ji 
family. And, when he enquired concerning the nature of wisdom, 
Confucius encouraged him to “lead the people to justice,” not in the 
manner of the Ji family’s pompous and extravagant pretense of 
worship, by which they thought they could obtain greater blessings 
by unjust and immoderate sacrifice; but on the contrary, it was only 
by the practice of justice that one would necessarily gain blessings 
from God. By “justice” is meant the “proper” way, if one could do 
things properly, he was practicing the Way of Heaven and of course 
he would obtain blessings from Heaven; if people could understand 
justice, they would then freely offer proper sacrifice to satisfy the 
“Rite”. From the vantage point of people, “jin gui shen er yuan zhi” was 
the wisdom of obtaining blessings from above; from Fan Chi’s 
perspective, “lead the people to justice” was the political wisdom of 
governance. This saying can be further explained by two more 
passages of Confucius. In the passage of Wei Zheng, Confucius speaks 
of both inordinate sacrifice and justice again, “For a man to sacrifice 
to ghosts not belonging to his ancestors is flattery; to see what is right 
but not to do it is cowardice.” “Ghosts,” according to the 
interpretation of the above words, referred the souls of the deceased. 
Hence, he called someone a coward who would offer flattering 
sacrifices to other people’s ancestors in order to seek blessings rather 
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than to obtain these by practicing “the Way of Heaven”. In Silk 
Manuscript of Chapter Yao??????, Confucius more directly says, 
“People who lack virtue attend to the gods, people lack wisdom tend 
to practice divination.” Again, he said, “The noble should seek 
blessings by practicing virtue, so that little sacrifice is necessary.”12 
Wei Zheng also comments on, “Sacrifice to ghosts who do not 
belong to his ancestors”. This lacks the word “gods,” while in Yong Ye 
“ghosts” and “gods” are included. That was because the lower 
officials and common people had no right to offer sacrifice to “God” 
and “gods”. (To sacrifice to God was only the right of the monarch; to 
sacrifice to gods who governed mountains and rivers was the scope 
for feudal dukes.) They did not have the authority to sacrifice to both 
God and gods. According to excavated Dingzhou Han bamboo-slips 
version, Yong Ye said, “jin gui er yuan zhi.”13 Here the word “ghosts” 
with no word following “gods”. Accordingly, controversy and 
confusion of “respect souls and spirits, but keep a certain distance 
from them” can be dealt with to a further degree and thus bring 
resolution. By examining the meaning of “respecting ghosts,” we can 
affirm that Confucius believed “ghosts” were in existence. Hence, it 
can be established that Confucius was not an atheist. In the above 
paragraphs we discussed the differences between “God,” “gods” and 
“ghosts”. “Ghosts” and “gods” were the souls and spirits of the dead, 
consequently, they were not the objects of Confucius’ Personality-
dominated belief. What Confucius believed and ultimately respected 
was “God,” in this way, his words did not derive from an 
understanding of his religious beliefs. The reason why interpretors in 
later ages had misunderstood was probably because the version of The 
Analects of Confucius passed down recorded “respect ghosts and gods, 
but keep a certain distance from them” while Shuo Wen recorded that 
“god” was the one who “generated all things.” These records were 
combined and became misleading. 
Now let us analyze The Biao Ji, “The principle of the Xia Dynasty 
was the fear of God’s will, attending to ghosts, respecting gods, while 
                                                 
12 Liu Bin ??, Research on Collected expositions on the Silk Manuscript of Chapter 
Yao (Beijing: Beijing Guangming Daily Press, 2009), pp. 29, 46. 
13 Hebei Cultural Relics Research Institute Bamboo-slips of Han-Dynasty Tomb 
in Dingzhou Organizing Group, Dingzhou Han Tomb Bamboo Slips-“The Analects of 
Confucius,” p. 28. 
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keeping a certain distance from them, and that the most important 
thing was to educate people in loyalty. The principle of the Zhou 
Dynasty was respect for the Rite, attending to ghosts, respecting gods, 
while keeping certain distance from them; the most important thing 
was to teach people loyally.” Here from Confucius’ words we can see 
the following. First, the Xia Dynasty and Zhou Dynasties were the best 
examples of personality-dominated belief, “respect ghosts and gods, 
but keep a certain distance from them” did not come from the 
prevailing religious belief. Second, the “Will” of Xia Dynasty and the 
“Rite” of Zhou Dynasty were in reality the same thing; the “Rite” came 
from the “Will” and this confirmed Confucius’ integrated concept of 
“the Will of God” and “the Way of Heaven,” which followed and 
modelled itself upon the predecessors of the Three Generations. His 
concept of “the Way of Heaven” was not naturalism. Third, “fear 
Heaven (God),” “respect gods” and “attend to ghosts” were observed 
by nobility as well as common people, and these were well regulated 
services. Both ghosts and gods came from transformed living humans, 
and so cannot be compared to God, who is the origin of creation and 
the spring of impartial justice (the highest goodness). As a result, 
“God” to be regarded as the object of respect and the model to follow. 
Confucius did not mention the principle of the Shang Dynasty. This is 
because there were abundant examples of improper sacrifices to 
ghosts and gods in the Shang Dynasty. In that case, “jin gui shen er 
yuan zhi” was because of repect for the Will and Rite. The goal of the 
Will and Rite is to faithfully illustrate the Way of Heaven / the Will of 
God to the people. Illustrations of the Way of Heaven has as its aim to 
reveal the degrees of rank in a model society by God, gods and ghosts. 
Blessings for man come from respect of the Will and Rite, but not from 
inordinate sacrifices and flattery for ghosts and gods. This was in line 
with the theme of Yong Ye, Wei Zheng and Chapter Yao. But why did 
Confucius speak of “respect for ghosts”? Just as Liu Baonan explained 
in Explanatory Note of the Analects of Confucius??????, “To attend 
to also consists of ‘respect for’”14 In addition, Confucius mentioned 
only “ghosts” to Fan Chi but stressed to “keep a certain distance”. He 
used the word “respect” to show that he did not mean we should be 
deficient in respect shown to our ancestors. 
                                                 
14 Huang Huaixin. (ed.), Collected expositions on the Analects of Confucius, Part I, 
p. 522. choreography 
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In a word, the meaning of “jin gui shen er yuan zhi” is: We should 
respect our ancestors but keep aloof from inordinate and providing 
sacrifices, by which people seek their own good and purposes by 
serving their own, or even not their own, ancestors’ souls. The proper 
interpretation should be: “respect our ancestors and keep aloof from 
false sacrifices.” This was Confucius’ expostulation of bringing order 
from the chaos brought about by the extravagant and improper 
sacrifices of the Ji family.  
 
Confucius’ Personality-Dominated Concept in His Early Years. 
Confucius’ personality- dominated concept can be traced by to his 30th 
year. This was the first year in the reign of Qi Jing Gong ??? who 
came to Lu and consulted Confucius with the principles of 
governance. Confucius “had his mind bent on learning at fifteen” and 
“stood firmly at thirty”. The documents recorded that Confucius was 
obsessed with the “Rite” and he aspired to learn with great 
enthusiasm. “The Master, when he entered the grand temple, asked 
about everything. Someone said, ‘Who say that the son of the man of 
Zou knows the rites of propriety! ’…(before the age of 25)” (Ba Yi). 
Besides, Zhao Gong Seventeenth Year??????? recorded, “In 
autumn, Tan Zi?? visited Lu and Zhao Gong, and held a feast for 
him. Zhao Gong asked, ‘Why has Shao Hao Shi??? used the name 
of a bird as the official name?’ Confucius heard that Tan Zi could 
answer such questions so he paid a visit to Tan Zi to learn from him 
(27 years old).15 Confucius began to take office as a lesser officer when 
                                                 
15 Qian Mu ?? explained and analyzed the passage of “entered the grand 
temple,” “we are not sure in which year this happened, but we assure that at that 
time Confucius had already been in politics so he got the right to enter the grand 
temple to be an assistant for sacrifice ceremonies.” (Qian Mu, The Past Masters in 
Pre-Qin Dynasty Scheduled by year????????) Liu Fangwei ??? further 
analyzed that Confucius was called “the son of the man of Zou”. It must be before 
he was famous for knowledge of rites. “The son of the man of Zou” indicated that 
(at the age of 17) he was recently recognized as the son of Shu Liang He ??. But 
people were used to calling him “the son of the man of Zou”. At that time, he 
would have been promoted as civil officer with higher rank from the original 
positions of “Wei Li ?? (officer in charge of grains)” and “Cheng Tian ?? 
(officer in charge of animals).” When he was 27 years old he asked for advice 
about the ancient official system from Tan Zi, who was the king of Tan. Between 
the age of 21 and 25 marks his “entering the grand temple”. Liu Fangwei, 
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he was 21 years old and at the age of 25 he received promotion to enter 
the grand temple as an assistant of sacrificial ceremonies. At that time 
he was questioned whether he knew the rites of propriety. When he 
was 30 years old, he was asked by a Duke of a powerful state about 
the political issues connected to the rites. It can be said that until then 
Confucius’ knowledge and career were firstly approved and that he 
became famous among the feudal dukes. Confucius himself goes on 
to say that, “At thirty, I stood firmly.” 
Zhu Xi ??  says of Confucius’ statement: “At thirty, I stood 
firmly,” “if one could establish his own moral belief, keep it fast and 
not change it.”16 And so it can be seen that Confucius’ had a firm belief 
in The Way and the Rite from the founding of his career. In 522 BC, 
Zhao Gong was in his Twentieth year, and Jing Gong of Qi and Yan 
Ying?? came to Lu. Jing Gong asked why Mu Gong ?? of Qin?
could seek political dominence as a small nation, Confucius answered, 
“although it is small, Qi’s ambition is great; although its geographic 
location is remote, it practices ‘impartiality’…These merits more than 
warrant him to be a king (the Biography of Confucius). This “impartial 
justice” is the virtue of goodness granted from Heaven. 
Shangshu•Shang Shu•Tang Gao???•??•???spoke of this when 
he said, “Heavenly God who grants ‘zhong’ ? to common people.” 
Kong Anguo ??? commented: “‘zhong’ is goodness.” Kong Yingda 
??? explicated, “Heaven raised a large population and gave them 
five constant virtues (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom 
and fidelity).” Shangshu•Zhou Shu•Lv Xing???•??•???said, 
“To govern citizens by upright acts…There are glorious blessings in 
fulfilling ‘impartiality’ (zhong ?).” Kong Anguo annotated and said, 
“The wise man shows by deeds and serves ‘impartial justice’ in five 
constant virtues.” Li Ji•Zhongni Yan Ju (????) records Confucius’ 
explanation of “impartiality” thus, “The Master said, ‘Shi ? was too 
excessive while Shang ?was too insufficient.’ Zi Gan crossed the mat, 
and responded, ‘could I ask by what means it is possible to secure 
impartiality.’ The Master said, ‘By means of Rite! It is those rites which 
                                                 
Confucius Ji: The Gateway of Academic Thought and the Creation of Cultural System 
(Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2009), pp. 69-70. 
16 Huang Huaixin. (ed.), Collection of Correction and Interpretation of the Analects of 
Confucius, Part?, p. 112. 
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define and determine ‘impartiality.’” In Confucius’ opinion, although 
Mu Gong of Qin was the leader of a small nation, he could practice the 
virtue of “impartial justice” granted by the Heaven. So by this virtue, 
it was more than enough for him to be a king. Hence we can say it was 
as clear as if it were in front of us that Confucius’ personality-
dominated concept was well-formed by the age of 30; we can return 
to basic assertion that “at thirty, I stood firmly”. 
 
Confucius Was Enamored of the Book of Changes: Personality-Dominated 
Concept of the Way of Heaven 
 
The Transition from the Personality-Dominated Concept to the 
Philosophical View of the Way of Heaven. The Biography of Confucius 
recorded as noted above, that “Confucius was enamored by The Book 
of Changes in his later years… The Book of Changes was read so many 
times by Confucius that the rawhide ropes linking the bamboo slips 
repeatedly broke. It also records Confucius as having said, ‘If I could 
live for several years more, I would have followed the thought and 
essence of the Book of Changes.” Silk Manuscript of Chapter Yao also 
recorded this event, “When Confucius became old, he was enamored 
by The Book of Changes. When he was at home, the book would be on 
his bed; when he was on the journey, he would carry along the book 
in his sack.”17 “When he was on the journey” referred to his experience 
of traveling around the territories at the age of 55. But Confucius had 
already understood the Will of God at fifty. “To understand” had 
transcended purely perceptual belief. If this is so the the question then 
becomes when did Confucius begin to have interest in the rational 
investigation of the philosophical aspect of “Heaven”? It is worth 
noting that The Silk Manuscript of Chapter Yao supplements our 
explanation of why Confucius was enamored by The Book of Changes: 
 
Formerly I was fortunate and lucky (and so I had no time 
to study it, when the mishaps began in my life, then I 
explored it more) (qiao ?  → kao ? ). The one who 
examines the essence of the book will not go against the 
virtue of The Book of Changes. …I was not only at ease with 
                                                 
17 Liu Bin, Research on Collected expositions on the Silk Manuscript of Chapter Yao, p. 
29. 
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its spirituality but I was also pleased with {the words in 
it}.18 
 
As for “formerly I was fortunate and blessed, when the mishaps 
began in my life, then I explored it more (qiao ? → kao ?), Qiu Xigui 
??? , Liao Mingchun ??? , Chen Songchang ??? and 
Tomohisa Ikeda ????19all agreed on the explanation of “formerly 
I was fortunate and blessed and lucky…Now I suffered many mishaps 
in my life.”20 At the end of 40 years old, Yang Hu??, the servant of 
the Ji family, seized power day by day, so that Confucius called him 
“under secretary to the officers of the state,” (The Analects of Confucius 
• Ji Shi (?? )). The Biography of Confucius recorded, “as under 
secretaries of the great officers gathered in the powers of the state, 
Confucius quit politics and retreated to his studies Shi???, Shu??
?, Li???and Yue???.” When he was 50 years old, GongShan Buniu
???? rebelled against the Ji family and occupied Fei ? city. He 
then sent for Confucius. “Confucius followed and practiced the Way 
(of Zhou Dynasty) for a long time but his talents still were suppressed 
everywhere and nobody appointed him…When he was going to Fei 
city, Zi Lu was displeased.” It is thus clear that the translation of 
“Confucius was enamored of the Book of Changes in his later years” 
should be about the end of 40 years old. 
                                                 
18 Liu Bin, Research on Collected expositions on the Silk Manuscript of Chapter Yao, 
pp. 30-31. 
19 Ibid., p. 30. 
20 Qiu noted: “That word that appeared after ‘formerly’ (qian?) and ‘mishaps’ 
(fu?) might be interpreted as ‘lamb’ (yang?). The Silk Manuscript of Xi Ci??, 
second part of Line 45 recorded, “Good fortune is lamb (present version is 
blessing (xiang ? ). The word ‘lamb’ is the same shape as the pictographic 
character … There is another doubt that these two words of ‘lamb’ might be read 
as ‘contrary’ (ni?). This still needs to be further confirmed.” The word “explore” 
(qiao ?) is the same as “research” (kao ?), with the meaning of exploration. Shi 
Ming ?Shi Yan Yu ????????said, “to explore, is actually to research. To 
research different elements and integrate them together.” Wang Xianqian ??? 
annotated and supplemented Wang Qiyuan ??? said, “In ancient times, the 
word ‘explore’ is the same as ‘research’…In Shiji?the Biography of Lu Zhou Gong 
(?????), the word‘research’was written as ‘explore’. Such was the proof. ” 
Guo Yi, 2004. “A Textual Research on Chapter Yao of Silk Manuscript,” Studies on 
the Book of Changes. Vol. 66, no.2, 47.  
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It is also noteworthy that, Confucius himself once said “At forty, I 
had no doubts.” Silk Manuscript of Chapter Yao recorded Zi Gan 
doubted Confucius, “I heard from you before, ‘people who were 
humble and practiced righteousness would have no doubts.’” That 
was because Confucius once said, “People without the virtues tend to 
the gods”. But now he became “doubtful” and was enamored of the 
Book of Changes. When did Zi Gan hear the words? Zi Gan was 32 years 
younger than Confucius. If he heard this when Confucius was 40 years 
old, he was only 8 years old at that time. If we calculate that the time 
when “he suffered many mishaps in life” was at the end of 40 years 
old, it is clear that the statement what Zi Gan heard from Confucius 
was advocated in his beginning of the interim of 40 years old. Then 
“to be humble and practice righteousness would have no doubts” was 
Confucius own annotation for “at forty, I had no doubts”. Therefore, 
Sun Chuo?? explained in Huang Kan Yi Shu??????, “At forty, 
I had no doubts” seemed to be Confucius’ voice from the heart, “In his 
40 years old, be strong and acquired greater achievement in career, it 
is because the ten years’ learning and practicing virtues after 30 years 
old led him to be successful and an outstanding talent in his state and 
to put forward his aspiration in politics as a result of his firm belief of 
dao.21 
Personality-Dominated Concept of the Way of Heaven In the previous 
part of this paper, we noted that Confucius followed the Three 
Generations of ancient sages and analyzed “Heaven” with a religious 
sense in The Jing Series of the Book of Changes, “Way” and “Impartiality” 
virtuous thought. In 1973, The Silk Manuscript of Yi Zhuan??????
was unearthed and this version really complemented important 
evidence for study on Confucius’ personality-dominated concept of 
the Way of Heaven. Silk Manuscript of Chapter Yao22 recorded: 
 
Confucius said, “There is the Way of Heaven in the 
philosophy concept of Changes ?, the sun, the moon, and 
the stars cannot cover all, so these can be summarized by 
the concept of Yin ? and Yang ?; there is the Way of 
Earth…so these can be summarized by the concept of 
                                                 
21 Huang Huaixin. (ed.), Huang Huaixin ???, ed., Collected expositions on the 
Analects of Confucius, Part I, p. 113. 
22 Liu Bin, Correction and Interpretation of Silk Manuscript of Chapter Yao, p. 1. 
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Firm and Yielding (gangrou ??); there is the Way of 
Human…so these can be summarized by the concept of 
Noble and Low (shang-xia??(??)) ; there is the change 
of four seasons…so these can be summarized by the 
concept of Ba Gua ??…there is the Way of kings…”23 
 
Confucius summarized the whole universe in Five Ways ?? of 
Heaven (Tian ?), Earth (Di ?), Human (Ren ?), Time (Shi ?) and 
King (Jun ? ). “The Five Ways” exactly reflected Confucius’ 
personality-dominated concept of the Way of Heaven. Because Earth, 
Human, Time and King contained time, space (material world) and 
human (including administrators (kings) and subordinates (citizens) 
of the whole universe; the Way of Heaven, with attributes of 
personality, is the principle of other four Ways of Earth, Human, Time 
and King.  
First of all, Confucius regarded “the sun, the moon, and the stars” 
on behalf of all things. He believed behind them is “the Way of 
Heaven” which operates in the mode of the continuous intercourse of 
Yin and Yang. His concept of astronomy had already gone beyond the 
perspective of lives, it shows a relatively complete conception of the 
universe. Thus it can be seen that Confucius aimed to explore the 
origin of the whole universe and he considered the paradigm of the 
operation of the universe to be Yin-Yang; also he believed Yin-Yang 
had personality traits granted by God. Silk Manuscript of Yi Zhi Yi?
?? recorded: 
 
Confucius said, “The essence of the Book of Changes can be 
understood well. Jian? {qian ?} Hexagram and Chuan ? 
{Kun ?} Hexagram are the gateway of the Book of Changes. 
The Jian Hexagram is an image of yang objects and states; 
the Chuan Hexagram an image of yin objects and states. 
When yin and yang are in harmoniously intercourse, they 
give birth to all creatures that bear firm or yielding nature 
in which are incarnate concretely the creation of Heaven 
and Earth, and exemplify the miraculous virtue of God. 
… (Yin and Yang) are of natural instinct of benevolence 
and righteousness and that is why they are the examples 
                                                 
23 Ibid., pp. 57-64. 
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of all things whether in traits of firm or yielding in the 
universe. 24  
 
Confucius believed that the key truth of The Book of Changes relied 
on Qian-Kun. Qian-Kun was the entrance to comprehendind The Book 
of Changes, because Qian-Kun respectively belongs to Yang and Yin. 
Yin-Yang was the basic governing principle of the universe. The 
intercourse of Yin-Yang derive all things with trait of firm or yielding, 
and thus exemplify the miraculous virtue of God. Then what is the 
virtue of God? Yi Zhi Yi provided very important supplement, “(Yin-
Yang) and the natural instinct of benevolence and righteousness” and 
this was regarded as the model of the Way of all things. Since it was 
said that Yin-Yang is born from God, then the virtue of God is 
benevolence and righteousness which is indisputably the necessary 
condition of personality. Accordingly, Confucius’ personality-
dominated concept of the Way of Heaven admitted of no doubt.  
Also Silk Manuscript of Er San Zi Wen?????? recorded 
Confucius explaining the Qian Hexagram: 
 
The Dragon is grand. The shape of dragon is transformed 
from Yin-Yang, and it submits itself to God, as if a virtue 
of God.25 
 
The dragon submits itself to God. The reason that the dragon is 
considered as the vehicle of the virtue of divinity is because “God” 
                                                 
24 In Yi Zhi Yi, there is one paragraph from “and  can keep silent” to “then 
brilliant talent are Trustworthy” (??????? ? ???????) after the 
paragraph of “in which incarnate concretely the creation of Heaven and Earth” (
????????). Guo Yi considered it may be in lost of some bamboo-slips here 
and put forward his adjustment suggestion. Figuring out the meaning of the 
passage, Hu Zhihong ??? indicates Guo was almost right. However, he points 
out that Silk Manuscript would not be in the situation of losing words like the 
Bamboo-slips version, unless it transcribed from the Bamboo-slips version, as a 
result the incorrect Silk Manuscript version spread. Hu Zhihong, “The View of 
Morality between Human and Heaven of Four Passages in Silk Manuscript of Yi 
Zhuan,” Studies on the Book of Changes, p.23. 
25  According to Liao Mingchun and Chen Songchang’s version. See Chen 
Guying ???, Study on Taoist Culture (Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Press, 
1993), Vol. 3, p.424. 
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grants it the virtue of divinity.26 Confucius pointed out, “Virtue of 
dragons…27  The one who grants it is called the virtuous man; be 
watchful for changes and respect unity; accurate, pure, tender and 
peace….so it is called a virtuous man.” By means of the metaphor 
between the Dragon and God, God as the origin of virtue was 
revealed. Confucius also explained The Sixth Chapter Yao Ci of Kun 
Hexagram, “Stepping on frost, the icy day is just around the corner.” 
He explained as follows, “The virtue begins with the Way of Heaven 
and certainly follows the five elements.” The “five elements” are the 
five virtues of benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and 
fidelity. It can be confirmed by the Five Elements ?? stated in the 
unearthed Guodian’s bamboo-slips ?? of Chu Guo ? .28  This is 
another confirmation. 
In fact, the term “five elements" appeared just three times in 
Shangshu. The first time it appeared was in Shangshu•Xia Shu•Gan Shi
???•??•???: 
 
The Emperor said, “I told you that Hushi?? was proud 
and insulted five elements; also he idled and abandoned 
three righteousness.” Kong Anguo annotated, “The 
virtues of five elements are inherited and adopted by the 
emperors.”  
 
The meaning of “five element” was of virtue’s basis. Subsequently, 
the “Five Constant (Virtues)” in Shangshu took the place of the “five 
elements” in virtues. The second and third times it appeared were in 
Shangshu•Zhou Shu•Hong Fan???•??•???: 
 
In ancient time of Gun?, Yin? (River was blocked) and 
the regulation of flood was out of the Way. (The Heavenly 
God) exposed his five elements. Kong annotated, 
                                                 
26 Hu Zhihong, “The View of Morality between Human and Heaven of Four 
Passages in Silk Manuscript of Yi Zhuan,” p. 24. 
27 Here original version was written “said????? changes????”. Chen 
Guying, Study on Taoist Culture. Vol. 3, p. 425.  
28  See Gou Dongfeng ??? , 2011. “Interpretation for ‘Five Elements’ of 
Guodian Chu Bamboo-Slips.” Journal of Ancient Books Collation and Studies. Vol. 4, 
pp. 35-42. 
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“Exposed his five elements, equals ‘was proud and 
insulted five elements’ “in Gan Shi.  
 
This means the Heavenly God exposed that Gun’s performances 
were not meeting the standard of the virtues of five elements. The 
meaning of “five element” still was of virtue’s basis, however, it was 
continually recorded: 
 
The Heavenly God granted Da Yu ?? nine laws to 
regulate flood. The first law was called “Five 
Elements”…. “Five Elements”: the first was water (shut ?
), the second was fire (huo ?), the third was wood (mu ?
), the fourth was gold (jin ?), and the fifth was earth (tu 
?). 
 
To transfer the virtues of the "Five Elements" into five basic 
elements of the physical world signifies the thought in Shangshu that 
all substances are formed because of “virtues” as the origin. This is 
the strong theoretical basis for Confucius’ personality-dominated 
concept of the Way of Heaven. 
Actually, Jing Series of the Book of Changes was essentially used for 
divination. “God” is the established object of their inquiry and prayer. 
Emperor Wen Wang and Zhou Gong of Zhou were the authors and 
both of them were with clear religious thought. Confucius also said in 
Chapter Yao, “I can do divination with 70 percent accuracy.”29 
The Silk Manuscript of Yi Zhuan was unearthed and it testified that 
Confucius fully understood and inherited the following ideas in 
Shangshu and The Book of Changes: “Heavenly God who grants 
goodness to common people,” the personal thought of “the Way of 
Heaven,” the essence in the Hexagrams in the Book of Changes, the 
Hexagram descriptions, and discipline of changes of different 
Hexagrams. He first advocated the philosophical theory of “Yin-
Yang,” indicating the two Hexagrams of Qian and Kun had with the 
properties of “Firm and Yielding” respectively. He summarized these 
as “the Way of Heaven” concept that born from the Dominant 
                                                 
29 Liu Bin, Research on Collected expositions on the Silk Manuscript of Chapter Yao, p. 
41.  
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Personality gives birth to all things. 30  Based on heaven-human 
relationship of “Only God grants goodness to common people,” he 
advocated the theory of “the Way of Heaven” which was shown in 
Earth, Human, Time and King. So we can find that Confucius’ 
comprehension of the Dominant Personality and “the Way of 
Heaven” was sublimated from perception in his early years to 
rationality in his later years. That discerns his universal consciousness 
and the further development of his cosmological vision.  
 
Further Analysis of “At fifteen, he had his mind bent on learning” to “At 
seventy, I could follow what my heart desired” 
 
Confucius “at fifteen, had his mind bent on learning” and “at 
seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing 
what was right” (Wei Zheng). That was a step-by-step progression of 
life. Confucius “had his mind bent on learning at fifteen,” “strive hard 
in learning rites from below and pursuit of understanding the truth 
on high” (Xian Wen), and “at thirty” he became famous among the 
feudal dukes and thus built up his career. Believing “virtues were 
granted by Heaven,” he also stood firm on the “Way” and “rite” as his 
basic principle for holding steady. Furthermore, at the age of 34, 
Confucius was sent to pay a formal visit to Zhou to inquire about rites; 
when he was 34-35 years old, he became a retainer of Gao Zhao Zi ?
?? of Qi. During that period, an expanded epistemology broadened 
his life horizons, Confucius served the powerful state with his lofty 
                                                 
30 There is no record of "Yin-Yang" as a term in the Book of Changes. "Yin and Yang" 
firstly appeared in Poetry?Daya?Gongliu??????????, “see its Yin-Yang,” 
meaning the south and north of the mountain. Another book was Shangshu 
?Zhoushu?Zhouguan??????????, “(Cheng Wang ??) established Taishi 
?? , Taibao ??  and Taifu ?? , these three masters discussed the way of 
governing the state, and the coordination of various (Yin-Yang) departments.” 
Then Yin-Yang comprises the meaning of “various” and “relatively”. "Yin-Yang" 
appeared just once in the Book of Odes????and the Book of Shangshu. The ancient 
record was that because Cheng Wang was going to inherit the throne, so Zhao 
Kang Gong cited Gongliu to warn him to care the citizen matters; Zhouguan was 
written by Cheng Wang. So the time of these two passages were close but Gongliu 
was a little earlier. According to Silk Manuscript of Yao, Yi Zhi Yi and Er San Zi 
Wen, it was confirmed that Confucius was the first one who summarized this 
concept of “Yin-Yang” as “the Way of Heaven” concept that born from the 
Personality Dominate gives birth to all things.  
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ambition while to be “humble and practice righteousness.” He 
guarded further staunch beliefs as a result of the deeper experience 
and understanding of the “Way” and “rite,” thus he said, “at forty, I 
had no doubts”. 
Confucius at 40 years old, began to suffer many mishaps and 
torments, he started to ponder the Impartial Entity that could reach 
not only the benevolent ruler but also be sovereign over all things in 
the universe by granting individuals a unique mission and 
significance. It was “at fifty, I ‘comprehended’ the Will of God” that 
he enter into rational philosophical thought. Another recorded, “The 
Master said, ‘Without recognizing the Will of God it is impossible to 
be a superior man.’” (The Analects of Confucius • Yao Yue??) When 
Confucius was 21-25 years old, “he had entered the grand temple and 
asked about everything”; then he was laughed and questioned 
whether he really understood the rite or not. He made defense, “This 
is a rite of propriety.” Bo Niu ?? was only six years younger than 
Confucius, but he died at an early age. When Bo Niu was sick in bed, 
Confucius was in his prime of life. Confucius was confused by Bo 
Niu’s sickness and questioned the Will of God, “That such a man 
should have such a sickness?” (Yong Ye). However, when he was in 
the capital of Zheng ? at the age of 57, he lost contact with his 
disciples; and during his helpless situation, he was laughed at and was 
“as panic-stricken as a stray dog” (The Biography of Confucius). 
Confucius accepted with pleasure and answered, “Indeed you are 
right; indeed you are right!” (Ibid.). He said, “I comprehended the Will 
of God.” On the other hand, he found the principle of creation of 
heaven and earth displayed in the Book of Changes was “the Way of 
Heaven,” the “Way” was born from the “Will”. This was Confucius’ 
integrated cosmology concept of “the Will of God” and “the Way of 
Heaven”. 
“My ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth” and “I 
could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was 
right” were obviously developed from “I comprehended the Will of 
God”. When he reached 60 years old, he began to comprehend that 
Heaven was absolute perfection, the perspective of Heaven was 
higher than the human. During his period of going through trials and 
tribulations, he was willing to accept the gain, loss, anxiety and 
suffering that resulted from practicing the Way of Heaven and 
obeying the Will of God. Therefore, “at sixty, my ear was an obedient 
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organ for the reception of truth.” When Confucius planned to move 
west to Zhao at the age of 60, he heard some virtuous officials were 
killed by Zhao Jianzi when he arrived at the bank of the Yellow River. 
Confucius clearly understood that he should not serve a lord without 
virtues and he regarded it as God’s hope for him to practice 
impartiality. Although he could still go forward to cross the Yellow 
River, he chose to go back. This could be called “at sixty, my ear was 
an obedient organ for the reception of truth.” “The ear was an 
obedient organ for the reception of truth” indicates listening and 
comprehending the Will of God and being obedient to it willingly. 
Confucius promoted from “comprehend” to “obedient” because he 
comprehended “the Way of Heaven” so he got a further 
understanding of “the Will of God” and obeyed it (shun ?). 
After another ten years, Confucius had already thoroughly 
understood “the Way of Heaven” so he was sincerely convinced and 
accepted “the Will of God”. As a result, he could “follow what my 
heart desired, without transgressing what was right”. From 
“obedient” to “follow what my heart desired,” it was integrity of the 
Will of God and the Will of Self, “submit to Heaven and be content 
with the Will”. The former is willing to surrender, the latter is a 
combination of Heavenly freedom release and satisfaction without 
excess of rites and principles which embodied “the Way of Heaven”. 
This was called “follow what my heart desired”. 
Hence, Confucius developed from “stood firmly” to “had no 
doubts”; his personality-dominated belief of “virtues were granted by 
Heaven” was advanced from “believe” (stood, li ?) to “conviction” 
(had no doubts, buhuo ??), from “had no doubts (conviction)” to 
“comprehend (zhi ?) the Will of God” , and as for “the Will of God,” 
from “comprehend” to “obey” (shun ?) then to “follow what my 
heart desired” (congxinsuoyu ????) it can be said that the progress 
of perception is from religious belief to religious philosophy, and the 
exploitation of cosmology, the sublimation from perception to 
integrity of perception-rationality, and this is a grand scroll of the 
realm of life with multi-layers. 
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A Brief Discussion of Comparison between Confucius’ 
Personality—Dominated Cosmology Concept and Concept of 
Creation in the Bible 
 
Comparison between the Name of the Creator in the Bible and the Chinese 
Concepts of “Heaven” and “God” 
 
There are many names for the Creator in the Bible. The first 
appearance for the name was in the Bible·Genesis1:1. The original 
Hebrew word was “  ִ֑הֱאםי ,” pronounced “E-lo-him,” meaning 
“Sovereignty, Almighty (Power)”. In English it adopted this meaning 
and was extended as universal usage for “God,” the highest 
sovereignty and power in the universe. “  ִ֑הֱאםי  ”was a plural word, in 
line with the doctrine and the concept of creation in the Bible that Holy 
Father ??, Holy Son ??(that is Jesus, also is called “Way”(English 
translation is ‘WORD’)), Holy Spirit ?? “Trinity ????”. Also 
there are some scholars who interpret it according to Hebrew syntax 
as “He is the Power (singular) over powers (plural).” 31  The 
Bible·Exodus 3:14 recorded another name which was positively stated 
by the Creator Himself: “Self-existent and Everlasting ????” and 
its original Hebrew scriptures were “I AM THAT I AM ???? ( היהא
היהא רשא),” which is ancient Hebrew first person pronoun. Greek 
translation is “I am Self-existent ?????”; English translation is “I 
AM WHO I AM”. “AM” indicates to exist forever and everlasting 
without beginning or end. In addition, in the Hebrew Bible (Old 
Testament), the third person proper pronoun “  ָ֥וְהיה ” was frequently 
used, and it was cited 6,828 times. Its pronunciation is “Yah-weh,” 
composed by four Hebrew letters (from right to left): “Yodh,” “He,” 
“Waw,” and “He,” “YHWH” for short-hand. “HWH” indicates Eve 
who was the first woman in the world referred to in the Bible, the 
original Hebrew word comprises the meaning of “life”. “Yodh” is the 
third person pronoun, so “YHWH” could be interpreted as “He makes 
life,” “He causes life” or “He is life”.32In the previous part of this 
paper, we discussed that ancient Chinese “God” was “origin of life,” 
                                                 
31 Mark S. Smith, “God in Translation: Deities in Cross-Cultural Discourse in the 
Biblical World,” p.15. (Books.google.com.au. Retrieved 2011-12-05) 
32 Chan Tak-Kwong ???, "Ex 3:14a—State of the Question and a Possible 
Chinese Mystical Interpretation,” Fu Jen International Religious Studies. Vol. 5 nr.1 
(Summer 2011), pp.4-9. 
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which is synonymous with “Heaven” as original source of all 
creations in the whole universe. Its meaning has connection with 
“YHWH” in the Bible and “God” in the English version of the Bible. 
The earliest version (published in 1919) and Chinese Union Version?
????  which is used most widely among Chinese people are 
respectively “God ?” version and “god ?” version, because different 
Christian factions don’t have a final conclusion of using “God” or 
“god” to name the Highest One in the Bible. Then it is apparent that 
early missionaries mistook the concepts of “God” and “god” and 
resulted in this phenomenon. Chinese Union Revised Version???
?? , which was newly published in 2010, has already unified 
standard “Shang Di??” in contrast with “god ?”. In addition, the 
transliterated term “Ye He Hua???” is also used. Accordingly, the 
“God” traditionally believed by Chinese people is basically the same 
as the essence of the Creator in the Bible. 
 
Comparison between Concept of Creation in the Bible and Creation of the 
Universe in Confucius’ Cosmology Concept 
 
The creation of the universe manifested in the Bible was 
significantly different from Confucius’ concept. The Creator declared 
in the Bible directly created the world from the “Trinity” of Holy 
Father, Holy Son and Holy Spirit. However, Confucius regarded that 
it was such a God who was based on “benevolence and righteousness” 
as ontology that granted the nature of “benevolence and 
righteousness” to Yin-Yang. Then “Yin-Yang” derived all things by the 
way of being opposite to each other and complementing each other. 
Yin-Yang is “the Way of Heaven,” but there is still a dominant “God” 
beyond “the Way of Heaven”. (Genesis 1:1-3) 
 
In the beginning God (E-lo-him, plural of Father, Son and 
Spirit) created the heaven and the earth…And the Spirit 
of God (Holy Spirit) moved upon (English Version is 
“move”) the face of the waters. And God “said” (Holy 
Son (word)), Let there be light: and there was light. 
 
In the previous passage, we revealed that the Holy Son is Jesus, 
who also is called “the Way” (Word). The Bible claims that “the Way 
is God”: 
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In the beginning was the “Word,” and the “Word” was 
with God, and the “Word” was God. (“???‘?’, ‘?’?
????,‘?’????”.) (John 1:1, KJV) 
 
Besides, the “Way” created the heaven and the earth: 
 
All things were made by Him; and without Him was not 
anything made that was made. (? “?” ???????,
????????,????,???????????.) 
(John1:3, KJV) 
 
Psalms 33:9 also said, “For He (God) spoke, and it was done; he 
commanded, and it stood fast. “The creation by speaking the 
“WORD” is a declaration of ontology with will and authority, also a 
display of direct “command” and “stood fast” life relationship 
between the creatures and the Creator. This was basically different 
from Confucius’ view that all things were indirectly created by 
interactive derivation of Yin-Yang (Qi ? ). The process of God’s 
creation narrated in Genesis has now been recognized and widely 
accepted by scientists. The “big bang cosmology” theory about the 
formation of the universe nearly totally corresponded with it.33 
 
Comparison between Sacrifice and Law in the Concept of Creation in the 
Bible and Sacrifice and Rite in Confucius’ Cosmology Concept 
 
The sacrifice and the law in the Old Testament of the Bible were richly 
recorded in Exodus and Leviticus. The Law which was put in the Ark 
by the Israelites was “testimony” (?? (  ָ֣ה ֻ֔דֵעת )) as the original Hebrew 
word. The English version Bible translated it as testimony” (Exodus 
25:21, KJV). It is thus evident that the Creator in the Bible grants human 
“Law” in order to “testify to” His Holy nature and the law and 
principle of the creation system in the universe. Therefore, Confucius 
considered “Rite” was the principle thought of all people and all 
things embodied by “the Way of Heaven” on Earth. This was 
substantially in agreement with the Bible. The difference is, the law in 
the Bible and the detailed regulations for Israelites on sacrifices was 
                                                 
33 Wu Jiawang ???. 2008. “Genesis and Science-Creation.” Overseas Campus 
Magazines. Vol. 89.no.6, pp.87-92. 
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actively granted by the Creator. In the content of sacrifice and the 
concrete rules, “God’s perfect,” “Redemption” and “Reconciliation of 
God and man” are the core symbolic significance. This is based on the 
Creator’s Holy essence and His complete love for all creatures; the 
argument proved above shows us that Confucius regarded sacrifice 
as an action to show worship to God and respect to gods and 
ancestors, was a sincere tribute to the origin of life. Moreover, 
Confucius considered different superiority or inferiority should 
sacrifice corresponded to God, gods and ghosts with different degrees 
for the sake of order in “the Way of Heaven”. In conclusion, the 
sacrifice concept in the Bible is the reconciliative relationship between 
God and human from up to down, while Confucius’ sacrifice concept 
is the sincerity and respect to God, spirits and ancestors from down to 
up.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Confucius’ personality-dominated cosmology concept developed 
layer upon layer, showing his advancing and mature thought in “the 
Will of God” and “the Way of Heaven.” Guo Qiyong ??? said in 
the preface of the Study of the Thought of Bamboo Slips at Guodian Chu 
Tomb????????????, “Since the Shang and Zhou Dynasties, 
Chinese philosophy and culture always paid close attention to the life 
of the human and the life of the universe which are their basic focus.” 
Confucius’ enthusiasm to pursue the truth about the universe 
sincerely and deeply has represented the ancient sages and 
philosophers from the pre-Qin Dynasty, He explored and understood 
the ontology of the universe in the whole Chinese culture on the basis 
of observations from heaven down to earth, He showed the Chinese 
positive spirit for the pursuit of understanding the self and care for 
the value and significance of all life.  
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Part IV 
Spiritual Manifestations in Aesthestics 
 

11. 
On the Influence of Phenomenological 
Aesthetics in Contemporary Chinese 
Aestheticians from the Mode of Thought: 
Taking Ye Lang, Zhu Liyuan and Zeng 
Fanren as Individual Cases1 
DONG HUIFANG 
 
 
The great influence of phenomenology in the modern world has a 
close relation with the revolution of its mode of thought. Inheriting 
the spirit, method and mode of thought of phenomenology, aesthetics 
is divided into numerous western aesthetic groups in the 20th century. 
Having come into the vision of Chinese scholars for more than 30 
years. Phenomenological aesthetics has been profoundly recognized 
by Chinese scholars as of great significance to the Chinese academic 
community. In 2001, Xu Dai thought one of its revolutionary 
significances is “bridging the gulf long-standing between subjective 
and objective with the notion of intentionality.” 2  In 2005, Zhang 
Yongqing published On the Significance of Phenomenology to the 
Construction of Chinese Aesthetics in the New Century from Viewpoint of 
the Mode of Thought, considering that phenomenology has brought 
shock and revolution to traditional ideas in at least two aspects as 
follows. First, it contributes to breaking with the tradition that beauty 
is a kind of entity. Second, it reinterprets the tradition that beauty is a 
kind of knowledge.3 Both remarks are from the angle of modes of 
thought of phenomenology and phenomenological aesthetics. 
Contemporary Chinese aestheticians also learn from its mode of 
1 The article belongs to Social Science Youth Project of China Education Ministry 
“On Mikel Dufrenne Aesthetics’ Mode of Thought”(13YJC720009) and Social 
Science Youth Project in Liaoning Province “The Influence of Western Literary 
Theory’s Thinking Mode on the Construction of Contemporary Chinese Literary 
theory”(L12CZW006). 
2 Xu Dai. 2001. The Aesthetic Methods of Phenomenology, Fujian Forum, Vol. 5.  
3 Zhang Yongqing, “On the Significance of Phenomenology to the Construction 
of Chinese Aesthetics in the New Century from the Mode of Thought,” Academic 
Monthly, 2005, Vol. 10. 
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thought when they accept phenomenological aesthetics. In fact, the 
aestheticians who consider the construction of contemporary Chinese 
aesthetics from the angle of modes of thought have already become a 
noticeable group, among which many recognize that studying beauty 
should not follow the pattern of subject-object dichotomy, but adopt 
an approach beyond the opposition between subject and object, such 
as Ye Lang, Zhu Liyuan and Zeng Fanren et al. Although the 
establishment of their modes of thought is usually affected by several 
ideas, the influence of modes of thought of phenomenological 
aesthetics is obvious.  
 
“Beauty lies in the image” of Ye Lang and Mode of Thought of 
Phenomenological Aesthetics 
 
Influenced by Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei, Cai Yuanpei, Zhu 
Guangqian, Zong Baihua and other contemporary Chinese 
aestheticians, Ye Lang pays much attention to learning from western 
aesthetics. According to the aesthetic thought presented in his work 
Principle of Aesthetics, Ye Lang’s core idea can be summarized as 
“Beauty lies in image.” This theory is constructed on the basis of 
traditional Chinese culture, mixing with contemporary western 
aesthetic achievements, especially achievements in phenomenological 
aesthetics. In the process of western aesthetics’ development lasting 
for more than 2500 years, Ye Lang lists 19 aestheticians, who have the 
greatest influence or deserve most attention in the view of the 
construction of aesthetics. Up to four of them are aestheticians in 
phenomenology and phenomenological aesthetics, namely Edmund 
Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Roman Ingarden and Mikel Dufrenne. 
Thus we can see that Ye Lang attaches great importance to 
phenomenological aesthetics. Also, judging from his quotations, 
Heidegger, Dufrenne, Husserl, Sartre and Ingarden are quoted 
repeatedly.  
Accepting the mode of thought of phenomenological aesthetics, Ye 
Lang understands aesthetic activity as an activity of intentionality. 
Thus, aesthetic image becomes a result of intentionality, namely an 
intentional object. Ye Lang thinks this means that the activity of 
intentionality not only lets “image” be presented, but also promotes 
meaning. Thus, it is explained that aesthetic activity is the 
communication between “me” and the world. In fact, in his view, 
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“me” and the world can’t be separated at all in aesthetic activity. 
Obviously, once the world of aesthetic object is presented, “me” has 
already been included. Just the same, without “me,” this world can’t 
be presented. It is clear that Ye Lang uses the intentionality of 
phenomenology to interpret the characteristic of aesthetic image: 
Aesthetic image can only exist in aesthetic activity and the 
presentation of aesthetic image is a co-presentation of “me” and the 
world. According to Ye Lang’s analysis in this paragraph, his 
understanding of intentionality is closer to Dufrenne in spirit since 
there are different understandings of intentionality among 
phenomenological aestheticians. 
Ye Lang defines sensuousness as the first character of the aesthetic 
image, which shows the influence of mode of thought of 
phenomenological aesthetics. He emphasizes that aesthetic image is a 
sensuous world which is complete, full of meaning and interest. His 
understanding of the sensuous is based on Dufrenne’s. Namely, 
sensuous is not a physical character of objects, but rather a mixture of 
subjective and objective taking shape after its appreciator has 
perceived the physical character of works of literature and art. In other 
words, the sensuous world presented in the eyes of the appreciator 
actually has a quality of emotion and is an object which has been 
soaked by the emotion of its appreciator. Just as the farmer’s pair of 
shoes painted by Van Gogh, it is neither the same with the pair of 
shoes that is thrown in the peasant’s house, nor the pair of shoes in 
the eyes of farmer, it is a new world found by Van Gogh. That is, the 
presentation of the sensuous can be separated neither from the sense 
object, nor the sense subject. Without either, can the sensuous exist. 
About this, Dufrenne’s says “the sensuous is an act common both to 
the sensing being and to what is sensed.”4 Obviously, Ye Lang agrees 
with Dufrenne on this point. However, differing from Dufrenne, Ye 
Lang comprehends the sensuous world as an emotion and scenery 
blending world in Chinese aesthetics. He emphasizes that emotion 
and scenery cannot be separated from each other, which originates 
from the fact that things on the earth cannot be separated from human 
survival and life. Thus it explains why an aesthetic image can always 
reveal some meaning of the world, since meaning is presented as the 
                                                 
4 Mikel Dufrenne, translated by Edward S. Casey, The Phenomenology of Aesthetic 
Experience (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), p.48. 
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sensuous. At this point, Ye Lang turned once again to the view of 
Dufrenne: “It is in the angle of integration of sensuous and meaning 
that Dufrenne describes aesthetic object as ‘splendid sensuous’.” 
“‘Splendid sensuous’ is a sensuous world which is complete and full 
of meaning, and this is aesthetic image, also ‘Beauty’ in a broad 
sense.” 5  When Dufrenne expounds on sensuous, he seeks for the 
fusion of the subject and object in the mode of thought. By accepting 
it, Ye Lang carries out the first step in defining aesthetic image. 
Ye Lang attaches great importance to the image world which takes 
shape in aesthetic activity. His interpretation of the image world is 
founded on Husserl, Heidegger, and Dufrenne’s interpretation of 
“life-world”. In fact, Husserl’s “life-world” raises a question on how 
to look upon the relationship between man and the world. In the 
tradition of western philosophy, man is opposite to the world and 
enjoys conquering the world. This subject and object dichotomy hides 
man from truly living in the world so that Husserl puts forward the 
concept of “life-world” to awaken people to reconsider the 
relationship between man and the world. Husserl’s train of thought 
becomes the origin of Heidegger and Dufrenne’s reconsideration. 
Heidegger proposes “poetically dwelling,” while Dufrenne advocates 
going back to the nature of man and the world by means of aesthetic 
experience. The “life-world” emphasized by Ye Lang is an “original 
experience world,” man and the world “coexisting”. Obviously, it 
coincides with phenomenological aesthetics. Moreover, Ye Lang 
proposes further that “The thought on ‘true’ (‘nature’) in Chinese 
aesthetics has similarities and communication with the ‘life-world’ 
thought in phenomenological aesthetics.”6 He thinks that the true is 
nature and the original appearance of existence. In the image world, 
the world is presented as it is, just as Heidegger says “Beauty is a way 
by which unhidden truth emerges.”  
Also, Ye Lang tries to combine the mode of thought of 
phenomenological aesthetics with Chinese theory that man is an 
integral part of nature to construct his own system of aesthetics. It is 
reflected in two aspects: On one hand, he constantly criticized the 
subject-object dichotomy. For example, he evaluates the big aesthetic 
discussion in 1950~1960s: “The whole discussion is carried out in the 
                                                 
5 Ye Lang, The Principle of Aesthetics (Beijing: Beijing University Press, 2002), p. 
63. 
6 Ibid., p. 75. 
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paradigm of subject-object dichotomy.”7 Another example is that he 
evaluates the issue on the essence of beauty, which has been discussed 
for thousands of years in western history: “On the essence of beauty, 
the two kinds of opinions above share one thing on the premise of a 
subject-object dichotomy.”8 It shows how necessary and urgent it is 
for aesthetics study in contemporary China to get out of the paradigm 
of subject-object dichotomy. 
On the other hand, Ye Lang constantly affirms the mode of thought 
that man is an integral part of nature. He points out that “Viewed from 
the mode of thought, Chinese aesthetics has a character which regards 
man as an integral part of nature instead of the paradigm of subject-
object dichotomy.”9 By saying “regarding man as an integral part of 
nature,” Ye Lang mainly refers to the meaning that man is connected 
with all the things on the earth just as they are in a body. 10On this 
premise, he summarized the mode of thought of Heidegger as 
“harmony between nature and human beings”: “Heidegger criticized 
the traditional subject-object dichotomy (subject-object construction), 
and raised a mode of thought which regards man as an integral part 
of nature (human-world construction). Heidegger rejected the 
paradigm of a subject-object dichotomy that regards the relationship 
between man and the world as an external relationship between two 
ready-made things, actually the relationship between man and the 
world is not an external one, but a kind of harmony with all things on 
the earth, as man is soaked in all things on the earth. The world 
presents itself because of man’s ‘Dasein’. ” 11In the aesthetic thought 
of Ye Lang, it has always been his goal to integrate the mode of 
thought of phenomenological aesthetics which stresses the blood 
relationship between man and the world with the traditional Chinese 
mode of thought that man is an integral part of nature. Because of this 
when he expounds on issues such as sense of beauty, image world, 
realm of life etc., Ye Lang’s statements always permeate the spirit, 
which surpasses the subject-object dichotomy and returns to man 
being an integral part of nature. 
                                                 
7 Ibid., p. 10. 
8 Ibid., p. 33. 
9 Ye Lang, Bamboo in the Mind-Chinese Aesthetics on the Way of Modern Times 
(Hefei: Anhui Education Press, 2002), p. 248. 
10 Ye Lang, The Principle of Aesthetics, p. 6. footnote. 
11 Ibid., p. 33. 
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Zhu Liyuan’s Practical Ontology: Aesthetics and Mode of Thought of 
Phenomenological Aesthetics 
 
By reflecting on Li Zehou’s practical aesthetics and transforming 
phenomenological ontology, Zhu Liyuan’s practical ontology 
aesthetics took shape in the debate on practical aesthetics and post 
practical aesthetics. Zhu Liyuan thinks there are mainly two 
limitations in Li Zehou’s practical aesthetics: First, it hasn’t surpassed 
the subject-object dichotomy paradigm of epistemology. Second, its 
view on practice is limited.12 This pushes him to reconsider practical 
aesthetics and find a way out for contemporary Chinese aesthetics.  
In the process of comparing contemporary Chinese aesthetics’ 
mode of thought and western aesthetics paradigm, Zhu Liyuan 
advocates learning from the trend of western aesthetics in order to 
transform the subject-object dichotomy paradigm of contemporary 
Chinese aesthetics. He reviewed two big discussions in contemporary 
Chinese aesthetics in the last century. At the same time, he studied the 
development process of western aesthetics. He noticed the criticism of 
Schopenhauer, Croce, Freud, Nietzsche et al on the traditional subject-
object dichotomy of epistemology aesthetics, particularly the 
contributions made by Husserl, Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida and 
Habermas and others surpass the subject-object dichotomy. The 
reversal of China and the West made him feel deeply that “in order to 
get breakthrough in the construction of Chinese aesthetics in the new 
century, perhaps breaking and surpassing the traditional subject-
object dichotomy paradigm is the key.”13 It is on the basis of this view 
that Zhu Liyuan established his mode of thought which surpassed the 
traditional subject-object dichotomy paradigm consciously in his 
practical ontology aesthetics. 
The aesthetic mode of thought of Zhu Liyuan has an inseparable 
and inherent relationship with that of phenomenological aesthetics. 
He pays more attention to Husserl, Heidegger and Dufrenne, 
especially Heidegger. Zhu Liyuan understands “practice” on the basis 
of Marxism and introduces the ontology of Heidegger. When Zhu 
Liyuan interprets man’s being, he introduces Heidegger’s “being-in-
                                                 
12  Zhu Liyuan, “The Reason Why I Turn to Practical Ontology Aesthetics,” 
Literature and Art Forum, 2008, Vol. 11. 
13 Zhu Liyuan, Towards Practical Ontology Aesthetics (Suzhou: Suzhou University 
Press, 2008), p. 40. 
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the-world,” within which he introduces Heidegger’s mode of thought 
regarding the relationship between man and the world: “According to 
the view of being-in-the-world, man cannot be separated from the 
world: On the one hand, man exists in the world. From the beginning, 
man is included in the world. Man is an integral part of the world. On 
the other hand, the world is meaningful only to man. Without man, it 
doesn’t matter whether the world has meaning or not. And ‘Dasein’ is 
the contact of man and the world. Man is always in contact of the 
world. When contacting, man is generated realistically. The process of 
contacting actually is a process in which man relates to the world in 
various ways through conscious activities. According to Marxism, this 
is ‘practice’ indeed.”14  It is easy to see that the “practice” of Zhu 
Liyuan is no longer the conquering or use of an object of practice by a 
subject of practices but a relationship between man and the world, a 
way by which man contacts with the world. Thus, it has become man’s 
basic way of existence. This kind of reformation lets “practice” not 
only be limited to activities of physical production, but also contain 
different kinds of man’s activities in life, such as morality, politics, 
economics and the arts etc. Thus, “practice” has become an intensive 
practice of life, which is the foundation of Zhu Liyuan’s practical 
ontology aesthetics. However, his mode of thought has been very 
different from practical aesthetics. 
When Zhu Liyuan expounds on the view that “beauty is 
generated,” it is clear he identifies the influence of the mode of 
thought on phenomenological aesthetics. First, learning from 
Heidegger, he changes the traditional question “what is beauty?” to 
“how is beauty generated and presented?” 
Second, Zhu Liyuan introduces the generative theory of Heidegger 
consciously to refute the view of traditional epistemology aesthetics 
which regards beauty as an already existing object. He thinks that later 
Heidegger’s interpretation of existence, truth, and logos sketches out 
a brand new beginning for philosophy. “He thinks that ‘beginning is 
ending’, which points out a new realm of thought and the authentic 
state of existence for us. ‘In-Sein’ everything is vivid. All is integral, 
complementary and always in a vivid surge; there are neither rigid 
systems nor ready methods, while everything is always in a state of 
happening and generating in an everlasting movement. Heidegger 
                                                 
14 Zhu Liyuan, Towards Practical Ontology Aesthetics, pp. 279-280. 
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calls this movement the game of the four: heaven, earth, god and man. 
Also, he calls this new realm ‘Ereignis.’ Compared with his early 
thought, this new realm is more of dynamic generative theory, which 
inspires us to understand and interpret beauty.” 15  Inspired by 
Heidegger and influenced by Jiang Kongyang’s creativity aesthetics, 
Zhu Liyuan inspected the reality of aesthetic activity and the 
development of human history, believing that aesthetic activity, 
aesthetic relationship and even “beauty” are processes which are 
constantly integrating. 
Third, on expounding the principle that the relationship between 
the aesthetic subject and the aesthetic object is prior to its two terms, 
Zhu Liyuan borrows Dufrenne’s intentionality construction of 
“aesthetic perception-aesthetic object”. Dufrenne thinks that only 
when a work of art has really been perceived can it become an 
aesthetic object. In Zhu Liyuan’s view, the change from a work of art 
to aesthetic object is the process in which “beauty” is generated. Before 
aesthetic perception begins, there is neither an aesthetic subject nor an 
aesthetic object. Both aesthetic subject and aesthetic object are formed 
simultaneously in the interaction of each other. Thus, Dufrenne’s 
intentionality construction finally brought Zhu Liyuan to the 
establishment of principle that the relationship between aesthetic 
subject and aesthetic object is prior to its two terms, namely: “In time, 
the construction of aesthetic relationship and the generating of 
aesthetic subject and object occur synchronously and have no 
particular order; however, logically, the aesthetic relationship comes 
first while the aesthetic subject and object are second. The aesthetic 
relationship determines the aesthetic subject and object, without an 
aesthetic relationship there is neither aesthetic subject nor aesthetic 
object. This is the principle of ‘relationship first’.”16 
Zhu Liyuan’s understanding of the realm of life also shows the 
influence of Heidegger. Particularly, he emphasized the connection of 
realm of life with existence and practice: “Realm of life, as it is an 
integration of man and the world but the integration on the level of 
ontology, namely the integration achieved in the practice in which 
man and the world rely on each other and construct bilaterally, the 
integration achieved in the practice in which towards man is man the 
                                                 
15 Ibid., p. 299. 
16 Ibid., pp. 314-315. 
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world generated.” This kind of integration embodies that man relies 
on the world and lives in the world, works hard endlessly in the life 
activities of the world, namely the practical relationship between man 
and the world. The realm of life generates the practical relationship 
between man and the world. This realm is rooted deeply in the 
practice of life.”17 The practical activities of life are extremely rich. 
Since the levels of these activities are different, the levels of the realm 
of life differ naturally. From the vision of ontology, Zhu Liyuan views 
the realm of life as an integration of man and the world on the level of 
ontology. The boundaries and limits of man’s existence are broadened 
by aesthetic activities. Since it enables man to have the closest 
relationship with the world, aesthetics is a higher realm of life. So Zhu 
Liyuan thinks that “It is only on the sense of practical ontology that 
the realm of life is communicated with the aesthetic and artistic 
realm.”18 
Over the last decade, Zhu Liyuan dedicated himself to exploring 
practical ontology aesthetics. Overall, his practical ontology aesthetics 
is an important attempt to explore the system of contemporary 
Chinese aesthetics, which is still based on a Marxist view of practice, 
inherits Jiang Kongyang’s practical creativity aesthetics, introduces 
the dimension of ontology of Heidegger, and integrates all three of 
them. This is an important step that Zhu Liyuan has made to try to 
overcome the epistemological mode of thought of a subject-object 
dichotomy coming from Li Zehou’s practical aesthetics system. Here, 
the mode of thought of phenomenological aesthetics which surpasses 
the dichotomy has given him important support. 
 
The Ecological Ontological Aesthetics of Zeng Fanren and the mode of 
thought of Phenomenological Aesthetics 
 
It is obvious that Zeng Fanren’s ecological ontological aesthetics is 
related to phenomenological aesthetics in the mode of thought, 
mainly Heidegger’s ontology aesthetics. First, with the thought of 
Heidegger’s ontology, Zeng Fanren cleared away the obstacles in the 
mode of thought for ecological aesthetics to come on the stage. The 
phenomenology of Husserl is dedicated to seeking a way to surpass 
                                                 
17 Ibid., p. 320. 
18 Ibid., p. 323. 
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the dichotomy of thinking and being, subject and object. Heidegger 
inherits the mode of thought of Husserl, but focuses on studying the 
being of beings. In his view, the traditional epistemology paradigm of 
“subject-object dichotomy” separates being from beings, resulting in 
the hiding truth. Heidegger’s ontology brought a transformation from 
traditional epistemology to contemporary ontology, and also meant a 
thorough change in the mode of thought. Obviously, Zeng Fanren 
recognizes that ecological aesthetics should learn from Heidegger’s 
thought. The need for a development of economy and society and the 
support from the field of literature both contribute to the birth of 
ecological aesthetics, still more the birth of ecological aesthetics needs 
the guidance of philosophy. Heidegger’s ontology, opposes the 
subject-object dichotomy and anthropocentrism, and provides an 
important basis in philosophical theory for the establishment of 
ecological aesthetics. 
Heidegger’s brand-new interpretation on the relationship between 
man and the world provides a new vision for Zeng Fanren’s ecological 
aesthetics to interpret the relationship between man and nature. For 
Heidegger the relation between man and the world is replaced by 
“dasein”. The meeting of dasein and of other beings is attributed to 
dasein’s hard work. Beings are brought forward in hard work, thus 
the world is generated. In the view of Zeng Fanren, this interpretation 
of Heidegger embodies an eco-holistic view of man and nature’s 
harmonious symbiosis and coexistence. Zeng Fanren thinks that this 
is the nature of ecological aesthetics. It is revealed in man’s kindness 
and appreciation towards nature and ecology, thus integrating man 
and the circumstances as a whole. He says, “We don’t consider 
studying the object of ecological aesthetics as ‘nature’ simply, as a 
whole ‘eco-system’ which contains not only everything in nature but 
also man.”19 This is the ecological holistic view much emphasized by 
Zeng Fanren, which is neither absolute anthropocentrism nor absolute 
egocentrism, but a modern view of nature that man co-exists and co-
prospers with nature, integrating “ecological humanism” and 
“ecological holism”.  
Zeng Fanren also regards Heidegger’s criticism of modern 
technology highly, since the criticism of modern technology is 
                                                 
19 Zeng Fanren, Introduction of Ecological Aesthetics (Beijing: The Commercial 
Press, 2010), p. 292. 
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apparently criticism of anthropocentrism. Heidegger criticized 
mercilessly the “herausfordern” of western modern technology to 
man’s existence. He reproves that man controls and manipulates the 
world by modern technology, but hasn’t realized it is herausfordern 
to man’s own living space if he treats the world willfully. This kind of 
instrumental rationality undermines “the game of the four: heaven, 
earth, man and god” and man’s society loses harmony. Thereby, Zeng 
Fanren realizes that the study of ecological aesthetics should insist on 
the content of ecological phenomenology, to “change man’s purely 
instrumental and calculable ways of treating nature to a way of equal 
dialogue and intersubjectivity interaction.” 20  Apparently, for 
ecological aesthetics, the paradigm of subject-object dichotomy and 
anthropocentrism both must be abandoned. 
Heidegger’s proposal of “poetically dwelling” is considered as the 
aesthetics ideal for ecological aesthetics by Zeng Fanren. “Poetically 
dwelling” is to resist man’s “technologically dwelling” which is under 
the control of instrumental rationality, and return to the integration of 
“heaven, earth, man and god”. In fact, it is calling for the harmony of 
man and the world; calling for man’s poetic dwelling in the world. 
Zhu Liyuan points out that, “Compared with the concepts of existence 
in the past, Heidegger’s understanding of existence is the most 
magical and ethereal. On one hand, there’s a ‘poeticizing’ tendency on 
the problem of existence. While on the other hand, it completely 
overcomes the Daseinism which exists more or less in the early time 
and reaches a poetical harmonious state of man, nature and the world. 
”21 Also in agreement with Zhu Liyuan’s understanding, Zeng Fanren 
greatly values Later Heidegger’s Ontology. He regards the quality of 
the poetic as an aesthetic state of man and the world, “The game of the 
four: heaven, earth, man and god” as the only way for men to obtain 
aesthetic dwelling. And, he pins the hope of ecological aesthetics’ and 
aesthetic ideal on men’s “poetically dwelling.” 
In a word, Zeng Fanren’s ecological aesthetics benefits much from 
Heidegger’s ontology. The mode of thought of Heidegger’s ontology 
opens the mind of thought to studying ecological aesthetics. Some 
theories become an important theoretical basis of Zeng Fanren’s 
ecological aesthetics while some concepts and categories are directly 
                                                 
20 Ibid., p. 301. 
21 Zhu Liyuan, “Seeking for the Ontology Foundation of Ecological Aesthetics,” 
Journal of Xiangtan University, 2006, Vol. 1. 
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absorbed as core components of Zeng Fanren’s ecological aesthetics. 
Compared with other contemporary Chinese aestheticians, the degree 
of participation of Heidegger’s aesthetics is the highest in Zeng 
Fanren’s ecological aesthetics. 
 
Reflections 
 
In the above, we have seen that phenomenological aesthetics has 
participated practically in the contemporary construction of Chinese 
aesthetics. For what reason are phenomenological aesthetics and its 
mode of thought favored in the construction of contemporary Chinese 
aesthetics? This can be analyzed in the following aspects: 
First, there is some agreement between traditional Chinese 
aesthetics and phenomenological aesthetics, which has increasingly 
become a consensus of Chinese aesthetics community. The first 
scholar who recognized this agreement between traditional Chinese 
artistic spirit and phenomenological aesthetics is Xu Fuguan, who has 
realized the connection between Zhuangzi’s “xin” of “xinzhai” and 
Husserl’s consciousness in his monograph Chinese Artistic Spirit 
(1996). Similarly, Liu Ruoyu thinks that phenomenology has some 
fundamental similarities with daoism in his book Chinese Literary 
Theory (1975). Later, the agreement is recognized by many renowned 
scholars in China, such as Zhang Shiying, Ye Lang, Zhang Fa, Ye 
Xiushan, Zeng Fanren, Yang Chunshi, Deng Xiaomang, Pan 
Zhichang, Gao Nan, Zhu Zhirong, Peng Feng, Peng Fuchun et al. 
Entering the new century, study in this field is deepened in a series of 
monographs, such as Zhang Xianglong’s From Phenomenology to 
Confucius, Chinese Ancient Thought and Phenomenology, Nine Lessons of 
Phenomenological Interpretation On Confucius, Heidegger’s Thought and 
Chinese Tiandao, Wang Qingjie’s Hermeneutics, Heidegger and Modern 
Interpretation on Confucianism and Daoism, Na Wei’s Mutual 
Interpretation between Daoism and Heidegger, and Sounds of Nature, 
Where are They Come from-Zhuangzi’s Saying without Mind and 
Heidegger’s Unspeakable Theory etc. All these achievements are the 
evidence that there is some agreement between traditional Chinese 
thought and phenomenology and phenomenological aesthetics. 
Second, is the need to explore contemporary Chinese aesthetics 
system. Since the 1990s, the problem of how to construct and develop 
contemporary Chinese aesthetics has become a puzzling task for 
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aestheticians. Reflections on the two big discussions of Chinese 
aesthetics makes many scholars realize that traditional literary theory 
must be transformed in the new situation, which should break with 
the traditional subject-object dichotomy epistemology. Thus, practical 
aesthetics represented by Li Zehou is challenged repeatedly and “life 
aesthetics,” “transcendent aesthetics,” “existential aesthetics,” 
“ecological aesthetics” etc. seek to jump out of the subject-object 
dichotomy paradigm. With the help of phenomenological aesthetics 
to realize the modern transformation of classic Chinese aesthetics or 
the construction of a modern Chinese aesthetics system, is thought as 
a possible way. 
Third, it is related to the change in the mode of thought in 
contemporary Chinese philosophy. In traditional Chinese philosophy, 
the mode of thought is that “man is an integral part of the world”. 
And the subject-object dichotomy paradigm intensifies gradually 
from Ming and Qing dynasties to modern China. Contemporary 
Chinese philosophy scholars have already recognized the necessity of 
changing Chinese philosophy’s mode of thought in studying 
contemporary western philosophy’s criticism of metaphysics. Ye 
Xiushan says in The Philosophy of Beauty, published in 1991, “The 
fundamental problem of Philosophy is the relationship between 
thinking and being, the relationship between subject and object. Here 
we call this problem the relationship between man and the world.”22 
Obviously, this understanding merges with the mode of thought of 
phenomenology and also represents an important change in Chinese 
philosophy. And then in Correlation between the Heaven and Human, a 
monograph published in 1995, Zhang Shiying proposed changing the 
mode of thought of philosophy from subject-object dichotomy to 
subject-object integration. Seeking to change the mode of thought in 
aesthetics is in accord with the mode of thought in contemporary 
Chinese philosophy. 
Regarding our reflections, it is helpful for us to deepen our thought 
by examining the differences and similarities presented when 
contemporary Chinese aestheticians accept the mode of thought of 
phenomenological aesthetics. When the three aestheticians above 
                                                 
22 Ye Xiushan, The Philosophy of Beauty (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1991), 
p. 37. 
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introduce the mode of thought of phenomenological aesthetics to their 
own theoretical system, they exhibit some common characteristics.  
First, they very consciously take Chinese cultural context as their 
standpoint. Ye Lang emphasized this point especially identifying 
Zong Baihua’s view that Chinese scholars should base themselves on 
their own cultural traditions. “Beauty lies in image” proposed by Ye 
Lang, is mainly on the premise of image theory in Chinese classical 
aesthetics. Western theories (phenomenological aesthetics included), 
categories and concepts are used by him as arguments for Chinese and 
the West proving each other. In his thought, a consciousness of 
exhibiting and stressing Chinese characteristics is obvious. Taking the 
Marxist conception of practice as its philosophical foundation and 
Jiang Kongyang’s practical creativity aesthetics as its theoretical 
premise, Zhu Liyuan’s practical ontology of aesthetics learned from 
Heidegger’s ontology, interprets and perfects the concept of 
“practice” from the angle of ontology. As for Zhu Liyuan, ontology is 
not dragged into the system of practical aesthetics, but has already 
been contained in the practical philosophy of Marx, with possibilities 
to break through the subject-object dichotomy. Especially when Jiang 
Kongyang’s theory of aesthetic relation has already showed vaguely 
a willingness to conquer subject-object dichotomy, Heidegger’s 
ontology only lets the original being be presented with its true 
features. When talking about the construction of ecological aesthetics, 
Zeng Fanren stresses on strengthening nativeness and insists on the 
Sinicism of ecological aesthetics. This shows his attention on the 
standpoint of ecological aesthetics. His aim is to establish the status of 
Chinese ecological aesthetics in world aesthetics and construct an 
ecological aesthetics system with the Chinese manner and style under 
the global vision. 
Second, they prefer Heidegger’s ontological phenomenology. All 
three phenomenological aestheticians, namely Ye Lang, Zhu Liyuan 
and Zeng Fanren have paid great attention to Heidegger. This is also 
in accordance with the common preferences of contemporary Chinese 
philosophy and aesthetics. Ye Lang values the mode of thought of 
Heidegger and his interpretation of the life-world. In Heidegger’s 
philosophy and aesthetics, he has found many similarities and 
communications with traditional Chinese aesthetics. Different from 
the fact that Ye Lang values Husserl, Dufrenne and Heidegger at the 
same time, Zhu Liyuan obviously attaches more importance to 
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Heidegger over Dufrenne. He appreciates the thought of Later 
Heidegger more, especially the thought of “being-in-the-world”. In 
the construction of literary aesthetics, Zeng Fanren once proposed to 
learn from Dufrenne’s aesthetic experience but in the construction of 
ecological aesthetics, he pays attention only to Heidegger. Like Zhu 
Liyuan, he also values more the thought of Later Heidegger, such as 
“being-in-the-world,” “The game of the four: heaven, earth, god and 
man,” “poetically dwelling” and criticism on technique etc. In fact, 
there are some resources contained in Dufrenne’s Natural Philosophy 
which ecological aesthetics can learn from. However, it seems that 
Dufrenne’s thought in this aspect has not drawn Zeng Fanren’s 
attention. 
Although they have the above points in common, the differences 
of internalizing ways of phenomenological aesthetics’ mode of 
thought deserve more reflection, which actually relates to their 
understandings towards phenomenological aesthetics’ mode of 
thought. 
Specifically, when Ye Lang integrates phenomenological 
aesthetics’ mode of thought with his aesthetic thought, his dominant 
idea is to explore ancient Chinese aesthetics’ value with 
phenomenological aesthetics, make use of the common aesthetic 
resources of China and the West to bridge the gulf between Chinese 
contemporary aesthetics and ancient aesthetics, seek common ground 
while reserving differences and realize the contemporary construction 
of Chinese aesthetics. As for Ye Lang, on one hand, phenomenological 
aesthetics helps to break with the epistemology mode of thought of 
subject-object dichotomy in contemporary Chinese aesthetics. On the 
other hand, it also helps to realize the contemporary value of classic 
Chinese aesthetics. Therefore he tries to combine phenomenological 
aesthetics’ mode of thought with the traditional Chinese view that 
“man is an integral part of nature”. He regards Heidegger’s view on 
the relationship between man and the world as similar to “man is an 
integral part of nature,” and thus to connect China with the West. 
Like Ye Lang, Zhu Liyuan also thinks it’s an important task for 
contemporary Chinese aesthetics to overcome the subject-object 
dichotomy, and surpass the dichotomy of the mode of thought. His 
thought is to explore the contemporary value of practical aesthetics 
with phenomenological aesthetics, dig out the ontology dimension 
which has already been contained in Marxism, go on from Jiang 
212           Dong Huifang 
Kongyang’s aesthetic thought, seek the development path of 
contemporary practical aesthetics and promote the contemporary 
instruction of Chinese aesthetics. When Zhu Liyuan interpreted the 
issue of the realm of life, he once talked about the Chinese longing for 
“man as an integral part of nature”. However, he hasn’t related it with 
phenomenological aesthetics to surpass the subject-object dichotomy. 
On the standpoint of constructing the branch of ecological 
aesthetics, Zeng Fanren regards Heidegger’s ontology as the 
philosophical foundation of ecological aesthetics, emphasizes the 
important significance of Heidegger’s ontology which overcomes 
subject-object dichotomy and anthropocentrism towards ecological 
aesthetics. The reason why he takes some propositions of Heidegger 
as the basic category of ecological aesthetics also lies in its mode of 
thought which overcomes anthropocentrism. 
What we should note is that each aesthetician comprehends the 
mode of thought of phenomenological aesthetics in his own 
theoretical context with its different emphasis: Ye Lang pursues the 
realm that “man is an integral part of nature,” Zhu Liyuan values 
surpassing opposition between subject and object, and Zeng Fanren 
emphasizes overcoming subject-object dichotomy and 
anthropocentrism. These differences resulted in phenomenological 
aesthetics itself, and can be accommodated by it. The real problem it 
raises is: Does surpassing subject-object relationship mean to abandon 
it or not? How should we regard the relationship of subject and object? 
Looking at the three aestheticians discussed in this article, their 
thoughts differ. 
According to Ye Lang’s view in the Principle of Aesthetics, his 
attempt to surpass subject-object relationship goes to the realm that 
“man is an integral part of nature,” so he advocate abandoning the 
subject-object relationship for research on beauty. As for Ye Lang, to 
abandon the subject-object relationship is not to pursue the 
integration of subject and object. He thinks the realm that “man is an 
integral part of nature” is different from the integration of subject and 
object: “The difference between the realm that ‘man is an integral part 
of nature’ and the integration of subject and object is that, it is not an 
epistemological relationship between two independent entities, but 
always a relationship in which the two are combined into one from 
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the view of ontology.” 23 The integration of subject and object is 
abandoned by Ye Lang because it distinguishes subject and object first 
and then seeks the integration of subject and object, thus it is an 
epistemological mode of thought. In addition to the study of beauty, 
when expounding on the issue of how man treats his life, namely 
beyond the study of beauty, Ye Lang advocates poetic life and treats 
the world with the mode of thought that “man is an integral part of 
nature”. Thus Ye Lang advocates abandoning subject-object 
relationship. 
 Zhu Liyuan’s practical ontology aesthetics proposes breaking with 
the mode of thought of subject-object dichotomy and surpasses 
subject-object dichotomy repeatedly. In fact, what Zhu Liyuan values 
is surpassing of confrontation. That is, advocating canceling the 
confrontation between subject and object but not denying subject-
object relationship. For example, in Aesthetics, which he considers 
having implemented his practical ontology aesthetics, he regards 
aesthetic activity as an integral activity containing subject and object. 
Also, subject and object are frequently mentioned in the book. This 
proves that he hasn’t denied subject-object relationship thoroughly 
but opposes regarding them as complete oppositions. 
Zeng Fanren’s ecological aesthetics advocates the symbiosis 
between man and nature, opposes the subject-object dichotomy and 
anthropocentric mode of thought, but still has remains of subject-
object relationship. He says, “History has proved that, the subject-
object dichotomy epistemology relationship between man and the 
world only exists in scientific experiments, but it is not a realistic 
existence. In reality, the relationship between man and the world is a 
kind of ‘dasein and the world’ ontology relationship, in which man 
and the world are not separated and confront each other, but are 
generated in the ecosystem that man can’t be separated from the 
world even for a moment.” 24 Even though the subject-object 
dichotomy epistemology relationship between man and the world 
only exists in scientific experiments, it is an undeniable existence. 
Moreover, he thinks China’s modernization process still needs to 
                                                 
23 Ye Lang, The Principle of Aesthetics, p. 85. 
24 Zeng Fanren, “Reflection on German Classical Aesthetics and Construction of 
Contemporary Chinese Aesthetics-from the Practical Aesthetics of ‘Humanized 
Nature’ to Ecological Aesthetics of ‘Universal State’,” Theoretical Studies in 
Literature and Art, 2012, Vol. 1.  
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depend on technology. He doesn’t agree with Heidegger’s complete 
denial of technique. 
In fact, in Chinese aesthetics community, scholars’ voices on the 
subject-object relationship are not consistent. Although many 
contemporary Chinese aestheticians think that the study of aesthetics 
should adopt the mode of thought which surpasses subject-object 
dichotomy, some scholars question this. For example, Ma Longqian’s 
subject-object construction aesthetics opposes the mode of thought 
which surpasses subject-object dichotomy; Tong Qingbing’s aesthetic 
ideology is still in terms of epistemology. Zhang Shiying proposes that 
“when continuing to call on Western subjective thought, we should 
combine subject-object dichotomy and subjectivity with the realm that 
‘man is an integral part of nature’ at the same time”. 25Xu Bihui thinks 
that “the distinction of subject and object is an unalterable fact from 
the beginning of human history. As long as man has self-
consciousness and man contacts the world in practical ways, there 
inevitably exists the distinction of subject and object. ” 26The various 
views show that the mode of thought of phenomenological aesthetics 
truly inspires the Chinese aesthetics community’s reflection, and 
contemporary Chinese aesthetics is exploring its own way of mode of 
thought. 
 
(College of Literature, Bohai University, Jinzhou, People’s Republic of China) 
                                                 
25 Zhang Shiying, Man and Heaven-Confusion and Choice of Chinese and Western 
Philosophy (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, 1995), p. 99. 
26 Xu Bihui, The Distinction of Subject and Object and Construction of New 
Century Aesthetics, Academic Monthly, 2002, Vol. 9. 
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LISTENING TO SILENCE: JOHN CAGE 
AND THE ZEN BUDDHIST SPIRIT 
WANG SHANG-WEN 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Western music developed rapidly during the careers of Arnold 
Schönberg (1874-1951) and Igor Stravinsky (1882-1971) in the 
twentieth century. Besides the innovative composing techniques of 
these composers of “new music,” they also pursued a different 
understanding of music itself. John Cage (1912-1992) was one of the 
most important avant-garde composers in the United States of 
America. He made several experiments in his compositions to try to 
find new dimensions in music. Well educated in the western tradition, 
he was also greatly influenced by Eastern culture, especially by Zen 
Buddhism. His notorious work 4’33’’ (1952) is a landmark of the new 
music in the twentieth century. This essay will try to analyze the Zen 
Buddhist Spirit in John Cage’s well-known work. 
This paper will be developed as follows: In the first part of this 
study the composer John Cage will be generally described. In the 
second part the work 4’33’’ will be introduced. The third section 
explains the position of silence, which is the subject of 4’33’’ in this 
musical composition. The fourth and fifth sections examine the 
fundamental concepts of Zen Buddhism. The sixth section discusses 
the special and “illogical” practice in Zen Buddhism. After these 
explanations, the discussion of the work 4’33’’ will show that it is an 
example of the practice of Zen Buddhism, which aims at 
understanding Truth that is manifest in Emptiness. 
 
John Cage and Contemporary Music 
 
John Cage was one of the most famous composers in the United 
States of America. Grove Music Online praises him: “One of the leading 
figures of the postwar avant garde. The influence of his compositions, 
writings and personality has been felt by a wide range of composers 
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around the world. He had a greater impact on music in the 20th 
century than any other American composer.”1  
He attended Arnold Schönberg’s private classes and classes at USC 
and UCLA in 1935-38. Schönberg, although known as a 
“revolutionary” who “emancipated” the dissonant in music, still 
composed with many traditional western principles. These included 
the use of structure, intervals and forms. David Bernstein indicated 
that in his early compositions Cage was greatly influenced by 
Schönberg’s “music idea”.2 Cage described himself: 
 
In all of my pieces coming between 1935 and 1940, I had 
Schoenberg’s lessons in mind, since he had taught me 
that a variation was in fact a repetition, I hardly saw the 
usefulness of variation, and I accumulated repetitions. All 
of my early works for percussion, and also my 
compositions for piano, contain systematically repeated 
groups of sounds or durations.3 
 
Concepts such as “structure” and “system,” however, which are 
more or less identical to “constraint” for an artist who always tries to 
create works “freely” are later left behind by Cage. He decided to 
launch another revolution, as had Schönberg, in twentieth century 
music. 
 
John Cage’s 4’33’’: Gag or Work? 
 
John Cage’s 4’33’’ (1952) is a crux of avant-garde music, which 
redefined the concept of music. This work had three movements 
without notes. There was, however, a printed score for this piece: all 
the instructions on the sheet were “tacet,” and the duration of silence 
was indicated 33’’, 2’40’’ and 1’20’’ separately for the three 
                                                 
1 James Pritchett, et al. "Cage, John." Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. 
Oxford University Press, accessed March 4, 2014, http://www.oxfordmusiconline. 
com/subscriber/article/grove/music/A2223954. 
2 See David W. Bernstein, “John Cage, Arnold Schoenberg, and the Musical Idea,” 
David W. Patterson (ed.), John Cage. Music, Philosophy and Intention, 1933-1950 
(New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 15-45. 
3 John Cage and Daniel Charles, For the Birds: John Cage in Conversation with 
Daniel Charles (Sale, NH: M. Boyars, 1981), p. 75. 
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“movements”. This work was composed for any individual 
instrument or any combination of them. The premiere of this work 
was held by pianist David Tudor in Woodstock, New York on August 
29, 1952, who separated the three movements by opening and closing 
the piano lid. 
 
 
Figure 1, The Score of John Cage’s 4’33’’. 
 
This work sharpened the situation of music listening and recreated 
its stage rules in that what is played by the performer is not identical 
with what is heard by the audience. Although the performer played 
nothing, the audience still heard something in the environment. John 
Cage talked about the premiere of 4’33’’: 
 
They missed the point. There’s no such thing as silence. 
What they thought was silence, because they didn’t know 
how to listen, was full of accidental sounds. You could 
hear the wind stirring outside during the first movement. 
During the second, raindrops began patterning the roof, 
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and during the third the people themselves made all 
kinds of interesting sounds as they talked or walked out.4 
 
This work was an attempt, people can say, to search for a new limit 
of music and music listening. Swiss/German musicologist Hermann 
Danuser, a famous specialist of twentieth century music, indicated: 
“The historical meaning of the four and half minutes, in which Tudor 
sat silently before the grand piano, is hard to estimate. They built a 
starting point for the avant-garde environmental art in the sphere of 
music”.5 
Since the early twentieth century composers inserted various 
environmental sounds into their “music”. In 1922 the Russian and 
Italian “Futurists,” for example, choreographed factory sirens, steam 
whistles, foghorns, artillery, machine guns and aircraft into an epic of 
“proletarian music”. Although 4’33’’ is not the earliest piece, it still “is 
the pivotal environmental work of the 20th century”.6 
 
“Silence” as a Constituent of Music 
 
Silence is in fact an important constituent of music since this art 
emerged. As the proverb goes: “Silence speaks louder than words,” 
silent music could also be clangorous. From the practical view point, 
on the one hand, the dramatic effect or climax of music could be well 
produced through the tacet or piano passage before fortissimo or 
sforzato, e.g. the Surprising Symphony of Joseph Haydn; from the 
theoretical view point, on the other hand, sound could not reveal itself 
if there were no silences: their independent existences depend on each 
other. 
In order to exactly experience what silence is, Cage made an 
experience in an anechoic chamber at Harvard University in 1951. This 
room was also sound-proofed. In this supposedly “silent” room he 
                                                 
4 Richard Kostelanetz, ed., Conversing with John Cage (New York: Routledge, 
2003), p. 70. 
5  Hermann Danuser, Die Musik des 20. Jahrhunderts. Neues Handbuch der 
Musikwissenschaft, Vol. 7 (Laaber: Laaber, 1984), p. 332. My translation from 
German. 
6  David Toop. “Environmental music.” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music 
Online. Oxford University Press, accessed November 14, 2013, http://www.oxford 
musiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/43820. 
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still heard something. “I heard two sounds, one high and one low. 
When I described them to the engineer in charge, he informed me that 
the high one was my nervous system in operation, the low one my 
blood in circulation.”7 That’s why he said, in the citation above, that 
“there’s no such thing as silence.” 
 
Zen Buddhism: History and Characteristics 
 
John Cage’s search for silence was grounded not only in musical 
motives but also in philosophical ones, especially those of Zen 
Buddhism. “I was just then in the flush of my early contact with 
Oriental philosophy. It was out of that that my interest in silence 
naturally developed. I mean it’s almost transparent.”8 Zen Buddhism 
was introduced to the West mainly through Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki  
(??????? , 1870-1966), a Japanese philosopher and scholar, 
after the Second World War and thus evoked a strong cultural 
influence. Many intellectuals and artists, including Cage, were greatly 
influenced by Suzuki at this time. These influences were also reflected 
in their works.9 Because of Suzuki’s introduction of Zen into the West, 
many people might have the false impression that Zen Buddhism is 
the product of Japan. 
Zen Buddhism is, in fact, the representative of Chinese Buddhism, 
which flourished during the Tang Dynasty (??, 618-907). Buddhism 
originally sprang up in India. At the end of Western Han Dynasty (?
?, 206 BC-9 AD) Buddhism began to be introduced into China via the 
Silk Road. At the beginning it encountered strong opposition from 
traditional Chinese Confucians and Taoists. Through various conflicts 
and dialogues, Buddhism fused with traditional Chinese thought. 
During the Tang Dynasty, three indigenous Buddhist schools 
                                                 
7 Donald Stein. “A Few Notes about Silence and John Cage.” Weekly Journal. 24 
November 2004. 
8 Richard Kostelanetz, ed., Conversing with John Cage, p. 70. 
9 In 1942 Cage knew the mythologist Joseph Campbell (1904-1987) and they and 
their wives thereafter lived together in one apartment. It is believed that Cage’s 
initial interest in Asian sources emerged in the exchange of ideas between them 
in this time. Cage was firstly engaged in South Asian concepts and in the 1950’s 
turned into East Asian works. See David W. Patterson, “Cage and Asia: History 
and Sources,” The Cambridge Companion to John Cage (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), pp. 41-59. 
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emerged: Tiantai School (???), Huayan School (???) and Chan, i.e. 
Zen School (??). 
The word Zen is derived from the Japanese pronunciation of the 
Middle Chinese word Chan (?), which in turn is derived from the 
Sanskrit word dhyāna, which can be approximately translated as 
“absorption” or “meditative state”. Chan Buddhism emphasizes 
achieving enlightenment and the personal expression of direct insight 
into Buddhist teachings. It deemphasized memorization and 
concentration on specific sutras and doctrine, and didn’t have a core 
sutra as its main narrative until the sixth patriarch Huineng (??)—
his words and deeds were collected as The Sutra of Sixth Patriarch (?
???) and form the canon for subsequent Chan Buddhists. Tiantai 
takes the Lotus Sutra (????? ) as its central text along with 
Huayan Flower Garland Sutra (???). 
The characteristic de-emphasis of literature and ceremony became 
an advantage for Chan Buddhism in becoming one of the most 
influential Buddhist schools in China during long periods of great 
conflict and strife. “The Chan School embodies the core teaching of 
Buddhism […]. The essence of any of the other schools can be reduced 
to the spirit of Chan.”10 
 
Gautama Buddha and the “Four Noble Truths” 
 
In spite of the variety of the Buddhist schools this common concern 
is still the original teachings of Shakyamuni (????, 563 BC - 483 
BC). He was “the sage of the Shakya people,” on whose teachings 
Buddhism was founded. His original name is Siddhārtha Gautama (
???????). He was the son of King Suddhodana (???), a 
leader of the Shakya people and lived in Kapilvastu (?????). It is 
said that Prince Siddhārtha at the age 29 decided to devote himself to 
finding an answer to: “how people can get rid of the suffering of 
ageing, sickness, and death?” Strolling around the city, he saw at the 
eastern gate an old man, at southern gate a sick man and at western 
gate a funeral. As a result he felt deep suffering in life. At the northern 
gate he saw a monk who looked so calm and free from worry that 
Siddhārtha had a yearning for a similar peaceful life. This decisive 
                                                 
10  Chan Master Sheng Yen (?? ), Orthodox Chinese Buddhism (New York: 
Dharma Drum Publication, 2007), p. 128. 
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event was called the “stroll to the four gates” (????). After a long 
period of thinking and reflecting he was enlightened. The term 
“Buddha” actually means “the enlightened one”. 
The essence of Gautama Buddha’s thinking can be explained with 
the concept “Four Noble Truths” (???):  
 
1) The truth or recognition of dukkha (suffering, anxiety, 
unsatisfactoriness, ?? ): The phenomenon of suffering always 
accompanied life because of aging, sickness and death. 
2) The truth of the origin of dukkha (?? ): Suffering and 
unsatisfactoriness come from trying to permanently hold onto things 
that are constantly changing, that in fact have no permanent existence. 
Since people can’t obtain what they want, they will feel depressed and 
suffer. 
3) The truth of the cessation of dukkha (?? ): If one wants 
ultimately to cease suffering in life, one has to change one’s mind and 
attitude toward the world: The world is ever-changing and has no 
eternal reality. The existences of things are transitory and come from 
the accidental combinations of many causes (?) and effects (?). If the 
cause-effect relations cease, then these things also vanish. Therefore 
one should give up the obsession with the false idea that the world 
has a separate eternal reality. The reality of the world is in fact empty (
?), i.e. no sustained substance. 
4) The truth of the path leading to the cessation of dukkha (??): 
Gautama Buddha indicated eight methods or paths to the cessation of 
suffering, i.e. the “Noble Eightfold Path” (???): “Right view” (??
), “right intention” (???), “right speech” (??), “right action” (?
? ), “right livelihood” (?? ), “right effort” (??? ), “right 
mindfulness” (?? ) and “right concentration” (?? ). Gautama 
Buddha suggested that through these eight “right” paths people can 
get rid of the obsession with the “real” world and experience—not 
only “understand”—the “emptiness” of the world. If one can attain 
this state of mind, one can transcend the suffering of life. 
 
The Special Practice of Chan Buddhism 
 
The following Buddhist schools, in spite of their variety of 
interpretations, aimed at the basic teachings of Gautama Buddha, 
especially at the core concept “emptiness”. Emptiness is not nothing, 
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not the absolute void. On the contrary, it is full of various possibilities, 
where all things obtain their, although short and accidental, possible 
existences. Emptiness is a vivid field, which lets all possibilities emerge. 
Chan Buddhism doesn’t have a strict ceremony and fixed canon. It 
became one of the most wide-spread Buddhist schools in China and 
abroad because of its strong general message and its unique view on 
“methodology”: There is no determined method, which can 
necessarily lead to enlightenment. Any method could be good, if it is 
a good way to reach Nirvana. A characteristic message of Chan 
Buddhism was therefore expressed as the “Jifong” or “prudent” 
dialogue (????). Jifong “originally means the trigger of a bow [ji, 
?] and the arrowhead [fong, ?]. The Chan School used the term as 
an analogue for the quick and deep arguments and sentences […]. 
Chan masters often used Jifong language to test “the enlightened 
degree of the other practitioners”.11 Through the “quick and deep” 
even “illogical” dialogues, the enlightened masters broke the 
obsession and stubborn prejudices of pupils, to help them experience 
the vivid emptiness and to be enlightened. The famous dialogues were 
collected as “Gong'an” (??, Japanese Kōan), which originally meant 
a government post, and subsequently became the proper name for the 
stories of Chan Buddhism. “Reflection on Gong'an” (???) later 
became the specific mode of practice for Chan Buddhism. 
A famous Gong'an in The Sutra of Sixth Patriarch is as follows: 
 
[…] I left there and went to Fa-hsin temple (???) in 
Canton. At that time Bhikshu [monk] Yin-tsung (??), 
master of the dharma, was lecturing on the 
Mahāparinirvāna-sūtra ( ? ? ? ) in the temple. It 
happened that one day, when a pennant was blown about 
by the wind, two bhikshus entered into a dispute as to 
what it was that was in motion, the wind or the pennant. 
As they could not settle their difference I submitted to 
them that it was neither, and that what actually moved 
                                                 
11 Ming-Chuan Li (???). “Jifong (??)”. Buddhist Dictionary Online (????
???). Electronic Buddhadharma Society of BAUS, accessed November 28, 2013, 
http://www.baus-ebs.org/fodict_online/. My translation. 
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was their own mind. The whole assembly was startled by 
what I said […].12 
 
According to Gautama Buddha, all things have no permanent 
existence, even motion and change are only illusion. If one is still 
arguing “which moves,” that means he must also indulge in the “real” 
existence of the world. This false attitude originates from the 
instability of the mind, which moves with the illusionary 
phenomenon and can’t meditate on the reality of the world. If people 
can reflect this point, they will get rid of the obsession with the “real” 
world and realize the truth. That’s what Patriarch Huineng wanted to 
indicate. 
 
4’33’’ as the Practice of Zen 
 
With its “abnormal” musical logic 4’33’’ can be treated as one of 
the excellent Gong'an of Chan Buddhism. In the non-conduct of the 
performer, a vivid silence arises, which forces us—paradoxically—to 
reflect on the essence of music, sound and emptiness. Silence is not 
pure emptiness, but the field of possibilities, which lets the infinite 
sounds arise. Music, which is usually thought of as the “art of sounds” 
doesn’t have to be full of external sounds. In listening to silence, one 
can find even more internal “sounds” in the heart and spirit, which 
should be the quintessence of music. 
 
Conclusion 
 
John Cage would prefer, of course, to conduct and to be treated as 
a musician rather than a practitioner of Chan Buddhism. His main 
motive for composition was still musical. 4’33’’ could be seen as a 
Gong'an of Chan Buddhism, on the one hand, and the idea of Chan 
Buddhism could also help push the boundary of music and find its 
new possibility, on the other hand. As a composer of “new music” 
Cage successfully combined the spirit of western avant-garde and 
eastern Chan Buddhism. 
 
                                                 
12 The Diamond Sūtra and The Sūtra of Hui-neng, tr. by A. F. Price and Mou-lam 
Wong (Boston: Shambhala, 1990), p. 76. 
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Created Truth and Remade Reality in 
Painting: From Jin Hao (833-917) 
to Ricoeur (1913-2005) 
KATIA LENEHAN 
 
 
Preface 
 
As Ricoeur has observed, the rise of photography and non-
representative painting in the modern period helps us reflect on what 
a painting really is. Without the imitative function of appearance, 
painting still remains precious to us. So, the value of painting 
obviously lies elsewhere, other than in imitation. For Ricoeur, after 
dispelling the mist of shadowy imitation, in the end we confront the 
core of painting—a reality, containing ontological truth value rather 
than scientific truth, reconstructed by the artist. Interestingly, without 
the shocking invention of photography and abstract painting, Jin Hao, 
1000 years earlier than Ricoeur, had proposed the idea of “truth in 
painting” in his famous article Drawing Notes. These two thinkers 
were unknown to each other, but their perspectives on painting are 
astonishingly similar and echo one another.  
To narrow the scope of our research, this paper will focus mainly 
on a comparison between two texts: one is from Jin Hao’s Drawing 
Notes, a highly influential work on Chinese painting theory, which 
constitutes approximately 1900 Chinese characters; the other is an 
article from Ricoeur’s “Lectures on Imagination,” which crystalizes in 
general his perspective on painting. We will first illustrate Jin Hao’s 
idea of painting, and then move on to Ricoeur. Finally, a comparison 
will be conducted between the two texts, not only elucidating similar 
insights on painting by both thinkers, but also illustrating some subtle 
differences between the two. However, it must be noted that the 
differences of these two thinkers do not cause any irreconcilable 
difficulties in the theory of painting; instead, they tell us more about 
truth in painting from different aspects.  
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Created Truth in Painting 
 
We are in debt to Jin Hao (c. 833- c. 917), the famous artist and 
theorist, for being the first to emphasize truth in painting ?? from 
Chinese aesthetics. Because of him, as early as 9th century China, the 
thesis “truth” in painting had become one of the most crucial and 
significant theses in Chinese painting aesthetics. Jing Hao elaborated 
his idea concerning truth in painting in a highly influential article 
entitled Drawing Notes???.1 
Drawing Notes is primarily an article which instructs us how to 
paint. Written in under 2000 Chinese characters, Jin Hao formulated 
the well-known thesis of “truth in painting??.” Jing Hao suggested 
without any hesitation that “truth in painting” ought to be the 
ultimate goal for the real artist to achieve and be the defining 
characteristic of great painting. 
By contrasting truth in painting with the idea of the similarity of 
an object’s appearance, Jin Hao brought to light the definition and 
significance of “truth” in painting. 
[The author] said, “Painting, [is] the exterior color. The valuable 
similarity of the object [in painting] obtains its truth, and that is its 
secret.” 
However, the old man said, “Not at all. Painting, [is] to paint. [You 
have to] ponder over the object’s images in order to catch its truth. 
[You] take its color in terms of its color and [you] take its reality in 
terms of its reality. If you do not know this technique, you may obtain 
only the similarity, but truth in painting remains unachievable.” 
The author said, “What is similarity? What is truth? ” 
The old man said, “Similarity obtains only the similar appearance 
of an object while truth fulfills [in painting] with a flourish both its 
spirit? (Qi) and quality? (Zhi).”2 
                                                 
1  There has not been an English translation of ???  accepted as a fixed 
translation. I have seen the translation of “Notes on Landscape Painting 
Techniques” or “Record of Brush Methods.” I use “Drawing Notes” since it points 
out the content of the article and is as simple and clear as it Chinese name.  
2 Jin Hao ?? , Drawing Notes ??? . Quoted from Yuan Yougen ??? , 
Interpretation of Jin Hao—the Pioneer of Chinese Northern Landscape Painting ???
?????????? (Beijing: China Federation of Literary and Art Circles 
Publishing Corporation???????, 2010). The Chinese word Qi ? has no 
equivalent English term for the translation. The famous thesis Qi Yun Sheng Dong
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Through the old man’s words, Jin Hao clearly pointed out his 
central idea that it is the truth of painting which the artist should aim 
for, and this truth is superior to the similar appearance of an object in 
painting.  
By Jin Hao’s definition, “truth” is what the painter achieves when 
he fulfills with a flourish both an object’s spirit (Qi) and quality (Zhi) 
in painting. In the context of the article, Jin Hao implied that “spirit 
(Qi)” is something invisible whereas “quality” is visible, since he 
clearly made the distinction between the similarity of appearance of 
things in painting to an object, which is visible, and truth in painting, 
which contains not only the visible (quality), but the invisible (spirit). 
It is also why the truth is superior to mere similarity, namely the 
external likeness to the original object. According to Jin Hao, the 
defects of painting can also be attributed to two types, the visible and 
the invisible: “There are two kinds of defects in painting: one is the 
invisible and the other is visible. The defect of the visible is a defect 
such as painted flowers and trees that have appeared in the wrong 
season or when the human figure appears larger than the size of a 
house…, defects of this kind may still have a chance to be corrected. 
The invisible defect, however, is the defect that the spirit? (Qi) and 
the rhythm? (Yun) of things are completely eliminated…, the defect 
as such is irretrievable.”3 
What is spirit (Qi)? The answer to this question is related to the 
idea of “truth” in painting, since truth in painting can be achieved only 
when (Qi) and quality (Zhi) spirit are both obtained by the painter. 
The best way to answer this question is to find clues and evidence 
from Jin Hao’s own words. In Drawing Notes, Jin Hao not only 
addressed the ideal of painting, but also elaborated concrete painting 
methods. In other words, he illustrated how to accomplish the truth 
                                                 
???? in classic Chinese aesthetics is proposed by Xie He?? (-532), whose 
painting theory had highly influenced Jing Hao. The thesis Qi Yun Sheng Dong
???? was translated as “the life-movement of the spirit through the rhythm 
of things” in The Ideals of the East. See Kakasu Okakura, The Ideals of the East 
(London: John Murray, 1903), p. 52. I will use Kakasu Okakura’s translation of Qi 
as "spirit" until I find a more perfect substitute. 
3 Yuan Yougen???, Interpretation of Jin Hao—the Pioneer of Chinese Northern 
Landscape Painting ?????????????? (Beijing: China Federation of 
Literary and Art Circles Publishing Corporation???????, 2010), pp. 325-
326. 
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in painting. He contended that there are six essential elements in 
painting: spirit ? (Qi); rhythm ? (Yun); thought ? (Si); scene ? 
(Jing); stroke ? (Bi); and ink ? (Mo). The definition of these six 
elements is as follows: 
 
Spirit?(Qi)—[In painting] the hand follows the heart in union; the 
image is obtained without hesitation. (????,????) 
Rhythm ?(Yun)—unnatural traces are eliminated and shape is 
established; to paint with principles but not to fall into a convention. (
????,????) 
Thought?(Si)—to discard the unnecessary and keep what is most 
important; to ponder and conceive the image of things. (????,?
???) 
Scene?(Jing)—to make choices of need and speculate [the object’s 
image] according to its real circumstances; to collect the wonderful 
from things and create the truth. (????,????)  
Stroke?(Bi)—to follow yet not be limited by rules, and to move 
the brush flexibly and smoothly; to be unconstrained by the texture 
and shape of every stroke but to be agile and vivid as flight. (???
?,????,????,????) 
Ink?(Mo)— to employ the ink lightly or thickly according to the 
higher and lower parts of things and to ascertain the real conditions 
of things; the distribution of ink is so natural that it seems not to be 
painted by the brush. (????,????,????,????)  
 
We will leave aside the practical use of stroke ?(Bi) and ink ?
(Mo), for it is not our chief concern. As we shall see, thought?(Si) and 
scene ? (Jing) have provided us crucial information on truth in 
painting. In fact, the discourse here concerning spirit (Qi)—the hand 
follows the heart in union; the image is obtained without hesitation—
indicates the state of a painter at his highest level in the act of painting. 
How can the artist paint with his hand and heart in union and obtain 
the painted image without hesitation? He must first go through a 
process of conceiving the image of things by “discarding the 
unnecessary and keeping what is most important,” so to speak, a 
process of thought. Furthermore, when he decides which elements are 
necessary or unnecessary, he must have “speculated the object’s 
image according to its real circumstances,” and since he does not 
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create from nothing, he has to “collect the wonderful from things,” or 
in other words, to refine the cream of things. This is how the truth is 
created in painting. 
With all these clues, we can now return to the idea of spirit (Qi) in 
painting. First, spirit (Qi) means the spirit (Qi) of the painted image. 
Second, the spirit (Qi) of the image rendered by the artist in painting, 
nevertheless, derives from the invisible spirit (Qi) of the object; the 
spirit (Qi) then also indicates the spirit (Qi) of the preexisted object 
observed by the artist before painting. Third, it is the painter who 
seizes the cream, the essence of the object according to who he is, so 
to speak, the spirit (Qi) of the painter is involved in creating the spirit 
(Qi) of image in painting. 
According to Jin Hao, it is clear that truth in painting is never a 
correspondent truth (a truth often emphasized in the western 
tradition of epistemology), since the spirit (Qi) of the painter is 
entangled in creating truth in painting. And this is also why we call 
an artwork a man-made “creation,” rather than “knowledge.” So, 
when Jin Hao said that truth in painting is obtained, he in fact declared 
that the truth is created as a result of an inseparable “union” of the 
artist’s and the object’s spirit (Qi). The artist therefore in this union is 
able to capture the cream of the object and then express it in painting 
“in his own unique way.” So, “truth in painting” is “truth” created by 
the artist in a new form of image, containing both the spirit (Qi) of the 
artist and the spirit (Qi) of the object. In a union of his and the object’s 
spirit (Qi), the painter is able “in his own way” to discard the 
unnecessary and keep what is most important in his work, ponder and 
conceive the image of things, and is able to see into things and disclose 
their truth “without hesitation” in a way that no one has ever done. 
Truth thus is created in his work.  
Jin Hao’s Drawing Notes is addressed to painters. Although he 
spoke of artworks in his writings, his main concern was how to create 
a great painting. The artist for him is key to a successful painting, since 
it is through the artist, through his spirit (Qi), that the spirit (Qi) of the 
object is seized and the truth of the image is revealed in painting. In 
short, the spirit (Qi) of the object is measured by the spirit (Qi) of the 
artist. It is correlative with the artist. This fact explains the reason why 
Chinese art criticism, especially in literati painting, placed so much 
emphasis on the painter’s state of being, including his moral integrity, 
education, and self-cultivation, because only the greatest artists who 
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have the greatest spirit (Qi) can have the utmost insight into things 
(namely, to reach the spirit [Qi] of things) and in turn create the 
greatest images in painting. The artist, and only the artist, is able to 
reveal to us the hidden of things, the hidden concealed in ordinary 
life, through the choices he makes in painting. This revelation he 
makes in painting, the revelation that shows a new dimension of 
things, thus, can be called “created truth.”  
One more thing worth noting is that the invisible spirit (Qi) of 
things in painting has to be presented together with its visible quality 
(Zhi). “Truth in painting” for Jin Hao is always a truth which fulfills 
both the invisible spirit (Qi) and the visible quality of things. With a 
strong emphasis on invisible spirit (Qi), Chinese painting has great 
potential to enter the abstract painting field, although it has never 
reached this stage. Traditional Chinese painting remains figurative. 
Still, figurative images for traditional Chinese painters are the 
indispensable means to express truth in painting.  
 
Remade reality in Painting 
 
In Ricoeur’s Lectures on Imagination delivered at the University of 
Chicago in 1975,4 we found that chapter 17 is especially dedicated to 
the topic of painting: “Fiction 3: The Pictorial Aspect of Reference.” In 
                                                 
4  George H. Taylor, ‘Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Imagination,’ Journal of French 
Philosophy, 16, 1 and 2 (2006), p. 101. Taylor in footnote 3 of the article wrote: “Paul 
Ricoeur, ‘Lectures on Imagination (1975) [Lectures]’ (unpublished). As noted, I 
reviewed transcriptions of the original 1975 course lectures, which were delivered 
at the University of Chicago. The transcriptions were based on cassette retapings 
in 1979 of the original reel-to-reel recordings of the 19 course lectures. The original 
recordings were available at that time at a University of Chicago library. Patrick 
Crosby undertook the original recording of these lectures (as well as the recording 
of the Lectures on Ideology and Utopia), and we owe him a considerable debt 
both for his foresight in anticipating the value of taping these lectures and for his 
care in making the recordings. In 2003-05, the cassette tapes were initially 
transcribed by staff at the Document Technology Center at the University of 
Pittsburgh School of Law, whom I thank for their arduous efforts, and I then 
listened to the tapes myself in order to edit the transcriptions to ensure their 
accuracy.” The author has to especially thank Professor George H. Taylor who 
introduced these lectures to me and offered great help for my current study. In 
the following footnotes I will cite these unpublished lectures as “Lectures on 
Imagination,” and cite the chapters and sections, according to the transcriptions 
Professor Taylor sent to me in 2012, as “chapter number: section number.” 
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these lectures, he proposed an analysis on the transition from 
reproductive imagination to productive imagination. The analysis on 
productive imagination is illustrated in the final five chapters of the 
lectures concerning “fiction,” with one of these chapters focusing on 
the topic of painting. It seems that Ricoeur approached the topic of 
painting as a bridge between the poetic imagination and the 
epistemological imagination.5 And then he used “the roundabout way 
of models [of epistemology] to prepare the last stage of referential 
value also of poetic language.” 6  After this detour, he finally 
crystallized his thoughts on poetics.  
Although his main concern in “Lectures on Imagination” is poetry, 
Ricoeur’s discourses on painting, which coincide with his theory of 
productive imagination, still offer us precious insight into painting, an 
insight I found akin to Jin Hao.  
In “Fiction 3: The Pictorial Aspect of Reference,” Ricoeur claimed 
that what occurs in painting is the transfiguration of reality through 
an iconographic device. He adopted François Dagognet’s idea of 
“iconic augmentation” to elaborate his theory of fiction in painting. 
Fiction, thanks to its negativity, “discloses new dimensions of 
reality.”7 
Ricoeur mentioned that, according to Dagognet, “…the images 
created by the skill of the artist are not less than real but more than 
real, because they increase reality.” The idea of “iconic augmentation” 
thus expresses the “power of both condensing and expanding 
reality.” 8  Dagognet’s argument is carried out by opposing iconic 
augmentation to the mere reduplicative function of the shadowy 
image. He criticized the platonic tendency of advocating the principle 
that in painting the copy is always less than the original, and 
accordingly “writing and pictures in general impoverish reality, 
                                                 
5 Ricoeur, “Lectures on Imagination,” 16: 4-5. Ricoeur said, “With this second 
topic [The Pictorial Aspect of Reference], the correlation between model and 
metaphor will occur, and then we will have a transition from the poetic 
imagination to what I call the epistemological imagination. They have an 
intersection in the theory of model to the extent that metaphor is to poetic 
language what the model is to epistemology.” 
6 Ricoeur, “Lectures on Imagination,” 19: 1.  
7Ibid., 17: 1.  
8 Ibid., 17: 8.  
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because they are themselves less than real, are mere shadows as 
compared to real things.” 9 
Dagognet’s perspective perfectly echoes Ricoeur’s idea of fiction, 
since fiction “seems to be non-referential in the sense that it has no 
object, that a new kind of reference may be opened thanks to the 
absence of a real referent, of an original. Whereas the reproductive 
image is marginal as regards reality, it is the function of productive 
imagination—of the fictional—to open and change reality.” 10 
Painting, while it breaks away from the function of copying the 
already existent object, creates its own original. As a fictional work, 
painting is completely distinguished from “the picture of [something 
that already existed].” 11 “…picture being the picture of in the sense of 
a copy while the fiction creates its own referent.” 12 
Furthermore, “iconic augmentation” helps illustrate how the 
productive imagination works to expand reality. First, painting as a 
work, not as “a picture of,” belongs to the category of “production.” 
Production of a work first of all means the externalization of the 
creative process. By giving form or organization to matter, painting 
delivers the creative process to an external barrier. This is the first 
sense of “augmentation” or the increase of reality.13  
Secondly, “iconic augmentation” is linked not only to the choice of 
material medium (to render its external existence), but also to “the 
creation of an alphabet, a structural grid used for abbreviating and 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 17: 7.  
10 Ibid., 15: 5.  
11 Ibid., 15:1, 17: 9.  
12 Ibid., 18:4.  
13 This first dimension of “augmentation” of reality in painting was also well 
illustrated by Etienne Gilson in his Painting and Reality. He said, “In the case of 
painting, art is not nature seen through a temperament; rather, it is the ability to 
create a new being that nobody would ever see, either in nature or otherwise, 
unless the art of the painter caused it to exist.” See Etienne Gilson, Painting and 
Reality (New York: Pantheon Books, 1957), p. 116. For Gilson, artistic creations 
increase the sum total of already existing reality. However, he also claimed that 
“Images add nothing to existing reality.” (Painting and Reality, p. 283.) It seems 
that his standpoint concerning the image is completely different from Ricoeur’s. 
But we have to keep in mind that the existing reality Gilson speaks of is always 
something outside the subject, while Ricoeur often posits the reality in the 
background of “being-in-the-world.” In other words, for Ricoeur, despite its 
objective sense, reality may also refer to a pre-objective world where the subject 
and the object do not separate from one another.  
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condensing the pertinent traits of reality, enabling a choice of 
pertinent traits.” 14  This process of abbreviation involves the 
productive imagination, since it involves the invention of a new 
medium of mimesis,15 a new alphabet, by choosing a finite set from 
endless possible connections, to express the world. Ricoeur brought 
up impressionism in painting as an example, “Impressionism tried to 
beat photography where it cannot work by creating a new alphabet of 
colors capable of capturing the transient and the fleeting with the 
magic of hidden correspondences. Once more, reality was remade, 
with an emphasis on atmospheric values and light appearances.” 
16With the productive imagination, the painting presents “a kind of 
plot here of colors and lines that is a condensed network in exactly the 
same way that the tragedy is more dense than life, has only the 
essential structure of life.” 17 
The third dimension of “iconic augmentation” has “even more 
important implication of the notion of creative imagination.” 18 
Ricoeur put the third and final implication in the form of a paradox: 
“the more imagination deviates from what is called reality in ordinary 
vision and in ordinary language, the closer it comes to the core of 
reality that is no longer the world of manipulable objects.” 19Following 
this logic, Ricoeur claimed that when painting is no longer figurative, 
that is, it disconnects itself from the copying of an existent object, non-
objective qualities of reality are then depicted. We transfer finally into 
a subtle, indirect ontology from the kind of direct ontology of 
figurative painting, which always obstructs us from our more 
fundamental relationships with the world. “…it is when a descriptive 
reference is abolished that a more fundamental reference is displayed. 
It is not a reference to a something, to objects, or to things but to a pre-
objective situation of our existence. Only through some imaginative 
variation may we reach this fundamental situation, and each painting 
                                                 
14 Ricoeur, “Lectures on Imagination,” 17: 10. 
15  The term “mimesis” here is used in Aristotelian fashion. “For Aristotle 
mimesis was not at all a way of copying a thing. It was a creative reconstruction 
of reality, as when the tragedy expresses the truth about human action, because 
it’s a muthos.” See Ricoeur , “Lectures on Imagination,” 17: 2. 
16 Ricoeur, “Lectures on Imagination,” 17: 14.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid. 
234           Katia Lenehan 
is an imaginative variation concerning a mode of relatedness to the 
world.” 20 In this sense, a feeling or a mood displayed in a painting is 
no less objective and we are no less related to reality through emotions 
(although this feeling may have no name before being painted by the 
artist), since it reveals even more “fundamental tensions that relate us 
to the world as a whole.” 21  In the same way, “The invention of 
landscape painting is at the same time a new way of looking at nature 
as a landscape. There is an augmentation of our world.”22 Or, precisely 
speaking, there is a new way of our relatedness to the natural world 
discovered in painting.  
Towards the end of Chapter 17 in “Lectures on Imagination,” 
Ricoeur criticized the concept of reality under the influence of science, 
which believes that “the reality is only what can confirm or falsify 
empirical statements,” and that “the capacity of giving truth value to 
empirical statements is what we tend to call reality.” According to 
Ricoeur, under the shock of fiction, the scientific concept of reality 
becomes problematic. This does not mean that reality and truth 
defined by science is unreal, but it indeed implies that reality is not 
only the reality of science, and that there also exists the reality 
manifested in painting and poetry, which reveals for us our even more 
fundamental relationship with the world before its objectification. As 
Professor George Taylor puts it, “Ricoeur’s theory of productive 
imagination requires revision not only of our concept of reality but 
also of our concept of truth. No longer is truth defined in terms of 
‘adequation,’ a conformation between judgment and existing reality, 
because the disclosure of new reality has more to do with a concept of 
truth as manifestation. ”23 
 
A Comparison between Jin Hao and Ricoeur 
 
I will conclude the similar views of Jin Hao and Ricoeur as the 
following 3 points: 
 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 17: 15, 17:16.  
21 Ibid., 17: 15.  
22 Ibid., 17: 16.  
23 George H. Taylor, ‘Ricoeur’s Philosophy of Imagination,’ Journal of French 
Philosophy, 16, 1 and 2 (2006), p. 98. 
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1/Both Jin Hao and Ricoeur are against the idea that painting is 
merely a copy of an existing object. 
For Jin Hao, it is truth in painting, not the external likeness of the 
object, for which a painter should aim as the ultimate goal. A painter 
may use the external quality of the object as a means to reveal truth, 
but a painting which has successfully depicted the similar appearance 
of the object is still far from a good painting. In Ricoeur, the same idea 
is again accentuated: “…in painting we have more than a copy, we 
have a certain creation of its own original.” 24 And the view that 
conceives of the painting as a shadowy image of the existing object 
simply blocks us from the way to an “ontology displayed by the image 
itself.”25 Both Jin Hao and Ricoeur believe that the mere imitative view 
on painting makes us blind to the truth in painting.  
2/ According to both Jin Hao and Ricoeur, productive imagination 
is involved in the artist’s creation. 
In Jin Hao, the definitions of “thought” and “scene” (two of his six 
crucial elements in painting) have clearly implied the process of 
“productive imagination,” a term used by Ricoeur. The discourses 
such as “to discard the unnecessary and keep what is most important” 
and “to make choices of need and speculate [the object’s image] 
according to its real circumstances” basically correspond to Ricoeur’s 
explanation of the artist’s “process of abbreviation,” a process in 
which the painter’s generative power of productive imagination 
works to create a new alphabet in painting through colors and lines. 
According to both Jin Hao and Ricoeur, productive imagination is 
surely involved and plays an extremely important role in the artist’s 
creation. 
3/ Jin Hao and Ricoeur both agree that truth is disclosed in 
painting.  
For Jin Hao, truth in painting is created by the artist who is open to 
the object. And in the union of his spirit (Qi) and object’s spirit (Qi), 
he produces the image of the object in painting. The image, therefore, 
through the visible colors and lines of the painted object, conveys to 
us a truth which concerns both the artist and the object, a truth which 
reveals the hidden of things captured only by the artist. For Ricoeur, 
reality is remade and reconstructed creatively in painting. An artwork 
                                                 
24 Ricoeur, “Lectures on Imagination,” 15: 4.  
25 Ibid., 16: 1.  
236           Katia Lenehan 
offers us a new way to look at the world and a new alphabet through 
which new dimensions of the world are opened up to us. 
Furthermore, through some imaginative variation, we may even reach 
a more fundamental reference depicted in painting, a reference to a 
pre-objective situation of our existence where fundamental 
possibilities of our relations to the world are revealed. There is a truth 
value given to the reality built by the artist in painting. Reality in this 
sense is no longer the reality limited by scientific definition, and truth 
in turn also sets itself free from the meaning of mere “adequation.”  
 
With Jin Hao and Ricoeur, despite the distinct eras in which they 
lived and differences of region and culture, the same insights into 
painting are proposed to us. But there are still some subtle differences 
shown in their discourses, which provide us an opportunity to think 
further on truth and reality in painting.  
First, Jin Hao’s text placed more emphasis on the creative activity 
of the painter, unlike Ricoeur’s text on the artwork. Ricoeur’s 
approach indeed discloses for us an ontology of artworks and 
efficiently prevents us from the subjective trend which is highly 
developed in Kant’s thought. This is a great contribution made by 
Ricoeur in painting theory and this contribution provides a base 
which keeps us in the line between the subject and the object without 
indulging in either.  
However, Jin Hao seems to place much emphasis on the subject 
(namely, the artist), since Drawing Notes is an article concerning how 
to paint. This may give us an impression that Jin Hao’s approach is in 
danger of subjectivism. In my opinion, nevertheless, Jin Hao’s stance 
is completely immune to Kantian subjectivism. First of all, truth in 
painting is not a truth only created by the artist, but a truth created 
through the union of the artist’s and object’s spirit (Qi). The Union of 
the subject and the object plays an extremely important role in Jin 
Hao’s theory of creation, which allows us on the one hand to “ponder 
over the object’s images in order to catch its truth,” so that the object 
and its truth is always involved in the painting; and on the other hand 
“to discard the unnecessary and keep what is most important,” so that 
the artist’s efforts and creative activities are also involved. Jin Hao had 
no intension whatsoever to develop any subjectivist view in his 
theory. 
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However, one thing of note here is that for Jin Hao there is no such 
idea called “pre-objective.” The idea of “pre-objective,” proposed by 
Ricoeur in his view on painting, derives from Heidegger. “Pre-
objective” indicates a world where objects are not manipulable, where 
Dasein is yet separate from the world, and where the fundamental 
possibilities that we relate to the world as a whole are presented. We 
have to note that the union of the artist’s and object’s spirit (Qi) 
implied in Jin Hao’s text, however, refers to a union containing a 
nuanced difference from the pre-objective union of the subject and the 
world. For Jin Hao, the truth in painting is not something that the 
artist can easily reach; otherwise Jin Hao would not have written 
Drawing Notes to instruct the painter. A Chinese painter had to 
cultivate his own spirit (Qi) to a certain level, so that one day he might 
see into things, see into his existential relatedness to things, and create 
the best images in painting which convey the truth concerning both 
himself and the object. This union indicates the highest level and 
achievement of artistic activity, which differs from the pre-objective 
union as Dasein’s fundamental existential structure of “being-in-the-
world,” the structure born to us or the situation we are thrown into.  
 For me, these two nuanced unions are not incompatible. In this 
paper, I would like to suggest that the first union of the subject and 
object, the pre-objective and primordial situation of our existence, 
provides the basis of the second union, a union which results from the 
artist’s efforts, his self-cultivation, and, most important of all, his free 
choices to be open to the object and to be united with it again while 
abandoning an ordinary attitude towards it. We may say that the 
second union cannot be reached if two parties (the subject and the 
object) in the first place exclude one another in nature. Luckily, we 
have a rather different starting point here: we are born as being-in-
the-world. Thus, it is not surprising that the image created in painting 
by the artist, who is reunited with the object, may at the same time 
reveal the basis of this reunion (which makes the reunion possible), so 
to speak, the primordial situation of our existence and the pre-
objective union between the subject and the world. The pre-objective 
world in which we “dwell” is so fundamental that we are hardly ever 
aware of it; however, with the efforts of the artist, with his willingness 
to embrace things and reunite again with them in the way he is, this 
primordial world is finally brought to light for us in painting.  
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Therefore, concerning art, there is still a necessity to speak of the 
artist, the subject, and the depth of his substance. This is, I think, what 
makes Chinese painting theory enlightening. It is unnecessary to 
become subjectivist just because we develop thinking on the subject, 
if we keep in mind that the subject is always a subject having 
existential structure as being-in-the-world, and that with this basis of 
being-in-the-world, and only with this basis, he is able to reunite 
himself with the world once again. This profound reunion occurs with 
all its depth when the artist is open to the object or, speaking 
phenomenologically, when the artist lets the object reveal itself to him. 
We shall not overlook the fundamental situation of our existence, but 
this should not become an obstacle which prevents us from an 
investigation into the artist. In fact, it is obvious that the artistic 
expression of the world in the work is never a shallow one and that 
the depth of an image first comes from the depth of the artist, his state 
of being, and his understanding of the world. Through his reunion 
with the world, the artist discloses in painting an image with depth, 
and this explains why the painting is to us “moving.” The 
fundamental situation of our existence as the basis of this reunion is 
in turn brought to light in painting in a most touching manner and is 
revealed in its profoundest meaning because of the artist’s art.  
In conclusion, Ricoeur’s approach to painting and his adoption of 
artworks as a starting point provides solid ground for a painting 
theory which avoids the danger of subjectivism. And his discourse on 
the pre-objective situation of our existence revealed in painting also 
provides a great basis for a profound reunion of the artist and the 
object, as implied in Jin Hao’s theory. Jin Hao’s discourse serves as a 
reminder that the primordial structure of our existential situation 
(though it is of great importance) does not offer an entire picture of 
the painting world. Jin Hao’s theory on painting shows us that the 
investigation on the subject, namely, the artist and his activity, does 
not necessarily fall into subjectivism, and truth created by him in 
painting is by no means less real than truth in science. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper stresses the similarities between Jin Hao’s and Ricoeur’s 
ideas on painting and attempts to reconcile the nuanced differences 
between the two. The opinion of this paper merely reflects the texts of 
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Jin Hao and Ricoeur, which provide us with tremendously similar 
insights into painting. Although there indeed exist subtle differences 
in their respective writings, these differences in fact complement 
rather than contradict one another.  
Perhaps such similar perspectives from Jin Hao and Ricoeur on 
painting are not surprising if we realize that their discourses are 
simply based on the same phenomena, a phenomena which resulted 
in the two thinkers, though living 1000 years apart, arriving at the 
same insights. In fact, arriving at a complete picture of truth in 
painting is far beyond the scope of this paper, which includes not only 
an ontological truth revealed in the artwork, how truth is to be created 
by the artist, and how the onlooker recognizes it in his aesthetic 
experience, but also the dialectical relationships between the work, the 
artist, and the onlooker. We are still on the threshold of exploring truth 
revealed in painting. But we have reason to believe, based on these 
two thinkers’ similar insights into painting, that we are getting closer 
to the core of painting and to the essential value that painting creates 
for us, and that we are keeping on the right path faithful to the 
phenomena of painting. 
 
(Fu Jen Academia Catholica, Fu Jen Catholic University, Taipei, Taiwan) 
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PROJECTS
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II.16 The Idea of a Nigerian University: A Revisited: Nigerian Philosophical 
Studies, III. Olatunji Oyeshile and Joseph Kenny, eds. ISBN 
9781565182776 (paper). 
II.17 Philosophy in African Traditions and Cultures: Zimbabwe 
Philosophical Studies, II. Fainos Mangena, Tarisayi Andrea Chimuka, 
Francis Mabiri, eds. ISBN 9781565182998 (paper). 
II.18 Universalism, Relativism, and Intercultural Philosophy: Nigerian 
Philosophical Studies IV. Joseph C. Achike Agbakoba and Anthony C. 
Ajah, eds. ISBN 9781565183162 (paper). 
 
Series IIA. Islamic Philosophical Studies 
 
IIA.1 Islam and the Political Order. Muhammad Saïd al-Ashmawy. ISBN 
156518047X (paper); 1565180461 (cloth). 
IIA.2 Al-Ghazali Deliverance from Error and Mystical Union with the 
Almighty: Al-munqidh Min al-Dadāl. Critical Arabic edition and English 
translation by Muhammad Abulaylah and Nurshif Abdul-Rahim Rifat; 
Introduction and notes by George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181530 (Arabic-
English edition, paper), ISBN 1565180828 (Arabic edition, paper), ISBN 
156518081X (English edition, paper) 
IIA.3 Philosophy in Pakistan. Naeem Ahmad, ed. ISBN 1565181085 (paper). 
IIA.4 The Authenticity of the Text in Hermeneutics. Seyed Musa Dibadj. 
ISBN 1565181174 (paper). 
IIA.5 Interpretation and the Problem of the Intention of the Author: H.-G. 
Gadamer vs E.D. Hirsch. Burhanettin Tatar. ISBN 156518121 (paper). 
IIA.6 Ways to God, Personal and Social at the Turn of Millennia: The Iqbal 
Lectures, Lahore. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181239 (paper). 
IIA.7 Faith, Reason and Philosophy: Lectures at Al-Azhar University, Qom, 
Tehran, Lahore and Beijing; Appendix: The Encyclical Letter: Fides et 
Ratio. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181301 (paper). 
IIA.8 Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue: Bulgarian 
Philosophical Studies, III. Plament Makariev, ed. ISBN 156518162X 
(paper). 
IIA.9 Values of Islamic Culture and the Experience of History, Russian 
Philosophical Studies, I. Nur Kirabaev, Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 
1565181336 (paper). 
IIA.10 Christian-Islamic Preambles of Faith. Joseph Kenny. ISBN 
1565181387 (paper). 
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IIA.11 The Historicity of Understanding and the Problem of Relativism in 
Gadamer’s Philosophical Hermeneutics. Osman Bilen. ISBN 
1565181670 (paper). 
IIA.12 Religion and the Relation between Civilizations: Lectures on 
Cooperation between Islamic and Christian Cultures in a Global 
Horizon. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181522 (paper). 
IIA.13 Modern Western Christian Theological Understandings of Muslims 
since the Second Vatican Council. Mahmut Aydin. ISBN 1565181719 
(paper). 
IIA.14 Philosophy of the Muslim World; Authors and Principal Themes. 
Joseph Kenny. ISBN 1565181794 (paper). 
IIA.15 Islam and Its Quest for Peace: Jihad, Justice and Education. Mustafa 
Köylü. ISBN 1565181808 (paper). 
IIA.16 Islamic Thought on the Existence of God: Contributions and Contrasts 
with Contemporary Western Philosophy of Religion. Cafer S. Yaran. 
ISBN 1565181921 (paper). 
IIA.17 Hermeneutics, Faith, and Relations between Cultures: Lectures in 
Qom, Iran. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181913 (paper). 
IIA.18 Change and Essence: Dialectical Relations between Change and 
Continuity in the Turkish Intellectual Tradition. Sinasi Gunduz and Cafer 
S. Yaran, eds. ISBN 1565182227 (paper). 
IIA.19 Understanding Other Religions: Al-Biruni and Gadamer’s “Fusion of 
Horizons”. Kemal Ataman. ISBN 9781565182523 (paper). 
 
Series III. Asian Philosophical Studies 
 
III.1 Man and Nature: Chinese Philosophical Studies, I. Tang Yi-jie and Li 
Zhen, eds. ISBN 0819174130 (paper); 0819174122 (cloth). 
III.2 Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development: 
Chinese Philosophical Studies, II. Tran van Doan, ed. ISBN 1565180321 
(paper); 156518033X (cloth). 
III.3 Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture: 
Chinese Philosophical Studies, III. Tang Yijie. ISBN 1565180348 
(paper); 156518035-6 (cloth).  
III.4 Morality, Metaphysics and Chinese Culture (Metaphysics, Culture and 
Morality, I). Vincent Shen and Tran van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180275 
(paper); 156518026-7 (cloth). 
III.5 Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence. George F. McLean. ISBN 
1565180313 (paper); 156518030-5 (cloth). 
III.6 Psychology, Phenomenology and Chinese Philosophy: Chinese 
Philosophical Studies, VI. Vincent Shen, Richard Knowles and Tran Van 
Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180453 (paper); 1565180445 (cloth). 
III.7 Values in Philippine Culture and Education: Philippine Philosophical 
Studies, I. Manuel B. Dy, Jr., ed. ISBN 1565180412 (paper); 156518040-
2 (cloth). 
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III.7A The Human Person and Society: Chinese Philosophical Studies, VIIA. 
Zhu Dasheng, Jin Xiping and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180887. 
III.8 The Filipino Mind: Philippine Philosophical Studies II. Leonardo N. 
Mercado. ISBN 156518064X (paper); 156518063-1 (cloth). 
III.9 Philosophy of Science and Education: Chinese Philosophical Studies IX. 
Vincent Shen and Tran Van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180763 (paper); 
156518075-5 (cloth). 
III.10 Chinese Cultural Traditions and Modernization: Chinese 
Philosophical Studies, X. Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and George F. 
McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180682 (paper). 
III.11 The Humanization of Technology and Chinese Culture: Chinese 
Philosophical Studies XI. Tomonobu Imamichi, Wang Miaoyang and Liu 
Fangtong, eds. ISBN 1565181166 (paper). 
III.12 Beyond Modernization: Chinese Roots of Global Awareness: Chinese 
Philosophical Studies, XII. Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and George 
F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180909 (paper). 
III.13 Philosophy and Modernization in China: Chinese Philosophical 
Studies XIII. Liu Fangtong, Huang Songjie and George F. McLean, eds. 
ISBN 1565180666 (paper). 
III.14 Economic Ethics and Chinese Culture: Chinese Philosophical Studies, 
XIV. Yu Xuanmeng, Lu Xiaohe, Liu Fangtong, Zhang Rulun and Georges 
Enderle, eds. ISBN 1565180925 (paper). 
III.15 Civil Society in a Chinese Context: Chinese Philosophical Studies XV. 
Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and Manuel B. Dy, eds. ISBN 
1565180844 (paper). 
III.16 The Bases of Values in a Time of Change: Chinese and Western: 
Chinese Philosophical Studies, XVI. Kirti Bunchua, Liu Fangtong, Yu 
Xuanmeng, Yu Wujin, eds. ISBN l56518114X (paper). 
III.17 Dialogue between Christian Philosophy and Chinese Culture: 
Philosophical Perspectives for the Third Millennium: Chinese 
Philosophical Studies, XVII. Paschal Ting, Marian Kao and Bernard Li, 
eds. ISBN 1565181735 (paper). 
III.18 The Poverty of Ideological Education: Chinese Philosophical Studies, 
XVIII. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181646 (paper). 
III.19 God and the Discovery of Man: Classical and Contemporary 
Approaches: Lectures in Wuhan, China. George F. McLean. ISBN 
1565181891 (paper). 
III.20 Cultural Impact on International Relations: Chinese Philosophical 
Studies, XX. Yu Xintian, ed. ISBN 156518176X (paper). 
III.21 Cultural Factors in International Relations: Chinese Philosophical 
Studies, XXI. Yu Xintian, ed. ISBN 1565182049 (paper). 
III.22 Wisdom in China and the West: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXII. 
Vincent Shen and Willard Oxtoby. ISBN 1565182057 (paper)  
III.23 China’s Contemporary Philosophical Journey: Western Philosophy 
and Marxism: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXIII. Liu Fangtong. ISBN 
1565182065 (paper). 
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III.24 Shanghai: Its Urbanization and Culture: Chinese Philosophical 
Studies, XXIV. Yu Xuanmeng and He Xirong, eds. ISBN 1565182073 
(paper). 
III.25 Dialogue of Philosophies, Religions and Civilizations in the Era of 
Globalization: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXV. Zhao Dunhua, ed. 
ISBN 9781565182431 (paper). 
III.26 Rethinking Marx: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXVI. Zou Shipeng 
and Yang Xuegong, eds. ISBN 9781565182448 (paper).  
III.27 Confucian Ethics in Retrospect and Prospect: Chinese Philosophical 
Studies XXVII. Vincent Shen and Kwong-loi Shun, eds. ISBN 
9781565182455 (paper). 
III.28 Cultural Tradition and Social Progress, Chinese Philosophical 
Studies, XXVIII. He Xirong, Yu Xuanmeng, Yu Xintian, Yu Wujing, 
Yang Junyi, eds. ISBN 9781565182660 (paper). 
III.29 Spiritual Foundations and Chinese Culture: A Philosophical Approach: 
Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXIX. Anthony J. Carroll and Katia 
Lenehan, eds. ISBN 9781565182974 (paper) 
III.30 Diversity in Unity: Harmony in a Global Age: Chinese Philosophical 
Studies, XXX. He Xirong and Yu Xuanmeng, eds. ISBN 978156518 3070 
(paper). 
III.31 Chinese Spirituality and Christian Communities: A Kenotic 
Perspective: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXXI. Vincent Shen, ed. 
ISBN 978156518 3070 (paper). 
III.32 Care of Self and Meaning of Life: Asian and Christian Reflections: 
Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXXII. William Sweet and Cristal Huang, 
ed. ISBN 9781565183131 (paper). 
IIIB.1 Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger: 
Indian Philosophical Studies, I. Vensus A. George. ISBN 1565181190 
(paper). 
IIIB.2 The Experience of Being as Goal of Human Existence: The 
Heideggerian Approach: Indian Philosophical Studies, II. Vensus A. 
George. ISBN 156518145X (paper). 
IIIB.3 Religious Dialogue as Hermeneutics: Bede Griffiths’s Advaitic 
Approach: Indian Philosophical Studies, III. Kuruvilla Pandikattu. ISBN 
1565181395 (paper). 
IIIB.4 Self-Realization [Brahmaanubhava]: The Advaitic Perspective of 
Shankara: Indian Philosophical Studies, IV. Vensus A. George. ISBN 
1565181549 (paper). 
IIIB.5 Gandhi: The Meaning of Mahatma for the Millennium: Indian 
Philosophical Studies, V. Kuruvilla Pandikattu, ed. ISBN 1565181565 
(paper). 
IIIB.6 Civil Society in Indian Cultures: Indian Philosophical Studies, VI. 
Asha Mukherjee, Sabujkali Sen (Mitra) and K. Bagchi, eds. ISBN 
1565181573 (paper). 
IIIB.7 Hermeneutics, Tradition and Contemporary Change: Lectures in 
Chennai/Madras, India. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181883 (paper). 
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IIIB.8 Plenitude and Participation: The Life of God in Man: Lectures in 
Chennai/Madras, India. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181999 (paper). 
IIIB.9 Sufism and Bhakti, a Comparative Study: Indian Philosophical 
Studies, VII. Md. Sirajul Islam. ISBN 1565181980 (paper). 
IIIB.10 Reasons for Hope: Its Nature, Role and Future: Indian Philosophical 
Studies, VIII. Kuruvilla Pandikattu, ed. ISBN 156518 2162 (paper). 
IIIB.11 Lifeworlds and Ethics: Studies in Several Keys: Indian Philosophical 
Studies, IX. Margaret Chatterjee. ISBN 9781565182332 (paper). 
IIIB.12 Paths to the Divine: Ancient and Indian: Indian Philosophical 
Studies, X. Vensus A. George. ISBN 9781565182486 (paper). 
IIIB.13 Faith, Reason, Science: Philosophical Reflections with Special 
Reference to Fides et Ratio: Indian Philosophical Studies, XIII. Varghese 
Manimala, ed. IBSN 9781565182554 (paper). 
IIIB.14 Identity, Creativity and Modernization: Perspectives on Indian 
Cultural Tradition: Indian Philosophical Studies, XIV. Sebastian 
Velassery and Vensus A. George, eds. ISBN 9781565182783 (paper). 
IIIB.15 Elusive Transcendence: An Exploration of the Human Condition 
Based on Paul Ricoeur: Indian Philosophical Studies, XV. Kuruvilla 
Pandikattu. ISBN 9781565182950 (paper). 
IIIC.1 Spiritual Values and Social Progress: Uzbekistan Philosophical 
Studies, I. Said Shermukhamedov and Victoriya Levinskaya, eds. ISBN 
1565181433 (paper). 
IIIC.2 Kazakhstan: Cultural Inheritance and Social Transformation: Kazakh 
Philosophical Studies, I. Abdumalik Nysanbayev. ISBN 1565182022 
(paper). 
IIIC.3 Social Memory and Contemporaneity: Kyrgyz Philosophical Studies, 
I. Gulnara A. Bakieva. ISBN 9781565182349 (paper). 
IIID.1 Reason, Rationality and Reasonableness: Vietnamese Philosophical 
Studies, I. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181662 (paper). 
IIID.2 Hermeneutics for a Global Age: Lectures in Shanghai and Hanoi. 
George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181905 (paper). 
IIID.3 Cultural Traditions and Contemporary Challenges in Southeast Asia. 
Warayuth Sriwarakuel, Manuel B. Dy, J. Haryatmoko, Nguyen Trong 
Chuan, and Chhay Yiheang, eds. ISBN 1565182138 (paper). 
IIID.4 Filipino Cultural Traits: Claro R. Ceniza Lectures. Rolando M. 
Gripaldo, ed. ISBN 1565182251 (paper). 
IIID.5 The History of Buddhism in Vietnam. Chief editor: Nguyen Tai Thu; 
Authors: Dinh Minh Chi, Ly Kim Hoa, Ha thuc Minh, Ha Van Tan, 
Nguyen Tai Thu. ISBN 1565180984 (paper). 
IIID.6 Relations between Religions and Cultures in Southeast Asia. Gadis 
Arivia and Donny Gahral Adian, eds. ISBN 9781565182509 (paper). 
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Series IV. Western European Philosophical Studies 
 
IV.1 Italy in Transition: The Long Road from the First to the Second 
Republic: The Edmund D. Pellegrino Lectures. Paolo Janni, ed. ISBN 
1565181204 (paper). 
IV.2 Italy and the European Monetary Union: The Edmund D. Pellegrino 
Lectures. Paolo Janni, ed. ISBN 156518128X (paper). 
IV.3 Italy at the Millennium: Economy, Politics, Literature and Journalism: 
The Edmund D. Pellegrino Lectures. Paolo Janni, ed. ISBN 1565181581 
(paper). 
IV.4 Speaking of God. Carlo Huber. ISBN 1565181697 (paper). 
IV.5 The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age. Paulo 
Janni and George F. McLean, eds. ISBB 1565181778 (paper). 
IV.6 Italic Identity in Pluralistic Contexts: Toward the Development of 
Intercultural Competencies. Piero Bassetti and Paolo Janni, eds. ISBN 
1565181441 (paper). 
IV.7 Phenomenon of Affectivity: Phenomenological-Anthropological 
Perspectives. Ghislaine Florival. ISBN 9781565182899 (paper). 
IV.8 Towards a Kenotic Vision of Authority in the Catholic Church. Anthony 
J. Carroll, Marthe Kerkwijk, Michael Kirwan, James Sweeney, eds. ISNB 
9781565182936 (paper). 
IV.9 A Catholic Minority Church in a World of Seekers. Staf Hellemans and 
Peter Jonkers, eds. ISBN 9781565183018 (paper). 
IV.10 French Catholics and Their Church: Pluralism and Deregulation. 
Nicolas de Bremond d’Ars and Yann Raison du Cleuziou, eds. ISBN 
9781565183087 (paper). 
 
Series IVA. Central and Eastern European Philosophical Studies 
 
IVA.1 The Philosophy of Person: Solidarity and Cultural Creativity: Polish 
Philosophical Studies, I. A. Tischner, J.M. Zycinski, eds. ISBN 
1565180496 (paper); 156518048-8 (cloth). 
IVA.2 Public and Private Social Inventions in Modern Societies: Polish Phil-
osophical Studies, II. L. Dyczewski, P. Peachey, J.A. Kromkowski, eds. 
ISBN. 1565180518 (paper); 156518050X (cloth). 
IVA.3 Traditions and Present Problems of Czech Political Culture: Czecho-
slovak Philosophical Studies, I. M. Bednár and M. Vejraka, eds. ISBN 
1565180577 (paper); 156518056-9 (cloth). 
IVA.4 Czech Philosophy in the XXth Century: Czech Philosophical Studies, 
II. Lubomír Nový and Jirí Gabriel, eds. ISBN 1565180291 (paper); 
156518028-3 (cloth). 
IVA.5 Language, Values and the Slovak Nation: Slovak Philosophical 
Studies, I. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gašparí-ková, eds. ISBN 1565180372 
(paper); 156518036-4 (cloth). 
254           Publications 
IVA.6 Morality and Public Life in a Time of Change: Bulgarian Philosoph-
ical Studies, I. V. Prodanov and A. Davidov, eds. ISBN 1565180550 
(paper); 1565180542 (cloth). 
IVA.7 Knowledge and Morality: Georgian Philosophical Studies, 1. N.V. 
Chavchavadze, G. Nodia and P. Peachey, eds. ISBN 1565180534 (paper); 
1565180526 (cloth). 
IVA.8 Cultural Heritage and Social Change: Lithuanian Philosophical Stud-
ies, I. Bronius Kuzmickas and Aleksandr Dobrynin, eds. ISBN 
1565180399 (paper); 1565180380 (cloth). 
IVA.9 National, Cultural and Ethnic Identities: Harmony beyond Conflict: 
Czech Philosophical Studies, III. Jaroslav Hroch, David Hollan, George 
F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565181131 (paper). 
IVA.10 Models of Identities in Postcommunist Societies: Yugoslav 
Philosophical Studies, I. Zagorka Golubovic and George F. McLean, eds. 
ISBN 1565181211 (paper). 
IVA.11 Interests and Values: The Spirit of Venture in a Time of Change: 
Slovak Philosophical Studies, II. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gasparikova, eds. 
ISBN 1565181255 (paper). 
IVA.12 Creating Democratic Societies: Values and Norms: Bulgarian 
Philosophical Studies, II. Plamen Makariev, Andrew M. Blasko and Asen 
Davidov, eds. ISBN 156518131X (paper). 
IVA.13 Values of Islamic Culture and the Experience of History: Russian 
Philosophical Studies, I. Nur Kirabaev and Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 
1565181336 (paper). 
IVA.14 Values and Education in Romania Today: Romanian Philosophical 
Studies, I. Marin Calin and Magdalena Dumitrana, eds. ISBN 
1565181344 (paper). 
IVA.15 Between Words and Reality, Studies on the Politics of Recognition 
and the Changes of Regime in Contemporary Romania: Romanian 
Philosophical Studies, II. Victor Neumann. ISBN 1565181611 (paper). 
IVA.16 Culture and Freedom: Romanian Philosophical Studies, III. Marin 
Aiftinca, ed. ISBN 1565181360 (paper). 
IVA.17 Lithuanian Philosophy: Persons and Ideas: Lithuanian 
Philosophical Studies, II. Jurate Baranova, ed. ISBN 1565181379 (paper). 
IVA.18 Human Dignity: Values and Justice: Czech Philosophical Studies, 
IV. Miloslav Bednar, ed. ISBN 1565181409 (paper). 
IVA.19 Values in the Polish Cultural Tradition: Polish Philosophical 
Studies, III. Leon Dyczewski, ed. ISBN 1565181425 (paper). 
IVA.20 Liberalization and Transformation of Morality in Post-communist 
Countries: Polish Philosophical Studies, IV. Tadeusz Buksinski. ISBN 
1565181786 (paper). 
IVA.21 Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue: Bulgarian 
Philosophical Studies, III. Plament Makariev, ed. ISBN 156518162X 
(paper). 
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IVA.22 Moral, Legal and Political Values in Romanian Culture: Romanian 
Philosophical Studies, IV. Mihaela Czobor-Lupp and J. Stefan Lupp, eds. 
ISBN 1565181700 (paper). 
IVA.23 Social Philosophy: Paradigm of Contemporary Thinking: Lithuanian 
Philosophical Studies, III. Jurate Morkuniene. ISBN 1565182030 (paper). 
IVA.24 Romania: Cultural Identity and Education for Civil Society: 
Romanian Philosophical Studies, V. Magdalena Dumitrana, ed. ISBN 
156518209X (paper). 
IVA.25 Polish Axiology: the 20th Century and Beyond: Polish Philosophical 
Studies, V. Stanislaw Jedynak, ed. ISBN 1565181417 (paper). 
IVA.26 Contemporary Philosophical Discourse in Lithuania: Lithuanian 
Philosophical Studies, IV. Jurate Baranova, ed. ISBN 156518-2154 
(paper). 
IVA.27 Eastern Europe and the Challenges of Globalization: Polish 
Philosophical Studies, VI. Tadeusz Buksinski and Dariusz Dobrzanski, 
ed. ISBN 1565182189 (paper). 
IVA.28 Church, State, and Society in Eastern Europe: Hungarian 
Philosophical Studies, I. Miklós Tomka. ISBN 156518226X (paper). 
IVA.29 Politics, Ethics, and the Challenges to Democracy in ‘New 
Independent States’: Georgian Philosophical Studies, II. Tinatin 
Bochorishvili, William Sweet, Daniel Ahern, eds. ISBN 9781565182240 
(paper). 
IVA.30 Comparative Ethics in a Global Age: Russian Philosophical Studies 
II. Marietta T. Stepanyants, eds. ISBN 9781565182356 (paper). 
IVA.31 Lithuanian Identity and Values: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, V. 
Aida Savicka, eds. ISBN 9781565182367 (paper). 
IVA.32 The Challenge of Our Hope: Christian Faith in Dialogue: Polish 
Philosophical Studies, VII. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN 9781565182370 
(paper). 
IVA.33 Diversity and Dialogue: Culture and Values in the Age of 
Globalization. Andrew Blasko and Plamen Makariev, eds. ISBN 
9781565182387 (paper). 
IVA.34 Civil Society, Pluralism and Universalism: Polish Philosophical 
Studies, VIII. Eugeniusz Gorski. ISBN 9781565182417 (paper). 
IVA.35 Romanian Philosophical Culture, Globalization, and Education: 
Romanian Philosophical Studies VI. Stefan Popenici and Alin Tat and, 
eds. ISBN 9781565182424 (paper). 
IVA.36 Political Transformation and Changing Identities in Central and 
Eastern Europe: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, VI. Andrew Blasko 
and Diana Janušauskienė, eds. ISBN 9781565182462 (paper). 
IVA.37 Truth and Morality: The Role of Truth in Public Life: Romanian 
Philosophical Studies, VII. Wilhelm Dancă, ed. ISBN 9781565182493 
(paper). 
IVA.38 Globalization and Culture: Outlines of Contemporary Social 
Cognition: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, VII. Jurate Morkuniene, ed. 
ISBN 9781565182516 (paper). 
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IVA.39 Knowledge and Belief in the Dialogue of Cultures, Russian 
Philosophical Studies, III. Marietta Stepanyants, ed. ISBN 
9781565182622 (paper). 
IVA.40 God and the Post-Modern Thought: Philosophical Issues in the 
Contemporary Critique of Modernity, Polish Philosophical Studies, IX. 
Józef Życiński. ISBN 9781565182677 (paper). 
IVA.41 Dialogue among Civilizations, Russian Philosophical Studies, IV. 
Nur Kirabaev and Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 9781565182653 (paper). 
IVA.42 The Idea of Solidarity: Philosophical and Social Contexts, Polish 
Philosophical Studies, X. Dariusz Dobrzanski, ed. ISBN 9781565182961 
(paper). 
IVA.43 God’s Spirit in the World: Ecumenical and Cultural Essays, Polish 
Philosophical Studies, XI. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN 9781565182738 
(paper). 
IVA.44 Philosophical Theology and the Christian Traditions: Russian and 
Western Perspectives, Russian Philosophical Studies, V. David 
Bradshaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182752 (paper). 
IVA.45 Ethics and the Challenge of Secularism: Russian Philosophical 
Studies, VI. David Bradshaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182806 (paper). 
IVA.46 Philosophy and Spirituality across Cultures and Civilizations: 
Russian Philosophical Studies, VII. Nur Kirabaev, Yuriy Pochta and 
Ruzana Pskhu, eds. ISBN 9781565182820 (paper). 
IVA.47 Values of the Human Person Contemporary Challenges: Romanian 
Philosophical Studies, VIII. Mihaela Pop, ed. ISBN 9781565182844 
(paper). 
IVA.48 Faith and Secularization: A Romanian Narrative: Romanian 
Philosophical Studies, IX. Wilhelm Dancă, ed. ISBN 9781565182929 
(paper). 
IVA.49 The Spirit: The Cry of the World: Polish Philosophical Studies, XII. 
Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN 9781565182943 (paper). 
IVA.50 Philosophy and Science in Cultures: East and West: Russian 
Philosophical Studies, VIII. Marietta T. Stepanyants, ed. ISBN 
9781565182967 (paper). 
IVA.51 A Czech Perspective on Faith in a Secular Age: Czech Philosophical 
Studies V. Tomáš Halík and Pavel Hošek, eds. ISBN 9781565183001 
(paper). 
IVA.52 Dilemmas of the Catholic Church in Poland: Polish Philosophical 
Studies, XIII. Tadeusz Buksinski, ed. ISBN 9781565183025 (paper). 
IVA.53 Secularization and Development of Religion in Modern Society: 
Polish Philosophical Studies, XIV. Leon Dyczewski, ed. ISBN 
9781565183032 (paper). 
IVA.54 Seekers or Dweller: The Social Character of Religion in Hungary: 
Hungarian Philosophical Studies, II. Zsuzsanna Bögre, ed. 
ISBN9781565183063 (paper). 
 
 
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy          257 
 
Series V. Latin American Philosophical Studies 
 
V.1 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. 
Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth). 
V.2 Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America. Raul Molina and 
Timothy Ready, eds. ISBN 0819173576 (paper); 0819173568 (cloth). 
V.3 El Cristianismo Aymara: Inculturacion o Culturizacion? Luis Jolicoeur. 
ISBN 1565181042 (paper). 
V.4 Love as the Foundation of Moral Education and Character Development. 
Luis Ugalde, Nicolas Barros and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 
1565180801 (paper). 
V.5 Human Rights, Solidarity and Subsidiarity: Essays towards a Social 
Ontology. Carlos E.A. Maldonado. ISBN 1565181107 (paper). 
V.6 A New World: A Perspective from Ibero America. H. Daniel Dei, ed. 
ISBN 9781565182639 (paper). 
 
Series VI. Foundations of Moral Education 
 
VI.1 Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Devel-
opment: Act and Agent. G. McLean and F. Ellrod, eds. ISBN 156518001-
1 (paper); ISBN 1565180003 (cloth). 
VI.2 Psychological Foundations for Moral Education and Character 
Development: An Integrated Theory of Moral Development. R. Knowles, 
ed. ISBN 156518002X (paper); 156518003-8 (cloth). 
VI.3 Character Development in Schools and Beyond. Kevin Ryan and 
Thomas Lickona, eds. ISBN 1565180593 (paper); 156518058-5 (cloth). 
VI.4 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. 
Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth). 
VI.5 Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development. 
Tran van Doan, ed. ISBN 1565180321 (paper); 156518033 (cloth). 
VI.6 Love as the Foundation of Moral Education and Character 
Development. Luis Ugalde, Nicolas Barros and George F. McLean, eds. 
ISBN 1565180801 (paper). 
 
Series VII. Seminars on Culture and Values 
 
VII.1 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. 
Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth). 
VII.2 Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America. Raul Molina 
and Timothy Ready, eds. ISBN 0819173576 (paper); 0819173568 (cloth). 
VII.3 Relations between Cultures. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 
1565180089 (paper); 1565180097 (cloth). 
VII.4 Moral Imagination and Character Development: Volume I, The 
Imagination. George F. McLean and John A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN 
1565181743 (paper). 
258           Publications 
VII.5 Moral Imagination and Character Development: Volume II, Moral 
Imagination in Personal Formation and Character Development. George 
F. McLean and Richard Knowles, eds. ISBN 1565181816 (paper). 
VII.6 Moral Imagination and Character Development: Volume III, 
Imagination in Religion and Social Life. George F. McLean and John K. 
White, eds. ISBN 1565181824 (paper). 
VII.7 Hermeneutics and Inculturation. George F. McLean, Antonio Gallo, 
Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565181840 (paper). 
VII.8 Culture, Evangelization, and Dialogue. Antonio Gallo and Robert 
Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565181832 (paper). 
VII.9 The Place of the Person in Social Life. Paul Peachey and John A. Krom-
kowski, eds. ISBN 1565180127 (paper); 156518013-5 (cloth). 
VII.10 Urbanization and Values. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 
1565180100 (paper); 1565180119 (cloth). 
VII.11 Freedom and Choice in a Democracy, Volume I: Meanings of 
Freedom. Robert Magliola and John Farrelly, eds. ISBN 1565181867 
(paper). 
VII.12 Freedom and Choice in a Democracy, Volume II: The Difficult 
Passage to Freedom. Robert Magliola and Richard Khuri, eds. ISBN 
1565181859 (paper). 
VII.13 Cultural Identity, Pluralism and Globalization (2 volumes). John P. 
Hogan, ed. ISBN 1565182170 (paper). 
VII.14 Democracy: In the Throes of Liberalism and Totalitarianism. George 
F. McLean, Robert Magliola and William Fox, eds. ISBN 1565181956 
(paper). 
VII.15 Democracy and Values in Global Times: With Nigeria as a Case 
Study. George F. McLean, Robert Magliola and Joseph Abah, eds. ISBN 
1565181956 (paper). 
VII.16 Civil Society and Social Reconstruction. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN 
1565180860 (paper). 
VII.17 Civil Society: Who Belongs? William A. Barbieri, Robert Magliola 
and Rosemary Winslow, eds. ISBN 1565181972 (paper). 
VII.18 The Humanization of Social Life: Theory and Challenges. Christopher 
Wheatley, Robert P. Badillo, Rose B. Calabretta and Robert Magliola, 
eds. ISBN 1565182006 (paper). 
VII.19 The Humanization of Social Life: Cultural Resources and Historical 
Responses. Ronald S. Calinger, Robert P. Badillo, Rose B. Calabretta, 
Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565182006 (paper). 
VII.20 Religious Inspiration for Public Life: Religion in Public Life, Volume 
I. George F. McLean, John A. Kromkowski and Robert Magliola, eds. 
ISBN 1565182103 (paper). 
VII.21 Religion and Political Structures from Fundamentalism to Public 
Service: Religion in Public Life, Volume II. John T. Ford, Robert A. 
Destro and Charles R. Dechert, eds. ISBN 1565182111 (paper). 
VII.22 Civil Society as Democratic Practice. Antonio F. Perez, Semou Pathé 
Gueye, Yang Fenggang, eds. ISBN 1565182146 (paper). 
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VII.23 Ecumenism and Nostra Aetate in the 21st Century. George F. McLean 
and John P. Hogan, eds. ISBN 1565182197 (paper). 
VII.24 Multiple Paths to God: Nostra Aetate: 40 years Later. John P. Hogan 
and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565182200 (paper). 
VII.25 Globalization and Identity. Andrew Blasko, Taras Dobko, Pham Van 
Duc and George Pattery, eds. ISBN 1565182200 (paper). 
VII.26 Communication across Cultures: The Hermeneutics of Cultures and 
Religions in a Global Age. Chibueze C. Udeani, Veerachart Nimanong, 
Zou Shipeng and Mustafa Malik, eds. ISBN: 9781565182400 (paper). 
VII.27 Symbols, Cultures and Identities in a Time of Global Interaction. 
Paata Chkheidze, Hoang Thi Tho and Yaroslav Pasko, eds. ISBN 
9781565182608 (paper). 
VII.28 Restorying the 'Polis': Civil Society as Narrative Reconstruction. 
Yuriy Pochta, Gan Chunsong and David Kaulemu, eds. ISNB 
9781565183124 (paper).  
VII.29 History and Cultural Identity: Retrieving the Past, Shaping the Future. 
John P. Hogan, ed. ISBN 9781565182684 (paper). 
VII.30 Human Nature: Stable and/or Changing? John P. Hogan, ed. ISBN 
9781565182431 (paper). 
VII.31 Reasoning in Faith: Cultural Foundations for Civil Society and 
Globalization. Octave Kamwiziku Wozol, Sebastian Velassery and Jurate 
Baranova, eds. ISBN 9781565182868 (paper). 
VII.32 Building Community in a Mobile/Global Age: Migration and 
Hospitality. John P. Hogan, Vensus A. George and Corazon T. Toralba, 
eds. ISBN 9781565182875 (paper). 
VII.33 The Role of Religions in the Public-Sphere: The Post-Secular Model 
of Jürgen Habermas and Beyond. Plamen Makariev and Vensus A. 
George, eds. ISBN 9781565183049 (paper). 
VII.34 Diversity and Unity. George F. McLean, Godé Iwele and Angelli F. 
Tugado, eds. ISBN 9781565183117 (paper). 
 
Series VIII. Christian Philosophical Studies 
 
VIII.1 Church and People: Disjunctions in a Secular Age, Christian 
Philosophical Studies, I. Charles Taylor, José Casanova and George F. 
McLean, eds. ISBN9781565182745 (paper). 
VIII.2 God’s Spirit in the World: Ecumenical and Cultural Essays, Christian 
Philosophical Studies, II. Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN 9781565182738 
(paper). 
VIII.3 Philosophical Theology and the Christian Traditions: Russian and 
Western Perspectives, Christian Philosophical Studies, III. David 
Bradshaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182752 (paper). 
VIII.4 Ethics and the Challenge of Secularism: Christian Philosophical 
Studies, IV. David Bradshaw, ed. ISBN 9781565182806 (paper). 
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VIII.5 Freedom for Faith: Theological Hermeneutics of Discovery based on 
George F. McLean’s Philosophy of Culture: Christian Philosophical 
Studies, V. John M. Staak. ISBN 9781565182837 (paper). 
VIII.6 Humanity on the Threshold: Religious Perspective on 
Transhumanism: Christian Philosophical Studies, VI. John C. Haughey 
and Ilia Delio, eds. ISBN 9781565182882 (paper). 
VIII.7 Faith and Secularization: A Romanian Narrative: Christian 
Philosophical Studies, VII. Wilhelm Dancă, ed. ISBN 9781565182929 
(paper). 
VIII.8 Towards a Kenotic Vision of Authority in the Catholic Church: 
Christian Philosophical Studies, VIII. Anthony J. Carroll, Marthe 
Kerkwijk, Michael Kirwan and James Sweeney, eds. ISBN 
9781565182936 (paper). 
VIII.9 The Spirit: The Cry of the World: Christian Philosophical Studies, IX. 
Waclaw Hryniewicz. ISBN 9781565182943 (paper). 
VIII.10 A Czech Perspective on Faith in a Secular Age: Christian 
Philosophical Studies, X. Tomáš Halík and Pavel Hošek, eds. ISBN 
9781565183001 (paper). 
VIII.11 A Catholic Minority Church in a World of Seekers: Christian 
Philosophical Studies, X. Staf Hellemans and Peter Jonkers, eds. ISBN 
9781565183018 (paper). 
VIII.12 Dilemmas of the Catholic Church in Poland: Christian Philosophical 
Studies, XII. Tadeusz Buksinski, ed. ISBN 9781565183025 (paper). 
VIII.13 Secularization and Development of Religion in Modern Society: 
Christian Philosophical Studies, XIII. Leon Dyczewski, ed. ISBN 
9781565183032 (paper). 
VIII.14 Plural Spiritualities: North American Experience:  Christian 
Philosophical Studies, XIV. Robert J. Schreiter, ed. ISBN 9781565183056 
(paper). 
VIII.15 Seekers or Dwellers: The Social Character of Religion in Hungary: 
Christian Philosophical Studies, XV. Zsuzsanna Bögre, ed. ISBN 
9781565183063 (paper). 
VIII.16 French Catholics and Their Church: Pluralism and Deregulation: 
Christian Philosophical Studies, XVI. Nicolas de Bremond d’Ars and 
Yann Raison du Cleuziou, eds. ISBN 9781565183087 (paper). 
VIII.17 Chinese Spirituality and Christian Communities: A Kenosis 
Perspective: Christian Philosophical Studies, XVII. Vincent Shen, ed. 
ISBN 9781565183070 (paper). 
VIII.18 Care of Self and Meaning of Life: Asian and Christian Reflections: 
Christian Philosophical Studies, XVIII. William Sweet and Cristal Huang, 
ed. ISBN 9781565183131 (paper). 
VIII.19 Religion and Culture in the Process of Global Change: Portuguese 
Perspectives: Christian Philosophical Studies, XIX. José Tolentino 
Mendonça, Alfredo Teixeira and Alexandre Palma, eds. ISBN 
9781565183148 (paper). 
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VIII.20 Seekers and Dwellers: Plurality and Wholeness in a Time of 
Secularity: Christian Philosophical Studies, XX. Philip J. Rossi, ed. ISBN 
9781565183155, (paper). 
 
The International Society for Metaphysics 
 
ISM.1 Person and Nature. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 
0819170267 (paper); 0819170259 (cloth). 
ISM.2 Person and Society. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 
0819169250 (paper); 0819169242 (cloth). 
ISM.3 Person and God. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 
0819169382 (paper); 0819169374 (cloth). 
ISM.4 The Nature of Metaphysical Knowledge. George F. McLean and Hugo 
Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819169277 (paper); 0819169269 (cloth). 
ISM.5 Philosophhical Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization. Oliva 
Blanchette, Tomonobu Imamichi and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 
1565181298 (paper). 
ISM.6 The Dialogue of Cultural Traditions: Global Perspective. William 
Sweet, George F. McLean, Tomonobu Imamichi, Safak Ural, O. Faruk 
Akyol, eds. ISBN 9781565182585 (paper). 
ISM.7 Philosophy Emerging from Culture. William Sweet, George F. 
McLean, Oliva Blanchette, Wonbin Park, eds. ISBN 9781565182851 
(paper). 
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